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

THE

BEGINNINGS OF CHRISTIANITY.

I shall find my way to
you soon.

Very truly yours,
Geo. P. Fisher

Prof. Wm. Warfield

Newark Dec. 12th 1887

My Dear Professor Marsh,

Thank you for your note.
I expect to take the train
which is set down to
leave New York at 4.30
P.M., and to reach
Princeton Junction at 6.03.
But do not think it
necessary to meet me.

THE

Rev B Warfield
Allegheny Penn 1879.

BEGINNINGS OF CHRISTIANITY

WITH A

VIEW OF THE STATE OF THE ROMAN WORLD AT THE BIRTH OF CHRIST.

BY

GEORGE P. FISHER, D. D.

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AUTHOR OF "ESSAYS ON THE SUPERNATURAL ORIGIN OF CHRISTIANITY,"
"THE REFORMATION," ETC.

NEW YORK:
SCRIBNER, ARMSTRONG & CO.
1877.

Πάντες γὰρ ἄνθρωποι περὶ θεῶν ἔχουσιν ὑπόληψιν.

ARISTOTLE, *de Cœlo*, I. 3.

Aliud est de silvestri cacumine videre patriam pacis . . . et aliud tenere viam illuc ducentem.

AUGUSTINE, *Confess.*, VII., xxi.

Salvation is of the Jews.

JOHN iv. 20.

We have this treasure in earthen vessels, that the excellency of the power may be of God and not of us.

II COR. iv. 7.

GRANT, FAIRES & RODGERS,
ELECTROTYPERS AND PRINTERS,
PHILADELPHIA.

TO

EDWARDS AMASA PARK

AS A TOKEN OF RESPECT FOR HIS SERVICES

IN PROMOTING THEOLOGICAL SCIENCE

AND OF GRATITUDE FOR PERSONAL KINDNESS

THIS WORK IS DEDICATED

BY THE AUTHOR.

PREFACE.

In this volume—which is founded on a Course of Lectures delivered at the Lowell Institute, in Boston, in February and March, 1876—I have undertaken, first, to describe the ancient Roman world, including both Heathen and Jewish Society, into which Christianity entered, and in which it first established itself; secondly, to examine the New Testament documents from which our knowledge of the beginnings of the Christian religion must be derived; and thirdly, to discuss some of the most important topics connected with the Life of Jesus and the Apostolic Age. The title given to the Lectures was the "Rise of Christianity and its Historical Environment," the last term being borrowed from the students of natural science; but finding that this title, although a good equivalent for my own conception, needed explanation, I have exchanged it for one expressed in plainer words.

Under the first of the heads above named, in addition to the preparation for Christianity which was furnished, in a more external way, by the unification of mankind under the Roman Empire, I have dwelt upon the less familiar but more deeply interesting branch of the topic—the mental and moral preparation for the Gospel, which was partly the result of the Roman polity, but which flowed, also, from the entire development of the ancient religion and philosophy. I should be glad to inspire my readers with the interest which I feel in this portion of the subject, especially in tracing the affinities between the noblest products of the poetry and philosophy of Antiquity and the Christian faith. The best of the Fathers

discerned so clearly the peculiarity of the Gospel, and the short-comings of Philosophy even in its best estate, that they did not fear to recognize the large measure of truth which heathen sages had embodied in their writings. Justin Martyr tells us that Christ was known in part to Socrates, he being enlightened by the Word.[1] Augustine was roused from sensuality and ambition by "the incredible ardor" which was kindled in his mind by a passage in the "Hortensius" of Cicero on the worth and dignity of philosophy, and burned, as he says, "to remount from earthly things to God."[2] He affirms that Christianity is as old as the creation.[3] He speaks very often of the near approach of Platonism to Christian doctrine;[4] yet he does not find in the Platonic writings a way of salvation: "No one hears Christ call, in these books—'Come unto me all ye that labor.'"[5] When we pass within the circle of Revealed Religion, and mark the divine training of the Hebrew People, in its successive stages, we understand how it is true that "Salvation is of the Jews." In the introductory chapter, I have dealt with this topic, and have illustrated the manner in which, as I conceive, the gradually developing character of Revelation contains a solution of moral difficulties in the Old Testament.

In the second division of the work, I have to take the reader into the field of New Testament criticism. It is necessary to investigate the origin and credibility of the New Testament histories, in the light of modern researches and controversies.[6] I must leave it to others to judge of the degree of candor and thoroughness with which the investigations under this head have been pursued. No one who has kept up with the German literature in this province can fail to have observed that the

[1] Apol. ii. 10. [2] Confess., iii. 7. [3] Retractt., I. xiii. 3.
[4] E. g., de vera Religione, 3. [5] Confess., vii. 27.
[6] In a former work, (*Essays on the Supernatural Origin of Christianity*, 1865; 3d ed., 1870), some of these questions were considered. In the present volume nothing is reproduced from that work; but I have taken the liberty occasionally to refer to it for a more full discussion of certain special topics.

ground taken by the Tübingen school respecting the "tendency," or theological bias, of the first two Gospels, and of the writings of Luke, is not now maintained by critics of an independent spirit, such as Reuss, Holtzmann, and Mangold. Is it too much to believe that a similar retrogression may be expected in the case of the Fourth Gospel? The two great critical questions are the credibility of the Acts, and the authorship of this Gospel. On the first of these questions, as it appears to me, the most enlightened criticism is moving steadily towards a general recognition of the trustworthiness of Luke. Respecting the Fourth Gospel, there are no present signs of an approaching unanimity of judgment. For one, I cannot bring myself to believe that this Gospel was manufactured by a Christian believer early in the second century, and palmed off on the churches of Asia where John had lived and died. For the attempt of Keim and Scholten to drive the Apostle out of Asia can only be considered as a desperate expedient to escape a conclusion which seems inevitable from the fact of his having lived and taught there. While I reject the extreme positions of the Tübingen school, I should be the last to deny that, directly or indirectly, by its agency, and especially by the labors of the late Dr. Baur, a flood of light has been thrown upon the New Testament period. What life and movement there was in the Apostolic age! What momentous questions were agitated among the Apostles themselves! What a progress of doctrine among them! And how wide of the mark, in many particulars, is the popular apprehension of the opening era!

After having formed a judgment of the character and value of the original documents, the way is open for the consideration of certain main points in the life and ministry of Jesus, together with the leading events in the Apostolic age. The chapters under this head conclude with a description of the characteristic features of early Christianity.

In prosecuting the studies, the results of which are included in this volume, I have resorted to the primary sources; and I

venture to hope that, here and there, especially in the part relating to the New Testament writings and their contents, I have been able to set forth some points in a somewhat clearer light than has been done heretofore. Where I have been assisted by the labors of others, it is little to say that I have exercised an independent judgment, and have tested statements and opinions by the evidence on which they claim to rest. I wish, however, to give full credit to the modern writers to whom I am most indebted. Upon the Greek religion I am under large obligations to the excellent treatises of Nägelsbach on the Homeric and Post-homeric Theology.[1] Although I have been guided by him, to a considerable extent, even in the order of topics, yet it is proper to say that in almost all cases, the illustrative passages from the ancient authors were selected by myself, in my own reading.[2] Upon the history of the Jews, and their social and religious life, I must, first, gratefully own my indebtedness to Ewald. His faults—his arrogant temper in relation to other scholars, and the dogmatic tone in which unverified conjectures are put on a level with demonstrated truth — lie on the surface, and are patent to all. But not less obvious are his profound and exact learning, with which is blended a rare ability to seize on comprehensive points of view, and, I will add, his unaffected piety. I have derived aid from the recent German works on the contemporary history of the times of Christ. Hausrath I have consulted with profit, although I differ widely from his critical views; but the condensed, lucid, and

[1] Die homerische Theologie in ihrem Zusammenhange dargestellt, von Carl Friedrich Nägelsbach, 1840. Die nachhomerische Theologie des griechisch. Volks-glaubens bis auf Alexander, dargestellt von Dr. Karl Friedrich Nägelsbach, Prof. d. Philolog. zu Erlangen. 1857.

[2] The extracts from Homer are given from Mr. Bryant's translation; those from Æschylus and Sophocles from the translations by Mr. Plumptre; and the passages from Plato are cited from Prof. Jowett's version (the ed. in 4 vols., 1861). But I have usually given the original text of the ancient authors, for the benefit of those who prefer to translate for themselves.

thorough work of Schürer,[1] which confines itself to the Jews, I have found of great service. Derenbourg, among others, has supplied me with information from Rabbinical sources. Gfrörer has been useful upon the subject of the Jewish Theology in the time of Christ. I have not neglected the modern Hebrew scholars, Jost, Grätz, Herzfeld, Geiger, and others. On various points of Jewish history I have referred with advantage to Milman, and to the graphic pages of Stanley. As to Roman customs and manners, I owe most to the compact and well-digested treatise of Friedländer.[2] Although I cannot always follow him to the full extent, in his judgments respecting ancient society, where they depart from the usual opinions, I have drawn freely from the invaluable store of facts which he has collected. As regards the Reforms of Augustus, the work of M. Boissier on the Roman Religion from Augustus to the Antonines, has been of advantage. The *Histoire des Theories et des Idées Morales dans l'Antiquité*, of M. Denis, has brought to my attention certain aspects of this subject which, without its aid, I might have overlooked. When a student in Germany I translated, and published in an American Journal,[3] an Essay of Neander on the Relation of Grecian to Christian ethics.[4] That Essay, more than anything else, has stimulated me to the study of Greek Philosophy in this particular relation, and some of its thoughts will no doubt be found in the chapter on that subject.

With respect to the critical discussions upon the New Testament books, and upon the early Christian history, I have not undertaken to make references to the copious literature any farther than was absolutely needful. It seemed undesirable to do

[1] Lehrbuch d. Neutestamentl. Zeitgeschichte, von Dr. Emil Schürer, A. o. Prof. d. Theol. zu Leipzig. 1874.

[2] Darstellungen aus d. Sittengeschichte Roms in d. Zeit von August bis zum Ausgang d. Antonine. Von Ludwig Friedländer, Professor in Königsberg. Th. i. (ed. 4), 1873; Th. ii. (ed. 3), 1874; Th. iii. (1871).

[3] Bibliotheca Sacra, vol. x.

[4] Wissenchaftl. Abhandlungen, von Dr. August Neander, pp. 140–214. (1851.)

more in this direction, as I have written, not for scholars and ministers alone, but also for the cultivated public who are interested in such inquiries. Besides, the best works on the Introduction to the New Testament supply this information, and the student has access to the accurate and exhaustive bibliographical Articles of Professor Abbot, in the American edition of Smith's Bible Dictionary. It gives me pleasure to express the obligations I am under to the writings of Professor Lightfoot. The frequent references which I have naturally been led to make to them, indicate better than any words of eulogy can do, my appreciation of the scholarship, candor, and critical tact which characterize them. Those who have long been accustomed to look to the Germans to lead the way in these studies must hail with peculiar satisfaction the appearance, in our own language, of works of so high merit. The writings of Lightfoot, Westcott, Ellicott, Jowett, Stanley, Discussions like those of Mr. Hutton and of Mr. Sanday upon the Fourth Gospel, even the Essays of Matthew Arnold, unsatisfactory as many of the opinions expressed in them may be, and the anonymous work entitled "Supernatural Religion," which reproduces the most extreme theories of the Tübingen School, all indicate that the barren age of English Theology, in the department of Criticism, is fast drawing to a close.

It remains for me to make my grateful acknowledgments to my friends, Mr. W. L. Kingsley, and Professor L. R. Packard of Yale College, for the assistance which they have given me while this volume has been passing through the press.

NEW HAVEN, September, 1877.

CONTENTS.

CHAPTER II.

THE ROMAN EMPIRE AS A PREPARATION FOR CHRISTIANITY.

"THE coming of Jesus Christ is the providential justification of the conquering policy of the Senate."[1] The close relation of the Roman Empire to Christianity has not failed to strike thoughtful minds of whatever creed. A stern spirit, a hard, unrelenting policy, marked the steps of Roman conquest. To spare the submissive and war down the proud—*parcere subjectis et debellare superbos*[2]—was the recognized maxim; but in practice the Romans not seldom fell below the measure of humanity dictated by this rule. There were flagrant crimes against civilization, like the destruction of the great commercial cities of Carthage and Corinth, and the enslaving of their inhabitants. Yet in the course of events that built up the stupendous and long-enduring fabric of Roman dominion, even the Christian Fathers who reprobated those crimes, discerned a providential purpose.[3]

Circumstances favored the growth of Roman power. Had Alexander the Great lived to carry his arms westward, the issues of history might have been wholly altered. Had Greece not fallen politically and morally, and had the kingdoms of the East not sunk into decrepitude, the subjugation of these countries might have been impossible, and Rome might have been stopped in her career of conquest.

[1] Laurent, *Rome*, p. 8. [2] Virgil, *Æn.* VI. 483.
[3] Augustine, *de Civit. Dei*, v. 12, 15 seq.

But after Carthage, her great rival, had been crushed, there was no other people that had the energy requisite to withstand her progress to universal empire.

So extended was the sway of Rome, and so deep were its foundations, that it seemed incapable of overthrow, and came to be regarded as a part of the fixed order of things, on a level with the unalterable system of nature. Some of the early Fathers, therefore, looked forward to the subversion of the Roman dominion as the precursor of Antichrist, and the signal for the final catastrophe in the world's history.[1] The idea of the perpetuity of the Roman Empire entered deeply into the Christian thinking of the middle ages. That Empire was conceived of as the counterpart of the Church, securing that unity of mankind in the secular sphere, which corresponded, as a necessary condition, to their unity in things spiritual. An imperishable State was mated to an imperishable Church. Hence when Europe crystallized anew under the auspices of the Franks, it was the revived Roman Empire of which Charlemagne became the anointed head; and the same Empire was continued, in all its sacred authority, under the line of German Emperors.

While the agency of Rome in paving the way for Christianity has never been overlooked, the tendency has been to dwell too exclusively upon the external features of this preparatory work. The wide-spread peace consequent upon the subjection of so many nations to a common government, the facilities for travel and intercourse which were open to the first preachers of the Gospel, the shield thrown over them by Roman law, and other advantages of a kindred nature, have justly attracted notice. But there is another side to the influence of Rome that is even more impressive in connection with the subject before us. The ef-

[1] Tertullian, *Apol.*, 32; Lactantius, *Instt.*, vii. 19, 25.

fect of the consolidation of so large a part of mankind in one political body, in breaking up local and tribal narrowness, and in awakening what may be termed a cosmopolitan feeling, is in the highest degree interesting. The Roman dominion was the means of a mental and moral preparation for the Gospel; and this incidental effect is worthy of special note. The Kingdom of Christ proposed the unification of mankind through a spiritual bond. Whatever tended to melt down the prejudices of nation, and clan, and creed, and instil in the room of them more liberal sentiments, opened a path for the Gospel. Now we find that under the political system established by Rome, a variety of agencies co-operated to effect such a result. Powerful forces were at work whose effect was not limited to the creation of outward advantages for the dissemination of the religion of Christ, but tended to produce a more or less genial soil for its reception. We have then to embrace in one view the influence of the Roman Empire in both of these relations, in shaping outward circumstances, and in favoring a mental habit, which were propitious to the introduction of the new faith.

1. Glance at the extent and general character of the Empire established by the Romans. It stretched from the Atlantic to the Euphrates, a distance of more than three thousand miles, and from the Danube on the north, and the friths of Scotland, to the cataracts of the Nile and the African desert. All the tribes and nations inhabiting this immense territory had surrendered their independence, and were connected together in one political system. The Parthians in the far East were left unsubdued; and beyond the Rhine were the Germans whom the Romans failed to conquer, and could only repel to their native forests. There have been, and there are now, empires which cover more square miles; but the peculiarity in the case of Rome is

that she brought under her sceptre all the civilized nations of the world. And the relation of most of her provinces to the Mediterranean gave to her dominion a geographical unity. Of its entire population we have not the data for an exact estimate. It was somewhere from eighty to one hundred and twenty millions.

The Roman world—*orbis Romanus*, as the Romans proudly called it—naturally divided itself into two regions, the East and the West.[1] It was not a mere geographical line that separated them, but differences lying deep in history and in the characteristics of their inhabitants; so that subsequently, when the Empire was divided, it was not an accident that drew the line between these two grand sections.

The East comprised that portion of Western Asia which was included between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean on the west, the Caucasus on the north, the valley of the Nile on the south, and the Caspian, the Euphrates, and the deserts of Arabia on the east. Egypt was placed by the ancients in Asia, and formed a part of the Orient.

In the Isthmus between the Euxine and the Caspian, were the numerous tribes of the Caucasus, grouped in confederacies or kingdoms under the protectorate of the Romans. Mostly uncivilized, and in perpetual conflict with the Sarmatians, Scythians, and other Asiatic hordes which were already in motion, they formed the vanguard of the Empire. The Greek colonies along the coast of the Euxine served as a connecting link and a channel of commercial intercourse between the Caucasus and the East, and the civilized communities of the West. Armenia, harassed by the Arsacides, the Parthian rulers who held Babylonia and

[1] See Amedee Thierry, *Tableau de l' Empire Romain*, p. 84 seq., with the references. In the brief paragraphs which immediately follow, I am principally guided by M. Thierry's sketch.

Chaldea, received its kings from the Romans, and was reduced to a province by Trajan. In Asia Minor there was a mixture of various races. Besides the indigenous peoples, the Greeks had their ancient and flourishing cities on the sea-coast. The Thracians had made their way to the coast of Bithynia. Celtic invaders had penetrated into Phrygia, and founded there the Galatian kingdom. A branch of the Syrian race had planted itself in Cappadocia. And, after the expedition of Alexander, all these different nations were mingled with occidental Greeks.

From the shores of the Halys eastward to the Tigris, and from the mountains of Caucasus on the north to the Arabian gulf, were spread the different branches of the Semitic race. On the north and extending to the Euphrates were the Syrians; in Palestine were the Hebrews, and upon the Tyrian coast the Phœnicians; in Babylon were the Chaldeans; while the nomadic Arab tribes roamed over the peninsula of Arabia and the plains of Mesopotamia. From the neighborhood of the Tigris, stretching toward the East, were the Persian dialects and nations. In the time of Augustus, the Roman boundary was the Euphrates. Arabia was still independent.

The native Egyptian race remained unmoved in its traditions, its social organization, and its religion; but in a few cities, of which Alexandria was the chief, under the auspices of the Ptolemies, Greek civilization attained to a flourishing development. Greece, which was considered to belong to the East, where it eventually fell at the division of the Empire, had nothing to boast of, save its glories in the past.

The primitive inhabitants of the African coast of the Mediterranean had belonged to one race, but had been divided into two aggregations or confederacies of tribes. West of the Lybian nations, along the whole coast as far as the

ocean, the Moors or Numidians had established themselves, whom tradition had traced to Western Asia as their prior home. Upon these barbarous peoples had come in the Greeks, who planted themselves about Cyrene, and the Carthaginians who made their abode in Carthage and its dependencies. Malta and Sardinia attached themselves to Carthaginian civilization, but Sicily was essentially Greek. The fierce and warlike Iberians, the primitive inhabitants of Spain, whose territory was fringed by Carthaginian and Greek settlements, after yielding to the Romans, not only learned military discipline from their conquerors, but developed a taste for letters. Over Gaul and Britain were spread the Celtic race, with its various branches, of which we have so full a description in the Commentaries of Cæsar. The Romans generally included under the term Illyricum the lands situated between Switzerland, Italy, and the Danube, and the confines of Greece and Macedonia; lands inhabited by a multitude of petty nations, only a portion of whom had adopted, in any considerable measure, the arts of civilization. Thrace felt the beneficial effect of its contiguity to Asia, and to the Greek cities, especially Byzantium.

The provinces into which the Roman world was divided were separated by Augustus (B. C. 27) into the proconsular, under the rule of the Senate, and the imperial, which were governed by the lieutenants of the Emperor. In these last were placed the standing armies. In the Senatorial provinces, the Emperor's authority, when he was present in person, superseded that of the proconsuls. In truth, the rule of the Senate within its own provinces was little more than nominal. Spain was divided into three provinces, of which the largest, Tarragona, in the north and east, and Lusitania, embracing the principal part of modern Portugal, were imperial, while Bætica, which corresponds pretty

nearly to the present Andalusia, with Seville and Granada, was under the Senate. Of the provinces into which Gaul was divided, Gallia Lugdunensis—so called from the flourishing colony of Lyons—and Belgica, lying beyond the Seine, with Aquitania, which extended from the Atlantic Ocean to the Rhone, were imperial, while Gallia Narbonensis, or Languedoc and Provence, was senatorial. Upper and Lower Germany, stretching from Basle to Leyden, on the west bank of the Rhine, were not constituted into provinces until later. They fell into the imperial class. Britain, also, was conquered, and became an imperial province in A. D. 43; comprising England, Wales, and the Lowlands of Scotland as far as the Friths. The other imperial provinces, under Augustus, were Rhœtia and Vindelicia, stretching from the top of the Alps to the Danube, and eastward to its junction with the Inn; Noricum, a battle-ground for the Roman legions and their German enemies; Pannonia, east of Noricum, embracing modern Hungary and portions of Austria; Mœsia, whose barbarous inhabitants occupied the territory which is now known as Servia and Bulgaria, and which, with Pannonia, included the whole right bank of the Danube, from Vienna to the Black Sea; and, in the East, Cilicia, Syria, Egypt. Dacia, on the north of the Danube, was not incorporated among the imperial provinces until its conquest in the time of Trajan (A. D. 107). Under the sway of the Senate, besides Sicily, Sardinia and Corsica, of which, however, the last, together with Dalmatia on the east of the Adriatic, were subsequently allotted to the Emperor, were Gallia Narbonensis, or Languedoc and Provence, Bætica or South Spain, Dalmatia, Achaia, Macedonia, Cyprus, Bithynia, and Pontus, or the land south-west of the Black Sea, Asia—that is, the portion of Asia Minor to the west of Mt. Taurus and the River Halys, Crete, with Cyrenaica, or the northern coast of

Africa, which is now divided between Egypt and Tripoli; Africa—that is, the main part of the ancient Carthaginian territory as far as the boundary of Mauretania between Cirta and Sitifis, now Constantine and Setif, in Algiers. Eastern and Southern Spain, the oldest of these provinces, with the exception of Sicily, had been conquered about the middle of the sixth century after the foundation of the city; the youngest, Egypt, Mœsia, Pannonia, were annexed to the Empire as the fruit of the victory over Mark Antony; Pannonia not being constituted a province until A. D. 10. Italy, of which Augustus fixed the Northern boundary at the Var, was governed, not by a proconsul, but by the civil officers of its own colonies and municipalities; and was divided for administrative purposes into eleven regions or circles.[1] There were districts under direct imperial control, which had not a regular provincial organization, but might be governed, like the Alpine districts, and Judea, by Procurators, or, in the case of Egypt, by a Prefect.

Rome did not make the first experiment towards the unification of mankind in a political form,—the only form in which the ancients could conceive of such a union. There had arisen a series of great Empires, extending back to the dawn of authentic history. First, Egypt, then the earlier kingdom of Babylon, then the Assyrian Empire, then the later Babylonian kingdom, had each of them collected multitudes of men under the sway of a single master. These colossal despotisms, notwithstanding the oppression and cruelty that belonged to them, were necessary to the rise of civilization. They put an end to the isolation of

[1] On the division of the Empire into provinces, see Marquardt in the *Handb. d. röm Alterthümer*, Vol. iv. (1873); especially the table, p. 330 seq. See, also, Von Reumont, *Gesch. d. Stadt Rom.* i. 217, and Merivale, *Hist. of the Romans*, i. 122.

warring tribes. They brought men together in peaceful intercourse, within walled towns. There, since the arts of defence always kept in advance of the means of attack, the fruits of industry could be stored up, and the conditions of society were fitted in some degree to stimulate invention and discovery. Yet under these old conquering powers, men were welded together in a mass; the individual counted for nothing. With the rise of the Persian monarchy, dominion was transferred from the Semitic to the Aryan family. The Persians in many things anticipated the Romans. Great roads, for example, bound together the different parts of their Empire. Herodotus describes the grand highway stretching from Susa, the capital, to Sardes near the western coast of Asia Minor; along whose whole length of 1,500 miles, were placed, at short intervals, government stations, and fine caravansaries for travellers, and which was traversed by the couriers of the Great King, riding by post, in five or six days.[1]

But the nations subject to the Persian dominion were not assimilated. It was a conglomerate of tributary peoples, with no approach to an organic union among them. The Greeks attached a moral value to the individual; through them a government of laws superseded the will of a despot, philosophy arose, and liberty and culture were appreciated. Yet the Greeks, notwithstanding their political talent, were driven by circumstances to organize themselves in small communities. Their states were municipal. Their confederacies were loosely bound together, and easily dissolved. The allies of Athens were so harshly treated that they deserted her in the time of her deepest distress, and left her to be crushed by her enemies; while the wisdom of Roman policy was manifest in the continued fidelity of the Latin allies in the great crisis of the struggle with

[1] Hist. v. 52 seq.

Hannibal. The empire of the Macedonian conqueror fell to pieces at his death. It perished with its founder. He spread the Greek language in the East, and with it a tinge of Hellenic culture; but he founded no united dominion co-extensive with his conquests. Rome, on the contrary, which properly succeeded to the work of Alexander, moved forward with a slower but sure advance, and held whatever she won, not solely or chiefly by the iron grasp of military power, but rather by a sagacious policy which, without sweeping away local customs and laws, aimed to dissolve former political bonds, and to establish stronger ligaments of connection with herself. Through her colonial system she established bodies of trustworthy supporters in the very heart of the communities that she annexed.

Rome did not begin, like the Greek cities, in the subjugation of one race by a stronger which trampled under foot the subject population. In the Palatine settlement there was a combination of different tribes and races on a footing of equality, and it furnished an open asylum to fugitives of all sorts. A distinction of classes, and an aristocracy arose, and the exclusiveness of the Patrician order increased after the expulsion of the kings. But within the walls of the city, the Plebeians gained, step by step, the concessions which at last broke down all the barriers of privilege. In the treatment of allies without, there was an analogous growth of liberality. The inhabitants of certain towns—municipia—were granted the rights of Roman citizenship. Citizenship became not a local but a personal distinction. It embraced certain private rights, and certain political rights; these last being principally the right of suffrage, and eligibleness to office. One possessed of the full prerogatives of a citizen, wherever his abode might be, could present himself at Rome and take part in the elections.

He belonged to a great fraternity—the civitas—actuated by common ideas, and taking pride in the possession of peculiar immunities and powers. The privileges involved in citizenship might be conferred on foreigners, in whole or in part. Not unfrequently upon Latin towns the private rights —for example, the right of commerce or of marriage with Romans—were bestowed, without the grant of political rights. Thus there grew up in connection with the Roman hegemony in Latium, a legal system—the *jus Latii*—which defined the rights and privileges of these more favored cities; and a similar system—the *jus Italicum* —with reference to the Italic communities, which were favored, though in a less degree than the Latin towns.[1] The struggle for equality on the part of the Latins and Italians resulted, in the end, in the communication of the rights of citizenship to all these allies. This advantage was gained by the Latins B. C. 90, by the Lex Julia, as the fruit of the Social War, and was soon after extended to the Italians. The territories outside of Italy, which were subject to Rome, were either provinces, free or confederated cities, or allied kingdoms. The *jus Italicum*, and sometimes the *jus Latii*, was conferred upon cities, here and there, beyond the bounds of Italy. The tendency of historical changes was to diffuse abroad the privileges connected with citizenship. This tendency was strengthened by the conversion of the Republic into the Empire. Cæsar had sedulously befriended the provinces, and in the civil war found in them his strongest support. By his victory, the democratic party of which Caius Gracchus may be considered the principal founder, and which Marius had afterwards led, gained the ascendency, and the ruling oligarchy fell from power. It has been questioned whether Cæsar

[1] Upon the *Jus Latii* and the *Jus Italicum*, see Walter, *Gesch. d. röm Rechts*, pp. 194, 196.

had distinctly in view the political elevation of the provinces, or anything beyond their rescue from misgovernment. It is certain, however, that the party by which he was raised to power, had generally stood as the opponent of Roman exclusiveness, and that his own measures tended strongly in the same direction. The government of the world by a single city could not be perpetual. There was a constant reaction of the provinces upon Rome. A vast influx of foreigners had filled the capital with a mixed, heterogeneous populace. The spirit and policy of Cæsar were cosmopolitan. He scandalized conservative Romans by filling up the Senate with Gauls and other foreigners. He gave the suffrage to transpadane Gaul, and annexed that province to Italy. The same privilege he conferred on many communities and individuals in transalpine Gaul and in Spain. With the establishment of the Empire began a series of changes that led eventually to the granting of the rights of citizenship to all of its subjects. The tendency of the imperial system from the beginning was towards administrative uniformity, and towards the effacing of the distinction between subject and citizen. It is significant that the provinces were glad to see the rule of the Senate subverted, and the imperial government taking its place. Tacitus, speaking of the concentration of power in the hands of Augustus, says: "Neither were the provinces averse to that condition of affairs; since they mistrusted the government of the Senate and people, on account of the contentions among the great, and the avarice of the magistrates; while the protection of the laws was enfeebled and borne down by violence, intrigue, and bribery."[1] Even the worst Emperors, Nero not excepted, were sometimes not unpopular in the provinces, which felt their cruelty less than the Romans themselves, and rejoiced in their own escape from the

[1] Annal., i. 2.

tyranny and extortion of that class of Republican magistrates of whom Verres was one. The main point is that under the Emperors Rome became merely the capital, instead of the mistress, of the world. In proportion as the government was resolved into an absolute monarchy, Rome was reduced to the level of other municipalities. At length the chiefs of the State came to be taken from the provinces, and in the end from the barbarians themselves. The leveling influence of Roman absolutism, a tendency that inhered in it from the start, aided essentially in producing a sense of equality among men.

2. Deserving of special mention is the unifying influence of Roman jurisprudence.

The great system of law, the principal legacy of Rome to subsequent ages, was of gradual growth. In the middle of the 5th century B. C., the first written code, the Laws of the Twelve Tables, was composed. This continued to be an object of reverence and eulogy long after many of its provisions had become antiquated, and vast additions had been made to its meagre contents. The annual Edict of the Prætor was the principal provision for the modification and expansion of the legal system, to meet the altered state of society, and the demands of an advancing morality. When this magistrate assumed his office, he was required to set forth publicly the rules on which he proposed to proceed in administering justice; in particular the form and method of the remedies that would be open to litigants. The Edict constituted really a supplement to the established code, and a means of liberalizing as well as enlarging it. Beneficent legal fictions were introduced for the purpose of getting rid of the inconvenient formalism and unjust requirements of the ancient system. The *jus gentium* was not without its influence in effecting this amelioration. This was not a system of international law. The Romans had no

such system, and did not recognize the equality of States, on which this branch of modern law is founded. The nearest approach to international rules was furnished by the *jus feciale* which defined the customs to be used in declaring and beginning wars; but no inquisition into their justice was involved in its injunctions. The old *jus gentium* was not a rule for the intercourse of nations. It was simply the rules of proceeding in the case of sojourners not entitled to the privileges of Roman law; rules deduced by Roman officials from a comparison of their own system with that of the nations to which the class in question belonged. A common law was sought for, which could be applied to the determination of causes in which foreigners were parties. As early as 247 B. C., a special magistrate, the Prætor Peregrinus, was created to take cognizance of this class of causes. In the later days of the Republic, however, after the Stoic philosophy was naturalized at Rome, the lawyers who had imbibed its tenets, connected with the Roman Law the Stoic idea of a universal law of nature or reason, which underlies all particular codes, and is exalted above them in rank. The *jus gentium* came to be identified in this way with the *jus naturale*.[1] Cicero, in the "Commonwealth" and in the "Laws," frequently dilates upon the Natural Law, and upon the great community of gods and men, of which each single country is only a portion, or a constituent part. "This universe," he says in a passage of the last named treatise, "forms one immeasurable commonwealth and city, common alike to gods and mortals. And as in earthly States, certain particular laws, which we shall hereafter describe, govern the particular relationships of kindred tribes; so in the nature of things doth an universal law, far more magnificent and resplendent, regulate the affairs of that universal city where gods and men compose

[1] See Hadley, *Introd. to Roman Law*, p. 92.

one vast association."[1] Of law he writes in another place of the same work, that "it was neither excogitated by the genius of men, nor is it anything discovered in the progress of society; but a certain eternal principle which governs the entire universe, wisely commanding what is right, and prohibiting what is wrong."[2]

As we shall see hereafter, the doctrine of a Natural Law, the expression of general justice and reason, did not remain, in imperial times, a barren maxim. It affected to some extent the contents of the law. For example, it softened the legislation relative to slavery, and thus mitigated the relation of master and slave.

Through the Prætorian Edicts, there grew up, by the side of the old law, a more broad system of Equity. The Edict was termed perpetual, as not being subject to alteration during the term of office of the Prætor who issued it. Finally, under Hadrian, a Perpetual Edict was composed or compiled by Salvius Julianus, which was to be open to no further increase in the future.[3] Through the labors of jurisconsults from about 100 B. C., this great body of supplementary laws was reduced to a scientific form.

The Roman Law was for Roman citizens alone. For example, a sojourner at Rome, or a provincial in his own

[1] —ut jam universus hic mundus una civitas communis deorum atque hominum existimanda; et quod in civitatibus ratione quadam, de qua dicetur idoneo loco, agnationibus familiarum distinguuntur status, id in rerum natura tanto est magnificentius, tantoque præclarius, ut homines deorum agnatione et gente teneantur. De Legibus, L. i. 7.

[2] —legem neque hominum ingeniis excogitatum, nec scitum aliquod esse populorum, sed æternum quiddam, quod universum mundum regeret, imperandi prohibendique sapientia. Leges, L. ii. 4.

[3] This is Mr. Maine's view of the controverted question as to the nature of the work done by Julianus. See *Ancient Law*, pp. 61, 63, and Prof. Dwight's remarks, p. xxv. (Am. ed., 1877); also, Phillimore's *Roman Private Law*, p. 53. Compare, however, Wenck's note in Smith's Gibbon, i. 268, and Merivale, *Hist. of the Romans*, vii. 426.

home, could not have the aid of the Roman magistrate in enforcing the father's authority — the *patria potestas* — which was so fundamental a feature of the Roman code. And the same was true of all the rights and immunities which were inseparable from citizenship. But wherever there was a citizen, this law was operative. Hence in the colonies everywhere, justice was administered according to its provisions. This, however, was far from being the limit of its operation. The governors of provinces issued edicts analogous to those issued by the prætors. In these, they proclaimed the rules and methods by which they would abide in the administration of justice. While the local laws and customs were left in force, especially in minor causes, the Roman law was not without a decided and increasing influence upon the programme of the prefect, and upon the whole judicial administration of the provinces.[1] This was more likely to be the case as the Edict would often be prepared at Rome, and under the advice of lawyers. As the bounds of citizenship were extended, the sphere of the Roman law was, of course, correspondingly widened. In the period when Christianity was spreading in the Roman world, the minds of men were becoming more and more familiar with this legal system. It was one of the means of reducing to homogeneity the component parts of the Empire. The conceptions that entered into the warp and woof of this great code were insinuating themselves into the common thinking of mankind.

3. We have to refer to the assimilation of mankind in language and culture.

The monarchy that was formed under the auspices of Julius Cæsar was Romano-Hellenic in its essential character. It was not a sudden creation; the materials of it had been long in preparation. The two nations which the policy of

[1] See Walter, *Gesch. d. röm. Rechts*, p. 436.

this great statesman aimed to unite as the main component elements of the Empire, had long been acting powerfully upon one another, as well as upon the so-called barbarian peoples. The process of Romanizing and Hellenizing the nations—if these terms may be allowed—had begun centuries before. The Greeks, like the Phœnicians before them, were a maritime and colonizing people. Their cities on the Western coast of Asia Minor were founded prior to 776 B. C., when the authentic history of Greece begins. The Greek towns in Sicily, and in the South of Italy, were some of them coeval with Rome. Cumæ preceded Rome by several centuries. Greek settlements were dispersed on the islands and along the sea-coast of the Mediterranean. Marseilles was founded by Phocæan colonists. From there Greek colonies planted themselves in Spain. The Greeks early came into close intercourse with Egypt; and through them was built up the flourishing city of Cyrene. The expedition of Alexander extended far and wide the Hellenic influence. The foundation of the city of Alexandria was an event of vast moment in this direction. There a multitude of Greeks were collected, who made the place a great centre, not only of trade and manufactures, but of Hellenic philosophy and culture. At Alexandria, the streams of Jewish and Oriental thought mingled with the current of Greek speculation. Its population in the early days of the Empire was not less than one million. Recent excavations have uncovered the seven main streets, running in straight lines through the city, and the twelve other main streets that crossed them at right angles. Alexandria had an equal reputation for industry and thrift on the one hand, and for wit and learning on the other. The Museum, or Academy, and the Library, which were founded by the Ptolemies, were brilliant nurseries of scientific and literary study. Antioch, founded by Seleucus Nicator, rivalled the Egyptian

capital in grandeur, and in the number and diverse nationality of its inhabitants. Its main street extended in a straight line for four miles, and like the main street of Alexandria, was bordered on both sides by colonnades. The rivals and successors of the Tyrians and Carthaginians, the Greeks transplanted their language to every port to which their ships sailed. But the Greeks were the lettered people of antiquity. Wherever a love of knowledge and of art was awakened, there Greek books penetrated, and Greek teachers and artists were welcomed. The downfall of Greek liberty, and the political and social calamities that followed, contributed efficiently to diffuse their language and learning. The phenomena, though on a vaster scale, may remind us of what occurred before and after the capture of Constantinople by the Turks, in the fifteenth century. A multitude of Greek slaves, especially after the fall of Corinth, were brought into Italy. Roman households were filled with them. The conservative Roman spirit had at first resisted the introduction of Greek learning. Cicero refers to the prejudice of his grandfather against the study of the Greek language. Cato was for driving the embassy of Greek philosophers out of Rome. He opined the worst results from the introduction of their doctrines. There was a contest like that between the old learning and the new, which prevailed at the Renaissance. But it was vain to attempt to stem the tide of innovation. The Roman youth, if at all studious, could not be withheld from acquiring the tongue of Plato and Sophocles, from placing themselves under the tuition of Greek rhetoricians and philosophers, and even, as in the case of Cicero, from resorting to Athens for instruction. Greek was the language of commerce, and the vehicle of polite intercourse, far more even than was true of French, in Europe, in the age of Louis XIV. "Greek," says Cicero, in his Oration for Archias, "is read

in almost all nations; Latin is confined by its own boundaries, which, of a truth, are narrow."[1] "Wherever the Roman legionary went, the Greek schoolmaster, no less a conqueror in his own way, followed; at an early date we find famous teachers of the Greek language settled on the Guadalquivir, and Greek was as well taught as Latin in the institute at Osca."[2] To a vast number of Jews dwelling out of Palestine, Greek was the vernacular tongue. Two centuries and a half before Christ, the Septuagint version of the Old Testament had been made at Alexandria; and this was the Bible with which they were chiefly familiar. But the inhabitants of Palestine itself, like so many other peoples at that time, were bilingual. Their narrow strip of territory was bordered on the east and west by Greek-speaking towns. The disciples of Christ were doubtless acquainted with Greek from their childhood. When the Apostle Paul was rescued from the mob at Jerusalem by a detachment of the Roman garrison, he craved the privilege of addressing the people. When they found that he spoke to them in Hebrew—that is, Aramaic—"they were the more attentive."[3] It is implied that they would have understood him had he spoken in Greek, as they seemed to expect that he would; but their own dialect was more grateful, as well as more familiar, to their ear. An illustration of this bilingual characteristic so common at that time, is presented in Luke's account of the preaching of Paul and Barnabas at Lystra, a town of Lycaonia in Asia Minor.[4] A miracle wrought by Paul had such an effect upon the people, that they took him and his companion for gods who had come down in the form of men, identifying Barnabas with Jupiter, and Paul, as the principal speaker,

[1] Græca leguntur in omnibus fere gentibus, Latina suis finibus, exiguis sane, continentur.—PRO ARCH., 10.

[2] Mommsen, *Hist. of Rome*, iv. 641. [3] Acts xxii. 2. [4] Acts xiv. 8-19.

with Mercury. In their excitement, they called out in their own dialect—"in the speech of Lycaonia"—that the gods were with them, and forthwith made ready to pay them divine honors. Paul and his associate had not at first perceived what they would do,—not understanding their language; but as soon as the Apostles found out what was intended, they repelled the design with warmth. The discourse of the Apostles had been in Greek, which was perfectly intelligible to their auditors; but these, when moved with strong emotion, fell back upon their vernacular, which Paul and Barnabas did not comprehend. Had the Lycaonians not been familiar with Greek, the messengers of the Gospel could not have preached to them. But for the diffusion of the Greek language generally, they would have been stopped everywhere by a like insuperable barrier. Under this check, the new religion, exposed as it was to hostility on the right hand and left, might not have lived long enough to take root. Persecuted in one city, its preachers could flee to another; and they were possessed, wherever they went, of a ready vehicle of communication with the people. Greek may be said to be the language of the primitive Church, at least beyond the bounds of Palestine. The earliest Christian worship at Rome was in that tongue. It was the medium for the expression of Christian thought, the language of theology in the first age of Christianity, in the West as well as East. Of the wide-spread influence of the Greek language and culture, Döllinger writes: "The sway of Greek customs, of the Hellenic tongue, maintained and extended itself continually, from the Euphrates to the Adriatic. Like a mighty stream, rushing forward in every direction, Hellenism had there overspread all things. Even in remote Bactria, as far as the banks of the Indus, Greek was understood. Greek culture held its

ground as late as the first centuries after Christ. Parthian kings had the dramas of Euripides enacted before them. Greek rhetoric and philosophy, the Hellenic predilection for public speeches, discussions, and lectures, prevailed through the Asiatic cities." [1]

In the Roman dominions west of the Adriatic, the Latin had a corresponding prevalence. Gaul, conquered by Julius Cæsar, rapidly experienced the influence of the language and civilization of Rome. The same effect followed in Spain, and, in a greater or less degree, in all the other provinces of the West. Speaking of the age of the Antonines, Gibbon says: "The language of Virgil and Cicero, though with some inevitable mixture of corruption, was so universally adopted in Africa, Spain, Gaul, Britain, and Pannonia, that the faint traces of the Punic or Celtic idioms were present only in the mountains or among the peasants." [2] As regards Britain only, the statement needs to be essentially curtailed; respecting the other countries named, it is well sustained by proof. Nor was the influence of the Latin restricted to the Occident. Roman magistrates, wherever they were, promulgated their laws and decrees in their own tongue. It was the language of courts and of the camp. In the year 88 B. C., by the order of Mithridates, all the Romans in the cities of Asia were massacred in a single day. The number was at least forty thousand; it is made twice as large by two of the ancient writers, and Plutarch's statement is one hundred and fifty thousand. The Romans who, at all times, were found in so great numbers in the countries of the East, on errands of business, war, or pleasure, made the Latin familiar to numerous natives of those regions.

4. We have to notice briefly the means and motives of intercourse between the inhabitants of the Empire. Fried-

[1] Heidenthum u. Judenthum, p. 33. [2] Vol. i., p. 174, (Smith's ed.)

länder, in his learned discussion of this topic,[1] has pointed out that at no time down to the beginning of the present century, has it been possible to make journeys with so much ease, safety, and rapidity, as in the first centuries of the imperial era. The motives and occasions of travel were quite as various then as now. The Empire brought peace to the world. It was a new condition of mankind. The constant employment of nations had been war. The ancient writers dwell with rapture upon the reign of tranquillity which now prevailed. The security of the traveller and the facility of intercourse are a common theme of congratulation in writers from one end of the Empire to the other. The majesty of Rome, as Pliny proudly declares, was the shield of the wayfarer in every place. Epictetus, and the Alexandrian Philo are especially fervid in their remarks on this subject.[2] They dilate on the busy appearance of the ports and marts. "Cæsar," writes the Stoic philosopher, "has procured us a profound peace; there are neither wars, nor battles, nor great robberies, nor piracies; but we may travel at all hours, and sail from east to west."[3] The vast territory subject to Rome was covered with a net-work of magnificent roads, which moved in straight lines, crossing mountains and bridging rivers, binding together the most remote cities, and connecting them all with the capital. The deep ruts, worn in the hard basaltic pavement, and still visible even in places far from the metropolis, show to what extent they were used. Five main lines went out from Rome to the extremities of the Empire. These, with their branches running in whatever direction public convenience required, were connected at the sea-ports with the routes of maritime travel. A journey might have been made upon

[1] Sittengeschichte Roms., ii. 1 seq. (3d ed.)

[2] See the references in Friedländer, ii. 4.

[3] Diss., iii. 13. 9.

Roman highways, interrupted only by brief trips upon the sea, from Alexandria to Carthage, thence through Spain and France, and northward to the Scottish border; then back through Leyden, Cologne, Milan, eastward by land to Constantinople and Antioch, and thence to Alexandria; and the distance traversed would have exceeded 7,000 miles. The traveller could measure his progress by the mile-stones along all these roads; and maps of the route, giving distances from place to place, with stopping-places for the night, facilitated his journey. Augustus established a system of postal conveyances, which were used by officers, couriers, and other agents of the government; but private enterprise provided similar means of travel for the public generally. In the principal streets of large cities carriages could be hired, and one could arrange for making a journey, in Italy at least, by a method resembling the modern post, or vetturino.

The fact that so extensive territories were united under one government gave rise to a great deal of journeying from one part to another. Magistrates, and official persons of every sort, were travelling to and from their posts. There were frequent embassies from the provinces to Rome. Large bodies of troops were transferred from place to place, and thus became acquainted with regions remote from their homes. A stream of travel flowed from all directions to the capital; but there was also a lively intercourse between the several provinces. "Greek scholars," says Friedländer, "kept school in Spain; the women of a Roman colony in Switzerland employed a goldsmith from Asia Minor; in the cities of Gaul were Greek painters and sculptors; Gauls and Germans served as body-guards of a Jewish king at Jerusalem; Jews were settled in all the provinces." The Empire gave a new impetus to commerce. There was everywhere one system of law, free-trade with the capital,

and uniformity in coins, measures, and weights. In the reign of Claudius, an embassy came to Rome from a prince of the island of Ceylon, who had been struck with admiration for the Romans by finding that the denarii, though stamped with the images of different Emperors, were of just the same weight. In ancient times, mercantile transactions could not, as now, be carried forward by correspondence. Hence, merchants were commonly travellers, visiting foreign markets, and negotiating with foreign producers and dealers, in person. Horace frequently refers to the unsettled, rambling life characteristic of merchants. Pliny describes them as found in a throng upon every accessible sea. In an epitaph of a Phrygian merchant, accidentally preserved, he is made to boast of having sailed to Italy, round Cape Malea, seventy-two times.

The pirates, who, before the time of Pompey and Cæsar, had rendered navigation so perilous, had been swept from the Mediterranean. The annexation of Egypt enabled Augustus to establish a new route of commerce with the East, by the way of the Nile and the Arabian gulf. Roman merchants visited every land. They had their ports for trade in Britain, and on the coast of Ireland. They brought amber, in the first century, from the shores of the Baltic. They went with their caravans and vessels to Ethiopia and India. The increase of luxury in the capital stimulated trade. Whatever could gratify the palate was brought from all quarters to the markets of Rome; and the same was true of the multiform products of art and mechanical skill.

In the Book of Revelation, where Rome is designated as Babylon, her imports are thus enumerated: "The merchandise of gold, and silver, and precious stones, and of pearls, and fine linen, and purple and silk, and scarlet, and all thyine wood, and all manner vessels of ivory, and all man-

ner vessels of most precious wood, and of brass and iron, and marble, and cinnamon, and odors, and ointments, and frankincense, and wine, and oil, and fine flour, and wheat, and beasts, and sheep, and horses, and chariots, and slaves, and souls of men " (Rev. xviii. 12–14). Except in winter, when the ancients laid up their ships, the sea was alive with vessels, transporting to Rome the precious metals from the mines of Spain, wild animals for the arena from Africa, the wines of Greece, the woollens of Asia Minor, the gums, and silks, and diamonds, of the East. The great corn fleet from Egypt was met at Puteoli by a deputation of Senators, and greeted with public demonstrations of joy.

Journeys from scientific curiosity were not at all unfrequent. Men visited distant countries in quest of knowledge. Each province had seats of education to which young men resorted. To Rome, Alexandria, and Athens, students came from all parts of the world. In Rome, and Athens, chairs of instruction were established by the State, and thus, like Constantinople afterwards, they had what resembled modern universities. Rhetorical teachers were accustomed to journey from city to city. To the more successful of them statues were erected by their admiring pupils, or by the municipal authorities, in the various places where they had sojourned. Artists, and manufacturers of artistic works of every kind, led a wandering life. They plied their vocation for a time in one city, and then transplanted themselves to another. They might be summoned from remote communities for some task of peculiar magnitude, or requiring extraordinary skill. If this class of persons were migratory in their habit, much more was this true in the case of actors, musicians, athletes, and purveyors of amusement of every description. When we consider how universal was the taste for art and artistic decoration, and how insatiable the craving for popular entertainments, we can judge how

numerous were the itinerants whose business it was to minister to these demands. Great public festivals, like the Pythian games, drew together a countless throng of spectators. Religious ceremonies, like those of the Eleusinian mysteries, had a like attractive power. Religious pilgrimages are not a peculiar feature of Christian society. Such visits were not uncommon to the shrines of heathenism. Invalids, in those days as at present, either of their own motion, or by the advice of physicians, undertook journeys by land and upon the sea, for the restoration of health. Then tourists who visited different countries, from a curiosity to see strange lands, and to inspect places of historical renown, were scarcely less numerous then than now. Egypt and its antiquities had a peculiar fascination for the Romans,—the same fascination that Rome and its monuments now have for us. Men journeyed from afar to behold the stupendous edifices upon the Nile. Grecian history, too, had a profound interest for the Romans. To them it belonged to a glorious past, and they resorted with reverence and delight to the spots made famous by Hellenic wisdom and valor.[1] In speaking of the means of social intercourse, we should not omit to mention the great watering-places,—places of fashionable resort, like Baiæ, where multitudes were collected at the proper season, and which were centres of gaiety, dissipation, and political intrigue.

In tracing the causes that produced a mingling of man-

[1] It is a curious fact that the relish for wild and romantic scenery, especially mountainous scenery, is of recent origin. It seldom appears in the literature of antiquity, or of the middle ages. It is not until the eighteenth century that this taste manifests itself to any considerable degree. The changed feeling, as contrasted with times previous, on this subject, may almost be said to date from Rousseau. Ruskin has called attention to the remarkable difference between modern and ancient feeling in this particular. The topic is fully treated by Friedländer, ii. 204 seq. (3d ed.). But as to Homer, see Shairp, *On Poetic Interpret. of Nature*, p. 143.

kind, we find that the terrible scourges, war and slavery, played a conspicuous part. The Roman Empire had been built up by incessant wars. In war, men of different races met, though it were for the purpose of mutual destruction. They crossed their own boundaries, and gained a better knowledge of each other. Armies were captured and surrendered, towns occupied by a conquering force. In like manner, slavery as it existed in the ancient world, leading as it often did, to the deportation of thousands of people at once from their homes to a new and, perhaps, distant abode, contributed to the same result. The hostility and cruelty of men were overruled by Providence, and made the occasion of a certain benefit.

We have stated that the Roman policy was to break up nationalities. In the case of the Jews all efforts in this direction proved futile. They maintained their separation of race, and held together in an unbroken unity.

There were three nations of antiquity, each of which was entrusted with a grand providential office in reference to Christianity. The Greeks, whatever they may have learned from Babylon, Egypt, and Tyre, excelled all other races in a self-expanding power of intellect—in "the power of lighting their own fire." They are the masters in science, literature, and art. Plato, speaking of his own countrymen, made "the love of knowledge" the special characteristic of "our part of the world," as the love of money was attributed with equal truth to the Phœnicians and Egyptians.[1] The robust character of the Romans, and their sense of right, qualified them to rule, and to originate and transmit their great system of law, and their methods of political organization. Virgil lets Anchises define the function of the Roman people, in his address to Æneas, a visitor to the abodes of the dead:—

[1] Republic, iv. 435 (Jowett, ii. 265.)

"Others, I know, more tenderly may beat the breathing brass,
And better from the marble block bring living looks to pass;
Others may better plead the cause, may compass heaven's face,
And mark it out, and tell the stars, their rising and their place:
But thou, O Roman, look to it the folks of earth to sway;
For this shall be thine handicraft, peace on the world to lay,
To spare the weak, to mar the proud by constant weight of war." [1]

Greece and Rome had each its own place to fill; but true religion—the spirit in which man should live—comes from the Hebrews.

The remarkable fact which we have to notice, respecting the Hebrews, is their dispersion over the world at the epoch of the birth of Christ.[2] Among those who listened to the Apostles on the day of Pentecost, at Jerusalem, were Jews "out of every nation under heaven"—Parthians, and Medes, and Elamites, and dwellers in Mesopotamia, and in Judea and in Cappadocia, in Pontus and Asia, Phrygia, and Pamphylia, Egypt, Cyrene, Crete, Arabia, and Rome.[3] Josephus says that there is no country on earth where Jews do not make up a part of the population.[4] In Strabo we find almost the same assertion. In Babylon and the neighboring region a multitude of them had remained after the close of the captivity; and, according to the Jewish historian, they were numbered there by tens of thousands. A colony of them had been planted at Alexandria by its founder; and there they became so numerous as to occupy two out of the five sections of the city, but were not con-

[1] Excudent alii sperantia mollius æra,
Credo equidem: vivos ducent de marmore vultus;
Orabunt causas meliùs; cœlique meatus
Describent radio, et surgentia sidera dicent:
Tu regere imperio populos, Romane, memento:
Hac tibi erunt artes; pacique imponere morem,
Parcere subjectis, et debellare superbos.—Æn. vi. 847–853.

[2] See Winer, *Realwörterbuch*, Art. *Zeitrechnung*.

[3] Acts ii. 5–12. [4] *Bell. Jud.*, vii. 33; *Ant.*, xiv. 7, 2.

fined to these quarters. They were governed by magistrates of their own; and while, in common with Jews every where, they kept up a connection with the sanctuary at Jerusalem, they not only reared synagogues, but had also a temple of their own at Leontopolis. In Egypt, in the first century of our era, there were not less than a million of Jews, constituting an eighth part of the population of the country. In the flourishing city of Cyrene they formed a large portion of the inhabitants. Nowhere, outside of Palestine, was the Jewish population more numerous than in Syria and Asia Minor. At Antioch they constituted a powerful body, and enjoyed there privileges analogous to those of their brethren at Alexandria. From Syria, they passed over into Asia Minor, forming settlements in all the principal towns. Besides the natural emigration from Syria, Antiochus the Great had transplanted to that region two thousand Jewish families from Mesopotamia. Among other places, Ephesus and Tarsus were noted seats of Jewish communities. In Crete, Cyprus, and other islands, there were synagogues crowded with worshippers. From Asia the Jews had found their way into the cities of Macedonia and Greece. Athens, Corinth, Thessalonica, Philippi, are among the places where were Jewish settlements. Jews were found in Illyricum, and early penetrated to the northern coasts of the Black Sea. The Jewish prisoners brought by Pompey to Rome, afterwards received their freedom. The district across the Tiber was principally occupied by them. An embassy of Herod to Augustus is said to have been accompanied by eight thousand Jewish residents of Rome. Among other towns of Italy, Caprea, and especially Puteoli, are known to have had a Jewish population. Apart from permanent residents of Hebrew extraction, Jewish merchants made their way to every place in the Roman Empire where there was any hope of profit from trade. Thus the Pales-

tinian community, though still the religious centre of all the Jews, comprised within its limits only a portion of this ubiquitous nation. Capable of making a home for himself anywhere, the Jew was specially adapted to the state "which was to be built on the ruins of a hundred living polities." "In the ancient world, also, Judaism was an effective leaven of cosmopolitanism and national decomposition; and to that extent specially entitled to membership in the Cæsarian State, the polity of which was really nothing but a citizenship of the world, and the nationality of which was really nothing but humanity."[1] Julius Cæsar, like Alexander before him, granted to the Jews special favors. Especially was this the case at Alexandria and Rome. Yet the Jews throughout the West were regarded with a peculiar antipathy. In Egypt, they were always objects of a national animosity. By the Roman writers, in particular after the stubborn and bloody insurrections in which the Jews endeavored to gain their freedom, they were spoken of with abhorrence. Their steadfast assertion that they alone were possessed of the true religion, excited both hatred and contempt from those who could see nothing in such a claim but the spirit of arrogance and intolerance. "Whatever," says Tacitus, "is held sacred by the Romans, with the Jews is profane; and what in other nations is unlawful and impure, with them is permitted."[2] Nevertheless, the Jews succeeded in making proselytes to their faith and worship to such an extent as to call out the sarcastic animadversion of Roman satirists, and to elicit from Seneca the complaint that "the conquered had given laws to the conquerors:" *Victi victoribus leges dederunt.*[3] Wherever they went, they carried a pure monotheism which neither bribes nor torture could move them to surrender, and which led them to spurn

[1] Mommsen, iv. 643.
[2] Hist. v. 4.
[3] Ap. Augustine, *de civ. Dei*, vi. 11.

with loathing all participation in the rites of heathenism. As the first preachers of Christianity went from city to city, it was in the synagogues that they first gained a hearing, and found a starting-point for their labors. There the law and the prophets were read on every Sabbath; and there would be found assemblies capable of apprehending, even if disinclined to believe, the proclamation of Jesus as the predicted Messiah.

5. What was the effect of the union and commingling of nations upon the heathen religions? The consideration of the general state of religion in the Roman Empire is reserved for subsequent pages. We advert here to a single circumstance,—the effect which must have resulted, and which, as history tells us, did result from the combination of so many nations under one sovereignty. There had existed a multiplicity of local religions. The gods of each people, it was believed, had ordained the method of their worship within the bounds of the territory over which they stood as guardians. National divinities were treated with respect by the Romans, and the diversified systems of worship were left untouched as long as they kept within their own limits. This was the extent of Roman toleration. For Roman citizens to bring in new divinities, or foreign rites of worship, was both repugnant to the laws, and abhorrent to conservative Roman feeling. Cicero, with all his liberality of sentiment, advocates, in his book of "the Laws," the suppression, among the Roman people themselves, of all departures from the legally established cultus.[1] Loyalty to the state involved a strict adherence to the state-religion. But polytheism could find room in its Pantheon for an indefinite number of deities. In early times, when the Romans attacked a foreign tribe, or city, they were at pains to invite in solemn form the local divinities to abandon

[1] De Legibus, B. ii.

the place where they were worshipped, and to transfer their abode to Rome. What must have been the effect upon the conquered nations of the inability or unwillingness of their ancestral gods to defend their own temples and worshippers? It is hardly possible that a shock should not have been given, in many instances, to the faith and devotion which experienced so terrible a disappointment. But our main inquiry here relates to the effect upon the minds of men of a familiar acquaintance with so great a variety of dissimilar religions. As regards a certain class, the tendency unquestionably was to engender skepticism. Lucian may stand as a representative of this class. In one of his diverting dialogues,[1] he represents Jupiter as pale and anxious on account of a debate which had sprung up on earth between Damis, an Epicurean Atheist, and Timocles, who maintained that there are gods and a providence. To avert a common danger all the divinities were summoned to a council. They came in a throng, those with names, and those without a name, from Egypt, and Syria, Persia, and Thrace, and every country under the sun. Mercury, to whom it belonged to seat them, could not quell their wrangles for precedence, and Jupiter ordered them to be seated promiscuously until a council could be convoked to determine their rank. While the debate goes on below between Damis and Timocles, the gods tremble with anxiety lest their champion should be worsted, and they should lose, as a consequence, their offerings and honors. Timocles appeals to the universal belief in the gods. "Thank you," rejoins Damis, "for putting me in mind of the laws and manners of nations, which sufficiently show how uncertain everything is which relates to their gods; it is nothing but error and confusion. Some worship one, and some another. The Scythians sacrifice to a

[1] Jupiter Tragœdus.

scimetar; the Thracians to Zamolxis, who came to them, a fugitive from Samos; the Phrygians to Mine [the moon]; the Cyllenians to Phales; the Assyrians to a Dove; the Persians to Fire; the Egyptians to Water." Then the special sorts of Egyptian worship, all differing from each other, are enumerated; and Damis concludes his lively speech with the exclamation: "How ridiculous, my good Timocles, is such variety!" It would be an error to conclude that the spirit of this passage, and of other passages in Lucian of like tenor, prevailed among his contemporaries. Yet it is obvious that he did not stand alone. All these religions must have seemed to many a confused jumble, and have moved some to reject all in common, if not to disbelieve in anything divine.

Another large class were tempted to forsake, in a degree at least, their traditional creed and worship, and to espouse another,—it might be some older religion from the East, which came clothed with the fascination of mystery.

A tendency to syncretism—to a mingling of heterogeneous religions—was a notable characteristic of the age contemporaneous with the introduction of Christianity. Men of a philosophical turn, in whom reverence for religion was still strong, sought to combine in a catholic system, and in harmonious unity, the apparently discordant creeds of heathenism. Plutarch is a conspicuous example of this tendency. The effort, futile as it proved, was one of the signs of the times, and was owing largely to the commingling of nations, and of the multiform religions which had divided the homage of mankind. An escape was sought from the distracting influence of polytheism, by an identification of divinities bearing different names, and by connecting a conception of the divine unity with the admission of multitudinous deities with subordinate functions.

Old beliefs were dissolving, at least were assuming new

forms, in the ferment of the Roman world. But the hope that there could be one religion for all mankind was deemed visionary. Celsus, the noted opponent of Christianity in the second century, thought that it might be a good thing "if all the inhabitants of Asia, Europe, and Lybia, Greeks and barbarians, all to the uttermost ends of the earth" were to come under one religious system; but, he says, "any one who thinks this possible knows nothing."[1] An expectation of this sort struck him as utterly chimerical. The Emperor Julian who dreamed of restoring paganism from its fall could not consider it natural or possible for the different nations to have a common religion. Their diversities were too radical. The Roman Empire did much to prepare the way for a universal religion; but such a religion it had no power to create from the materials of polytheism.

The idea of a common humanity, far as it was from attaining the force of a practical conviction, capable of neutralizing deeply-rooted prejudices of an opposite nature, was obscurely present in the minds even of men unused to philosophic speculation. The line of Terence,

"Homo sum: humani nihil a me alienum puto,"—

"I am a man; nothing that affects man is indifferent to me"

—signified, in the connection where it occurs, that the calamities which afflict one man should interest all.[2] "One touch of nature makes the whole world kin." A Roman theatre, filled though it was with an ignorant rabble, when that line was heard, rang with applause.[3]

[1] Origenes c. *Celsum*, viii. 72.

[2] Heaut. Act i. Sc. i. 25. On the use made of this passage by Cicero, and other ancient and modern writers, see Parry, *P. Terentii Comœdiæ*, p. 174.

"I think, articulate, I laugh and weep,
And exercise all functions of a man.
How then should I and any man that lives
Be strangers to each other?"

[3] Augustine, *Ep.*, 52. —Cowper, *The Task.* (*The Garden.*)

CHAPTER III.

THE POPULAR RELIGION OF THE GREEKS AND ROMANS.

THE heathen religions did not spring out of a mere scientific curiosity which, in its rude beginning, can give no better account of the world than to attribute it to a multitude of personal agents. No explanation of the origin of heathenism is adequate, which fails to recognize the religious factor,—the sense of the supernatural, the feelings of dependence and accountableness, and that yearning for a higher communion which is native to the soul. These innate sentiments lie at the root of religion, even in its cruder forms. "I consider it impossible"—writes one of the most genial and profound of scholars—"that that all-comprehending and all-pervading belief in the divine essence, which we find in the earliest times among the Greeks, as well as other nations, can be deduced in a convincing manner from sensible impressions, and conclusions built thereon; and I am of opinion, that the historian must here rest satisfied with pre-supposing that the assumption of a hyper-physical living world and nature, which lay at the bottom of every phenomenon, was natural and necessary to the mind of man, richly endowed by nature."[1] This native faith was determined as to the particular forms it should assume, by the nature and circumstances of individual nations and tribes: hence the various modes of religion. Under the prompting of this latent belief, the

[1] K. O. Müller, *Proleg. zu einer wissenschaftl. Myth.*, Leitch's English Transl., p. 176.

personifying imagination, so rife in the childhood of mankind, endues all the separate parts of nature with personal life and agency.[1] The various beings thus created by fancy discharge the functions attributed by science afterwards to material and mental forces.[2] To them the phenomena of nature without, and to a considerable extent, of the mind within, as well as the course of events in the world, are relegated, each of them being in charge of his particular province. The classic religions had risen above that simpler stage, where the god is shut up to the special natural operation which it belongs to him in particular to fulfil. The deities of Greece and Rome are anthropomorphic beings, still performing, each in his place, the various offices in the movement of nature and of human affairs, which they had been—so to speak—called into being to execute; but they are no longer limited to these specialties. They constitute a society, and enjoy a wider range of activity. Poseidon (Neptune), in addition to the management of the seas, takes part, as a member of the Olympian Council, in the administration of the world's affairs. It is the middle stage of religion, where the divinity is not yet set free from the bonds of nature, distinguished from natural agencies, and elevated above them. This progress has begun, but is only partially accomplished.

But the minds of men demanded more in the object of worship than the imagination could impart. "The tendency to individualize, and the endeavor to comprehend the universality of Deity," blindly struggled with each other. Hence the conflict of higher and lower conceptions

[1] Upon the process of the development of myths, and the agency of language in connection with it, see Max Müller's *Chips from a German Workshop*, Vol. ii.

[2] Upon the impossibility of monotheism in the ancient worship of Greece, in connection with the prevalent notions of the external world, see K. O. Müller, p. 184.

—in the case of Zeus, for example—and that undercurrent in the direction of unity, which marks the history of the Greek religion.[1]

We shall have to notice three phases in the development of the Greek popular religion—the Homeric faith; that system as altered and ennobled in the age of the tragic poets, when Greek life was at its highest point of vigor, and the later era of decline and dissolution. We begin with the Homeric theology.

1. *The nature of the gods and their relation to the world.* The gods in Homer are human beings with greatly magnified powers. They are males and females, each class having the characteristics of the corresponding sex among men. Their dwelling is in the sky above us, and their abode on the top of Mt. Olympus.[2] They have bodies like those of men, but their veins, in the room of blood, are filled with a celestial ichor. In size they do not, generally speaking, surpass the human measure, but sometimes they are spoken of as gigantic. When Ares (Mars) (Il. xxi. 407) is struck down upon the field of Troy, he stretches over seven plethrums (nearly two acres) of ground. They experience hunger, but feast upon ambrosia and nectar. They are overcome with sleep. They acquire knowledge through the senses, which are of vastly augmented power. Hence they must be present where their power is to be exerted. This, however, does not hold true of influences upon the mind; but it is true of all external, visible doings, with the exception of a few instances in the case of Zeus. The cry of Ares and of Poseidon when they are wounded, is like that of nine or ten thousand men (Il. v. 860; x. 14,

[1] See Müller, p. 184, and compare Nägelsbach, *Hom. Theol.* p. 11, seq., with the criticism upon the views of B. Constant in his work, *De la Religion*, iii. 327 seq.

[2] On the distinction between the Iliad and Odyssey as to the abode of the gods, see Prof. Ihne, in Smith's *Dict. of Biog. and Myth.*, i. p. 510.

148). The eye, and ear, and the other corporeal organs have a like strength as compared with man. The deities travel with miraculous swiftness. Hera flies from Mount Ida to Olympus as swiftly as thought. But some physical instrumentality is frequently introduced, as when Athena puts on her beautiful sandals in preparation for her journeys. The divinities mingle in battle with men. They cohabit with human beings, and heroes are the offspring. Thetis was obliged to defer presenting the complaint of Achilles to Zeus, on account of his absence from home on a visit, of twelve days duration, among the Ethiopians. With regard to the mental and spiritual faculties of the gods, there is the same unsuccessful, inconsistent effort to liberate them from the limitations of humanity. Their boundless knowledge and power are asserted in terms, but their title to these high attributes is not at all sustained by what is narrated of them. Even Zeus is the victim of a trick of Hera, and is kept in ignorance of what is taking place before the Trojan walls. It was only after the event that Poseidon had knowledge of the blinding of Cyclops by Ulysses. As to their power, they are the creators neither of nature, nor of men. They can hasten or retard the processes of nature; they can heal diseases by a miracle; they can transform the physical shape of men. Ulysses is changed by Athena into an old and shrivelled beggar, and restored back again to himself. Moreover, they can give life to things inanimate; golden statues, "with firm gait," order the steps of Hephæstus.[1] They can give immortality to whomsoever they desire. The ease and blessedness of the dwellers upon Olympus are celebrated. Yet this bliss is far from being perfect. To Aphrodite, wounded and distressed, Dione says:

[1] Il. xviii. 523-528.

—— "Submit, my daughter, and endure,
Though inly grieved; for many of us who dwell
Upon the Olympian mount have suffered much
From mortals, and have brought great miseries
Upon each other."[1]

The goddess proceeds to tell of Ares, who was chained up for thirteen months in a cell, and who became withered and weak from long confinement; and of the anguish of Hera, and of Pluto, when they were pierced with arrows. If we look at the moral conduct of the Homeric divinities, we find it rather below than above that of the heroes who figure in their company. They resort to treachery and deceit to compass their ends. Zeus sends a false dream to Agamemnon, in order to effect a slaughter of the Greeks. Athena incites the Trojans to break their truce, to furnish an occasion for their own destruction; and she is sent on this malignant errand by Zeus, who, in turn, is instigated by the pleas of Hera. Athena, assuming the form and voice of Deiphobus, gives to Hector a deceitful promise of assistance, for the purpose of betraying him to death. Ulysses, lying in ambush by night, and finding himself cold, assumes that some god has misled him into leaving his cloak behind in the camp. It is needless to refer to examples of cruelty and sensuality on the part of the Homeric divinities. They are painted as the authors of evil, as well as of good. Hera and Athena never forgave the judgment of Paris in favor of Aphrodite, and pursued the Trojans with implacable wrath. The deities are capable of being appeased in individual instances; but as they act in this matter on no fixed principles, they may show themselves utterly implacable.

[1] Τέτλαθι, τέκνον ἐμόν, καὶ ἀνάσχεο, κηδομένη περ.
Πολλοὶ γὰρ δὴ τλῆμεν Ὀλύμπια δώματ' ἔχοντες
Ἐξ ἀνδρῶν χαλέπ' ἄλγε' ἐπ ἀλλήλοισι τιθέντες.
Il. v. 382–384 (Bryant, v. 472–476).

The prime distinction of the gods is their exemption from death. They are immortal. But for this they are dependent on bodily sustenance. There is a virtue in their food which avails to keep them alive. The very words "ambrosia and nectar" signify this. These, infused into the body of Patroclus, keep it from decay; "a rosy and ambrosial oil" saved the corpse of Hector from being torn, when it was dragged along the earth. The gods have a birth and beginning; but they are lifted above the lot of men by the one distinction of being immortal.

The gods are the guides and rulers of nations. Their interposition is potent, their protection and aid are indispensable. But they act in this capacity according to no wise and continuous plan. Caprice and personal favor play a principal part in their proceedings. The dependence of the individual upon the gods is entire. All physical and mental advantages are their gift. As Polydamas reminds Hector:

> —— "On one the god bestows
> Prowess in war, upon another grace
> In dance, upon another skill to touch
> The harp and sing. In yet another, Jove
> The Thunderer implants the prudent mind,
> By which the many profit, and by which
> Communities are saved."[1]

Ulysses reminds Laodamas that the gods make one man comely in person, but may deny to him the gift of genius and eloquence which they bestow upon another less beautiful. Two caskets of gifts, one full of good things, and

[1] ἄλλῳ μὲν γὰρ ἔδωκε θεὸς πολεμήια ἔργα·
[ἄλλῳ δ' ὀρχηστύν, ἑτέρῳ κίθαριν καὶ ἀοιδήν·]
ἄλλῳ δ' ἐν στήθεσσι τίθει νόον εὐρύοπα Ζεὺς
ἐσθλόν, τοῦ δέ τε πολλοὶ ἐπαιρίσκοντ' ἀνθρώποι·
καί τε πολέας ἐσάωσε, μάλιστα δέ κ' αὐτὸς ἀνέγνω.
Il. xiii. 729–734 (Bryant xiii. 913–927).

the other of evil, stand by the threshold of Zeus: out of these the lot of men is made up. It is some god that makes Achilles brave. Athena inspires Diomede with valor. Zeus sends panic fear into the soul of Hector. Athena bereaves the Trojans of reason, that they may choose to fight in the open plain instead of behind their walls. The wisdom of the wise, the courage of the brave, felicity in domestic relations, safety and prosperity on the land and the sea, flow from the favor of the gods; and so infirmities and calamities of every sort are equally due to them. There is no devil in the Homeric system; no one being who plans and executes evil exclusively. The idea of such agents falls into a later period in the development of Greek religion. Hence, in Homer, evil suggestions and doings are credited to the gods generally. The functions of the Tempter and Adversary reside in them. They mislead, seduce, contrive mischief, prompt to crime. So far as evil purposes and proceedings are felt to be of preternatural origin, they are traced to Zeus and his associates. A deity is said to have prompted Helen to the foul wrong which led to the war of Troy (Od. iv. 339–343).

The general doctrine as to the administration of the world is expressed in the lines:

> —— "The great gods are never pleased
> With violent deeds; they honor equity
> And justice."[1]

But the exceptions to this rule on the pages of Homer are quite as numerous as the examples. The actual government of Olympus was marked by the same sort of injustice, oppression and partiality which were mingled in the conduct of human rulers towards their subjects.

[1] *οὐ μὲν σχέτλια ἔργα θεοὶ μάκαρες φιλέουσιν,*
ἀλλὰ δίκην τίουσι καὶ αἴσιμα ἔργ' ἀνθρώπων.
Od. xiv. 83, 84 (Bryant xiv. 100–102).

2. *The relation of the gods to each other.* Zeus sits as a King in the midst of his Council. They are not mere instruments of the Supreme Ruler. Posidon allows to his brother only a patriarchal supremacy, not an absolute, despotic rule. Like a family, the gods consult and debate on the summit of Olympus, where

> "The calm ether is without a cloud;
> And in the golden light that lies on all,
> Day after day the blessed gods rejoice." [1]

But this high assembly is far from being dignified or harmonious. Poor Hephæstus, limping across the floor, is greeted with inextinguishable laughter. The device by which he entraps Ares and unfaithful Aphrodite, provokes the same demonstration from the entire group of gods,—the goddesses, for decency's sake, having staid away from the brazen palace of the god of fire.[2] The converse of the deities is disturbed by harsh mutual crimination. There is little domestic concord between Zeus and Hera. Sometimes he takes pleasure in provoking her to anger. Then, like a timid husband, he advises Thetis not to be seen to leave his presence, lest Hera should raise new disputes and stir up his anger with contumelious language. The Iliad and Odyssey abound in passages in which the gods charge each other with crimes and follies,—generally with good reason. When the final struggle takes place between the Greeks and Trojans, the deities are sent down by Zeus to fight for whichever side each may choose to favor; and when he beholds them in the fierce contest with each other,

[1] ——μάλ' αἴθρη
πέπταται ἀνέφελος, λευκὴ δ' ἐπιδέδρομεν αἴγλη·
τῷ ἔνι τέρπονται μάκαρες θεοὶ ἤματα πάντα.
Od. vi. 44–46 (Bryant vi. 58–60).

[2] But this passage is considered an interpolation in the Poem. There is nothing in the Poem which is like it, in the way of burlesque upon the gods.

from his quiet seat upon Olympus, he is said "to laugh in his secret heart."

Yet Zeus is supreme. None of the deities can vie with him in strength. None venture to contend with him, hand to hand. When he rouses himself, he enforces silence and submission. Hera and Athena may sulk, but they obey. When his anger is excited, he even flings about the gods without ceremony, and to their imminent peril. There existed in the Greek mind a natural craving for a unity in the divine administration. The superiority of Zeus gratified, in some degree, this feeling. When the Greek thinks of no other god, he thinks instinctively of Zeus. Still more is the tendency to monotheism disclosed in the relation of Zeus to his four children, Aphrodite, Hermes, Athena, and Apollo; especially to the two last. They stand as his deputies to execute his will and pleasure. The unifying tendency appears, also, in the conception of Fate —Moira—which in Homer hardly attains to the distinctness of personality. There were events which presented themselves to the Greek mind as the product of a blind, inevitable force. There were things which could not, without difficulty, be ascribed to the will of the gods; things which even Zeus deplored but could not help. Hence arose the notion of an all-determining Fate. In Homer, Fate is in some passages identified with the will of Zeus. Elsewhere there is a separation between the two. The idea hovers between a personification and a person.[1]

3. *Modes of Divine Revelation.* The gods made themselves known by personal intercourse with men. They visit the earth, confer with mortals, and exhibit their præternatural attributes. But this communication between heaven and earth belonged, according to the Homeric be-

[1] On the Homeric idea of Moira, see Welcker, *Gricch. Götterlehre*, i. 186 sq.

lief, to an age prior to the Poet. The record is given of a state of things that had once existed, but had come to an end.[1] Even in the epic period, during the Trojan war, there were no further marriages of gods and men. The divinities present themselves invisibly, or visibly in their real form, or—what is most common—in the shape of man, and frequently of some particular hero whose form and voice they simulate. There were signs by which they made known their will,—such as thunder and lightning, the sudden passing of a great bird of prey. Where portents were of doubtful import, it belonged to the art of the seer, or soothsayer, to interpret them. Yet auguries were not always regarded with trust. When the eagle dropped from his talons the bleeding serpent into the Trojan army, Hector refused to be turned from his purpose, saying to Polydamas:

—— "Thou dost ask
That I no longer reverence the decree
Of Jove, the Thunderer of the sky, who gave
His promise, and confirmed. Thou dost ask
That I be governed by the flight of birds,
Which I regard not, whether to the right
And towards the morning and the sun they fly
Or toward the left and evening. We should heed
The will of mighty Jupiter, who bears
Rule over gods and men. One augury
There is, the surest and the best—to fight
For our own land."[2]

[1] Nägelsbach, p. 132 seq.

[2] *εἰ δ' ἐτεὸν δὴ τοῦτον ἀπὸ σπουδῆς ἀγορεύεις*
ἐξ ἀρα δή τοι ἔπειτα θεοὶ φρένας ὤλεσαν αὐτοί,
ὃς κέλεαι Ζηνὸς μὲν ἐριγδούποιο λαθέσθαι
βουλέων, ἅστε μοι αὐτὸς ὑπέσχετο καὶ κατένευσεν·
τίνῃ δ' οἰωνοῖσι τανυπτερύγεσσι κελεύεις
πείθεσθαι· τῶν οὔτι μετατρέπομ', οὐδ' ἀλεγίζω,
εἴτ' ἐπὶ δεξί' ἰωσι πρὸς Ἠῶ τ' Ἠέλιον τε,
εἴτ' ἐπ' ἀριστερὰ τοίγε ποτί ζόφον ἠερόεντα.
ἡμεῖς δὲ μεγάλοιο Διὸς πειθώμεθα βουλῇ,

Dreams were another great channel of divine revelation; but these, likewise, might be of doubtful interpretation, or might be sent on purpose to misguide. More trustworthy than such outward vehicles of communication was the vision of the future, granted to individuals at favored moments, especially the open vision vouchsafed to the dying. Such a superhuman insight was the constant gift from the gods to select prophets, like Calchas, by whom not only the future, but the past and present also, were clearly beheld. Even these might not, in every case, command implicit confidence; so that the surest means of obtaining a knowledge of the gods, and of their will, was through their direct personal manifestation, in visible theophanies. The oracles, in Homer, are quite in the background.

4. *Piety and the expressions of it in worship and conduct.*—No doctrine and no law were communicated from the gods. There was no body of written teaching to serve as a standard of belief and conduct. The religious sentiment through all the earlier ages of Grecian history was profoundly active. A sense of dependence on the gods, and of the need of their help, existed in all except the few who are denounced as impious. Hector says to Achilles:

> "I know that I
> In might am not thy equal, but the event
> Rests in the laps of the great gods."[1]

Sacrifice and supplication, the two chief forms of devotion, attend every important undertaking and emergency of life. Thank-offerings follow upon good fortune. The

> ὃς πᾶσι θνητοῖσι καὶ ἀθανάτοισιν ἀνάσσει.
> εἷς οἰωνὸς ἄριστος, ἀμύνεσθαι περὶ πάτρης.
> Il. xii. 233-243 (Bryant, xii. 282-291).

[1] οἶδα δ', ὅτι σὺ μὲν ἐσθλός, ἐγὼ δὲ σίθεν πολὺ χείρων.
ἀλλ' ἦτοι μὲν ταῦτα θεῶν ἐν γούνασι κεῖται.
Il. xx. 434-435 (Bryant, xx. 545-547).

deities occasionally visit their temples and shrines, where these exist;[1] and with each of them a priest is connected. But there is no dominant hierarchy; the father is priest in his own household. Prayers are chiefly petitions, and not unfrequently assume the form of claims on the ground of some service rendered by the suppliant to the divinity. When Chryses beseeches Apollo to give him redress for the wrong done by Achilles, he rests his appeal on the fact that he had decked the temple of the god, and burned goats and bullocks upon his altar. Zeus feels a kind of compunction in allowing Hector to be slain, who has offered him so many welcome gifts, and so many victims upon the altar.[2] Whether supplication was answered, or not, was contingent on the will of the divinities, which was determined not so much by general grounds of reason, or justice, as by personal favor, or disfavor. Moreover, the gods might resist and baffle one another, and so disappoint the hopes of the suppliant. Then to what god should a man in trouble resort? Which particular divinity was frowning upon him? The distracting effect of polytheism is constantly apparent in Homer. Resignation becomes a passive acquiescence in what is inevitably ordained. It is far removed from an active, cordial submission to the behest of a higher wisdom. Power eclipses the other attributes of divinity. Hence, the sufferer breaks out in loud complaints against the deities. Agamemnon more than once asserts that Zeus has cheated him. Menelaus, when his sword breaks in the duel with Paris, cries:—

> "O Father Jove! thou art of all the gods
> The most unfriendly."[3]

[1] See Nägelsbach, 175. In only one passage is an image of a god in a temple referred to, (Il. vi. 92). [2] Il. xxiv. 91-95.

[3] *Ζεῦ πάτερ, οὔτις σεῖο θεῶν ὀλοώτερος ἄλλος*"—Il. iii. 365 (Bryant, iii. 447–448).

This scolding of the gods on the part of men is for the most part, if not uniformly, directed against Zeus.[1]

In the Homeric system, morality is interwoven with religion. Justice and the fear of the gods are involved in each other. The heroes are simple and frank in the avowal of their feelings. When they are smitten with sorrow, they weep. Thus Achilles weeps aloud over Patroclus, and Ulysses and Telemachus weep aloud in each other's embrace. Truthfulness is prized. Achilles declares that he who hides one thing in his heart, and utters another with his lips, is as hateful to him as the gates of hell.[2] So there is a sense of honor and of shame, which rise above the dread of censure, and spring from an ideal of worthy character. Above all, oaths are sacred, and oath-breakers detested by gods and men. The ties of affection, where they subsist, are peculiarly tender. Many passages of the deepest pathos, in the Iliad and Odyssey, are linked to this theme. The power of friendship is displayed in the relation of Achilles and Patroclus. Monogamy prevailed among the Greeks. The attachment of husband and wife to one another is deep and fervent. On the whole subject of the relation of the sexes, an air of purity and innocence pervades the Homeric poems. Maidenly modesty is held in honor. The wife must be faithful to her husband. The husband, though he may have concubines, is bound to the wife by a higher and an indissoluble tie. Only death dissolves their connection. The wife, though she may be acquired by purchase, is not a slave, but a companion, and, with certain qualifications, an equal. Homer has much to say of the silence and compliance that befit woman; but his female personages, whether divine or human, exercise a high degree of practical freedom in speech. In the stories of Hector and Andromache, Ulysses and Penelope, we have pic-

[1] Nägelsbach does not admit any exception, p. 194. [2] Il. ix. 386-388.

tures of refined domestic love. Ulysses says to Nausicaa :—

> "There is no better, no more blessed state,
> Than when the wife and husband in accord
> Order their household lovingly." [1]

The thoughts of the wounded Sarpedon revert to his "dear wife and little son." [2] Helen, to express the depth of her attachment to Hector, tells him that he is "father and dear mother" now to her. One of the most pathetic touches in the lament of Andromache, is the reflection that Hector had not been permitted to speak a word of comfort to her, on which she might think, day and night, with tears.[3] The heart of Ulysses melted within him as he clasped his aged father to his breast. The Homeric poems abound in kindred references to the strength and tenderness of parental, filial, and conjugal love. Even the lot of the slave was softened in families where the patriarchal system prevailed ; although it is said that the day that makes a man a slave takes away half of his worth. The minstrel, and the aged, have a right to kindness and protection.

As concerns the treatment of enemies and the feelings excited by injury, we find abundant examples of unbridled anger and savage retaliation. On the battle-field of Troy, the heroes rage, much in the temper of the wolves, and wild boars, and ravenous lions, to which they are so often likened. They often deny quarter to the suppliant, and exult over his fallen body. Agamemnon advises Menelaus to spare not a life among the Trojans :—

> "The very babe within his mother's womb,
> Even that must die." [4]

[1] —— *οὐ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ γε κρεῖσσον καὶ ἄρειον,*
ἢ ὅθ' ὁμοφρονέοντε νοήμασιν οἶκον ἐ χητον
ἀνὴρ ἠδὲ γυνή.—Od. vi. 182–184 (Bryant, vi. 229–232).

[2] Il. v. 860-862.

[3] Il. xxiv. 945-946.

[4] —— *μηδ' ὄντινα γαστέρι μήτηρ*
Κοῦρον ἐόντα φέροι, μηδ' ὃς φύγοι·
—Il. vi. 58-59 (Bryant, vi. 73-74).

Yet gentle sentiments are not wanting; and it is a mistake, even in reference to the early stages of the Greek religion, to affirm that forbearance and forgiveness are wholly unknown. Magnanimity and mercy could never be imported into human nature, if some sparks of placable feeling were not native to the human soul. Peleus had warned Achilles that "gentle ways are best," and bidden him "to keep aloof from sharp contentions."[1] Agamemnon points to Pluto as the god who never relents, and pronounces him, on this account, of all the divinities, "most hateful to men." Patroclus was admired as a model of gentleness. Even Achilles, in a better mood, exclaims:

> —— "Would that Strife
> Might perish among gods and men, with Wrath,
> Which makes even wise men cruel, and, though sweet
> At first as dropping honey, growing, fills
> The heart with its foul smoke."[2]

Achilles will not be appeased, and never tires of inflicting vengeance, not sparing the dead body of his foe, and slaying twelve Trojans upon the funeral pile of Patroclus. But the wrath of Achilles is the subject of the Iliad. His immitigable anger is not held up for approbation, but rather as an object of censure, and even of loathing. The duty of forbearance is made to rest upon religious motives. The finest illustration of this whole subject is the exquisite speech which Phœnix made, "with many sighs and tears," to Achilles. After referring to his own tender nurture of the hero in his childhood, and to the hopes he had cherished respecting him, he exhorts him to subdue his spirit:—

[1] Il. ix. 318-319.

[2] ὡς ἔρις ἐκ τε θεῶν, ἐκ τ' ἀνθρώπων ἀπόλοιτο,
καὶ χόλος, ὅστ' ἐφέηκε πολίφρονά περ χαλεπῆναι·
ὅς τε πολὺ γλυκίων μέλιτος καταλειβομένοιο
ἀνδρῶν ἐν στήθεσσιν ἀέξεται, ἠύτε καπνός·
—Il. xviii. 106-110 (Bryant, xviii. 137-140).

"Ill it becomes thee to be merciless:
The gods themselves are placable, though far
Above us all in honor and in power
And virtue. We propitiate them with vows,
Incense, libations, and burnt offerings,
And prayers for those who have offended."[1]

This may remind us of the eulogy of Mercy which Shakespeare puts into the mouth of Portia, and of her argument: "We do pray for mercy."

The obligations of hospitality form a part of the Homeric code of duty. The guest is treated with a chivalrous courtesy; his name is not even asked until he has sated his hunger at the table; and when he departs he is dismissed with gifts. The stranger and the poor man are under the special guardianship of Zeus, who will punish any who ill treat them, or refuse to befriend them. When one arrives on a foreign shore, his first anxiety is to know whether the people among whom he is to be thrown are "god-fearing." The duty of civil loyalty has a prominent place. Regal government is held to be the right form, as contrasted with the rule of the many, which is regarded with low esteem. The king receives his authority from Zeus; insubordination in the subject has the character of impiety. International rights, any farther than they are created by treaty, have no recognition. The war of Troy gives rise to leagues, truces, confederacies. But war is waged for purposes of revenge, or for robbery and plunder; and is barbarous in its laws and usages.

5. *Sin and Atonement.*—The wrath of the gods is less

[1] *ἀλλ', Ἀχιλλεῦ, δάμασον θυμὸν μέγαν· οὐδέ τί σε χρὴ*
νηλεὲς ἦτορ ἔχειν. στρεπτοὶ δέ τε καὶ θεοὶ αὐτοί,
τῶνπερ καὶ μείζων ἀρετὴ τιμή τε βίη τε.
καὶ μὲν τοὺς θνέεσσι καὶ εὐχωλῇς ἀγανῇσιν,
λοιβῇ τε κνίσῃ τε, παρατρωπῶσ' ἄνθρωποι
λισσόμενοι, ὅτε κέν τις ὑπερβήῃ καὶ ἁμάρτῃ.
—Il. ix. 496–501 (Bryant, ix. 617–622).

excited by offences against themselves directly, although these bring punishment upon the trangressor, than by infractions of the moral order, such as impiety towards parents, cruelty to the stranger and to the poor, the infidelity of a wife to her husband.[1] The lawless self-assertion and insolence—ὕβρις—out of which wrongs of this character spring, is what calls down in a marked degree the divine displeasure. This temper provokes punishment at the hands of gods and men. Sin is an infatuation. The mind is deluded; and this delusion of the understanding is attributed to an influence from the gods themselves. A Satanic element belongs to the divinities, and thus the feeling of responsibility is lessened. Among the chief motives to right conduct are the impulses of conscience, the sense of shame, dread of public opinion, the example of the gods, and the fear of punishment from them. A belief in the punitive righteousness of the gods is deeply ingrained in the Homeric man. There is an abiding conviction that "wrong prospers not" (Od. i. 165). The destruction of Troy is decreed, because the Greeks had justice on their side in the original quarrel, and because the Trojans broke the Treaty. The rapacious and insolent suitors of Penelope were slain by the men whose rights they had invaded. Then Laertes cries:—

> "O Father Jove, assuredly the gods
> Dwell on the Olympian height, since we behold
> The arrogant suitors punished for their crimes."[2]

The divine justice exerts itself in the retribution that alights on individual evil-doers. More is said of the punishment of the wicked than of the reward of the good.

[1] See Nägelsbach, p. 269.

[2] Ζεῦ πάτερ, ἦ ῥα ἔτ' ἐστε θεοὶ κατὰ μακρὸν Ὄλυμπον,
εἰ ἐτεὸν μνηστῆρες ἀτάσθαλον ὕβριν ἔτισαν.
Od. xxiv. 351-352 (Bryant, xxiv. 426-428).

Sin is confessed. Agamemnon frankly acknowledges his faults. Helen speaks of herself as

"Lost to shame, and cause of many ills." [1]

She laments that she was not, at her birth, whirled away by the blast, or swallowed up by the sea. She alludes to the labors of Hector,

"For one so vile as I and for the sake of guilty Paris." [2]

Agamemnon speaks of her as having brought dishonor

"On women, even the faithful and the good;" [3]

and she is not without a painful consciousness of the infamy that awaits her.

The sense of sin against the gods gives rise to the need of pardon and reconciliation. The offended deity is approached with offerings, attended with prayer. The sacrifices are not presented as symbolical of the penalty incurred by the transgressor, as if this were transferred to the animal. They are rather gifts to the god, which gratify him, and imply an acknowledgment of his power, and of the honor due to him. But as the gods are actuated by no steady and impartial love to men, as they are not merciful and gracious on principle, the suppliant has no certainty that his suit for pardon is effectual. The divinity may turn a deaf ear to his petition, and spurn his offering. And there are crimes which are unpardonable, from the penalties of which there is no room for deliverance.

6. *Life, Death and Immortality.*—It is a prevalent error to suppose that the ancients regarded human life as a

[1] —κυνὸς κακομηχάνου, ὀκρυοέσσης.—Il. vi. 344 (Bryant, vi. 449).

[2] εἵνεκ' ἐμεῖο κυνὸς καὶ Ἀλεξάνδρου ἕνεκ' ἀτης.
Il. vi. 356 (Bryant, vi. 462-463).

[3] —χαλεπὴν δέ τε φήμιν ὑπασσεν
θηλυτέρῃσι γυναιξί, καὶ ἢ κ' εὐεργὸς ἔῃσιν.
Od. xxiv. 202-3 (Bryant, xxiv. 252).

scene of joy. The ancient writers are full of reflections of an opposite character. Zeus himself is made to say, that

> "The race of mortal men
> Of all that breathe and move upon the earth
> Is the most wretched." [1]

Laments and complaints relative to the hard lot of mortals, of various classes of men, and of individuals, are frequent on the pages of Homer. Fortune deserts the hero at the moment of seeming triumph. He becomes the victim of his own success. Nor is there any faith in a wise and merciful Providence that orders all things, and can make evil the occasion of good. Death offers no hope except that of a respite from anguish, or rest from pain. Its blessing is purely negative. The dead in Hades are spectres—ghostly images of the bodies worn on earth—groping about in the dark, with only a feeble remnant of their former life and intelligence. The soul is so identified with the body that there can be no conception of immortality without it. The departed heroes, who converse with Ulysses, must first drink blood in order to exercise the faculties of intelligence and memory. Achilles says to him:—

> "I would be
> A laborer on earth, and serve for hire
> Some man of mean estate, who makes scant cheer
> Rather than reign o'er all who have gone down
> To death." [2]

There is no positive punishment in Hades, except for

[1] *οὐ μὲν γάρ τί πού ἐστιν ὀϊζυρώτερον ἀνδρὸς*
πάντων, ὅσσα τε γαῖαν ἐπὶ πνείει τε καὶ ἕρπει.
Il. xvii. 446–447 (Bryant, xvii. 537-539).

[2] *βουλοίμην κ' ἐπάρουρος ἐὼν θητευέμεν ἄλλῳ,*
ἀνδρὶ παρ' ἀκλήρῳ, ᾧ μὴ βίοτος πολὺς εἴη,
ἢ πᾶσιν νεκύεσσι καταφθιμένοισιν ἀνάσσειν.
Od. xi. 489–491 (Bryant, 602–606).

perjurers; but there is, likewise, no reward. It is a region of flitting shadows; an abode of hopeless gloom. Menelaus, the favorite of the gods, was to be saved from this dismal lot, because his body was to be transported alive to the Elysian fields. Death, except for those whose sufferings had made existence itself a burden, was deprecated as an unmitigated curse.

In this outline of the Homeric theology, we have pointed out an incipient tendency to monotheism, in the patriarchal supremacy of Zeus over the Olympian family, and, further, in the half-defined notion of an all-governing fate. We have found no conception of a Providence which might serve as a warrant for resignation under calamities, and for the hope of good to emerge out of evil. Nor is there a divine Love, to attract the rational confidence and reciprocal affection of men. There is, however, a moral government on the part of the gods; a condemnation and punishment of injustice; but even this conception is clouded and disfigured by stories of crime and folly in the conduct of the gods themselves, and by particular instances of treachery and injustice in their dealings with individuals. And the Homeric religion kindles no consoling hope that reaches beyond the grave.

When we pass from Homer to Sophocles, we find ourselves in a vastly purer atmosphere of moral and religious feeling. How numerous are the passages in this incomparable poet which might fitly be incorporated in Christian teaching! In the great writers who flourished in the glorious manhood of Greek life, under Athenian institutions, the less worthy conceptions of the primitive age retreat into the background, while the nobler features of the popular creed attain to a full development.

1. The gods are still conceived of as clothed in corporeal

form. Art gives to this form an ideal perfection. Their images abide in their temples; and it is felt that when the image is taken away, the god forsakes his abode. But the divinities are no longer, as in Homer, obliged to be physically present where their power is exerted. They can act from afar. There is a much more exalted notion of their might, as well as of their knowledge. Teucros, in the Ajax of Sophocles, says of the fatal belt and sword of Hector:—

> "I must needs own the gods as working this,
> And all things else that come to mortal
> Men." [1]

Xenophon, in the Anabasis, makes Clearchus say to Tissaphernes that he who violates an oath can never be happy, "for whoever becomes the object of divine wrath, I know no swiftness can save him, no darkness hide him, no strong place defend him; since, in all places, all things are subject to the power of the gods, and everywhere they are equally lords of all."[2]

Pindar speaks of

> "God, that o'ertakes the eagle's wing
> And leaves the dolphin's haste behind
> In the mid sea; whose chastening hand hath bow'd
> The lofty spirit of the proud,
> And given to modest worth the imperishable crown." [3]

and in another place:—

[1] ἐγὼ μὲν ἂν καὶ ταῦτα καὶ τὰ πάντ' ἀεὶ
φάσκοιμ' ἂν ἀνθρώποισι μηχανᾶν θεούς.
Ajax, 1036–1037.

[2] τὸν γὰρ θεῶν πόλεμον οὐκ οἶδα οὔτ' ἀπὸ ποίου ἂν τάχους φεύγων τις ἀποφύγοι οὔτ' εἰς ποῖον ἂν σκότος ἀποδραίη οὔθ' ὑπως ἂν εἰς ἐχυρὸν χωρίον ἀποσταίη. Anab. ii. 5, 7.

[3] θεός, ὁ καὶ πτερόεντ' αἰετὸν κίχε, καὶ θαλασσαῖον παραμείβεται
δελφίνα, καὶ ὑψιφρόνων τιν' ἐκαμψε βροτῶν,
ἑτέροισι δὲ κῦδος ἀγήραον παρέδωκ.'
Pyth. ii., Str. ii.

"Vain hope, that guilt by time or place,
Can 'scape the searching glance of heaven." [1]

The monotheistic tendency is conspicuously manifest in this period. The "gods" are spoken of collectively, in relation to acts of divine government, as if a single agency or intelligence were in the mind of the writer. This is often observed in Demosthenes. The word "god" is used in the singular number, when no particular divinity is meant, as if there were an obscure sense of one presiding, governing mind. These modes of speech are not unfrequent in the dramatic poets, in moments of deep feeling. Moreover, the regal domination of Zeus, as the centre of divine power and authority, receives a new emphasis. He is clothed with the attributes of might resistless, of wisdom, of fatherhood, of truthfulness, and immaculate, unsleeping justice. Hermes, in "Prometheus Bound," speaks thus:

—— "the lips
Of Zeus know not to speak a lying speech,
But will perform each single word." [2]

In the "Seven against Thebes," Justice is called "Zeus's Virgin Child." Elsewhere, in Æschylus, he is styled

"Guardian of the just man's dwelling;" [3]

and, in the same drama,

—— "Our Father, author of our life,
The King, whose right hand worketh all his will." [4]

[1] —εἰ δὲ θεὸν ἀνήρ τις ἑλπεταί τι λαθέμεν ἐρδων, ἁμαρτάνει.
—Olymp. i., Str. ii.

[2] ψευδηγορεῖν γὰρ οὐκ ἐπίσταται στόμα
τὸ Διὸν, ἀλλὰ πᾶν ἔπος τελεῖ.—Prometh. Vinct. 1053–1054.

[3] —— οἰκοφύλαξ
ὁσίων ἀνδρῶν.—Suppliants, 26–27.

[4] πατὴρ φυτουργὸς, αὐτόχειρ ἀναξ
γένους παλαιόφρων μέγας
τέκτων, τὸ πᾶν μήχαρ οὔριος Ζεύς·—Suppliants, 586–588.

In Sophocles, Zeus is addressed (in the Œdipus at Colonos) as

——"Lord omnipotent of gods,
Who all on earth beholdest."[1]

Beside his throne dwells

"The eternal Right that rests on oldest laws."[2]

The chorus thus consoles Electra:

"Mighty in heaven he dwells,
Zeus, seeing, guiding all."[3]

There is

"nothing which Zeus works not."[4]

In the theology of this era, Fate (Moira) becomes subordinate to Zeus, whose will is supreme; but afterwards, Fate is identified with Fortune, (Tyche), and then, in the period of decline, this Power is placed behind and above all.

The gods, especially Zeus, are the fountain of law. In Æschylus, we read of

"Law sprung from Zeus, supreme Apportioner."[5]

And a part of the law guards the right of the suppliant. Here belongs the memorable passage in the Antigone of Sophocles:

"Nor did I deem thy edicts strong enough
That thou, a mortal man, should'st over-pass
The unwritten laws of God that know not change.
They are not of to-day nor yesterday,

[1] ὦ Ζεῦ, πάνταρχ',
ὦ παντόπτα.—Œd. Col., 1085–1086.

[2] ——— εἴπερ ἐστὶν ἡ παλαίφατος
Δίκη ξύνεδρος Ζηνὸς ἀρχαιοῖς νόμοις.—Œd. Col., 1382–1383.

[3] ἔτι μέγας οὐρανῷ
Ζεὺς, ὃς ἐφορᾷ πάντα καὶ κρατύνει—Electra, 174–175.

[4] κοὐδὲν τούτων ὅ τι μὴ Ζεύς.—Maidens of Trachis, 1278.

[5] —θέμις Διὸς κλαρίου.—Suppliants, 354.

But live forever, nor can man assign
When first they sprang to being." [1]

Parallel with this is the splendid passage in the Ajax upon the sovereignty of law over winter, and night, and storm—over the mightiest things in nature, and by analogy, over human feeling and conduct.[2] There are not wanting assertions of the tenderness of Zeus; as in "the Maidens of Trachis:"—

"—Who hath known in Zeus forgetfulness
Of those he children calls." [3]

It must be remembered that we have here the highest thoughts of the Greek mind upon divine things. It must not be supposed that this lofty mood was uniformly maintained even by the few; much less, that it was diffused among the multitude, on whom the Homeric theology retained a firm hold. On the contrary, the doubts of the divine rectitude, which are uttered in Æschylus and Sophocles, must not be taken as habitual to the poets themselves. They represent the occasional questionings and perplexities which sprang up in view of the mysteries of life. A similar struggle with doubt meets us in Job and in Ecclesiastes.

Perhaps the most striking feature of the Greek popular faith, as reflected in the classic writers, is the righteousness of the divine government, evinced, in particular, in the punishment of evil-doers. Not the worst men alone, as in Homer, but transgressors generally, are punished in Hades, as well as on earth. Retribution surely, though it may be slow, overtakes the guilty. The idea that "if the millstones

[1] *οὐδὲ σθένειν τοσοῦτον ᾠόμην τὰ σὰ*
κηρύγματ', ὥστ' ἀγραπτα κἀσφαλῆ θεῶν
νόμιμα δύνασθαι θνητὸν ὄντ' ὑπερδραμεῖν.
οὐ γάρ τι νῦν γε κἀχθές, ἀλλ' ἀεί ποτε
ζῇ ταῦτα, κοὐδεὶς οἶδεν ἐξ ὅτου 'φάνη.—Antig., 453-457.

[2] Ajax, 668-678.

[3] —*ἐπεὶ τίς ὧδε*
τέκνοισι Ζῆν' ἀβουλον εἶδεν.—Maidens of Trachis, 139-140.

of the gods grind slow, they grind fine," was cherished, long before it was coined into a proverb. The Greek tragedies would be emasculated, were they deprived of this pervading element. That which especially calls down the vengeance of the gods is haughty self-assertion, breaking through the bounds of law; the pride and insolence, which are expressed in the word ὕβρις. Zeus is called, in "the Persians" of Æschylus, "the avenger of o'er lofty thoughts." [1] The ghost of Darius sends the admonition to Xerxes,

"To cease his daring sacrilegious pride,"[2]

and predicts that the slaughter of Platæa will

—— "witness to the eyes of men
That mortal man should not wax over-proud;
For wanton pride from blossom grows to fruit,
The full corn in the ear, of utter woe,
And reaps a tear-fraught harvest." [3]

The daring transgressor, who tramples on justice,

—— "as time wears on
Will have to take in sail,
When trouble makes him hers, and each yard-arm
Is shivered by the blast." [4]

Then he will call in vain for help, and, in the midst of "woes inextricable," [5] will make shipwreck of his happi-

[1] Ζείς τοι κολαστὴς τῶν ὑπερκόμπων ἀγαν
φρονημάτων ἐπεστιν.—Persians, 823, 824.

[2] λῆξαι θεοβλαβοῦνθ' ὑπερκόμπῳ θράσει.—Persians, 827.

[3] —— σημανοῦσιν ὀμμασιν βροτῶν
ὡς οὐχ ὑπέρφευ θνητὸν ὄντα χρὴ φρονεῖν.
ὕβρις γὰρ ἐξανθοῦσ' ἐκάρπωσε στάχυν
ἄτης, ὅθεν πάγκλαυτον ἐξαμᾶ θέρος.—Persians, 815–818.

[4] τὸν ἀντίτολμον δὲ φαμὶ καὶ παραιβάτον
τὰ πολλὰ παντόφυρτ' ἄνευ δίκας
βιαίως ξὺν χρόνῳ καθήσειν
λαῖφος, ὅταν λόβᾳ πόνος,
θραυομένας κεραίας.—Eumenides, 523–527.

[5] ἐν μέσῃ
δυσπαλεῖ τε δίνᾳ.—Ibid. 528, 529.

ness. The feeling of Sophocles on this subject is expressed in the Œdipus Tyrannus, in the words:—

"But pride begets the mood
Of wanton, tyrant power;
Pride filled with many thoughts, yet filled in vain,
Untimely, ill-advised,
Scaling the topmost height,
Falls to the abyss of woe." [1]

The "Antigone" winds up with the moral from the chorus:—

"Man's highest blessedness,
In wisdom chiefly stands;
And in the things that touch upon the gods,
'Tis best in word or deed,
To shun unholy pride;
Great words of boasting bring great punishments,
And so to grey-haired age
Teach wisdom at the last." [2]

In the Ajax the same injunction is enforced:—

"Nor boast thyself, though thou excel in strength,
Or weight of stored-up wealth. All human things
A day lays low, a day lifts up again;
But still the gods love those of ordered soul,
And hate the evil." [3]

[1] ὕβρις φυτεύει τύραννον·
ὑβρις, εἰ πολλῶν ὑπερπλησθῇ μάταν,
ἃ μὴ 'πίκαιρα μηδὲ συμφέροντα,
ἀκρότατον εἰσαναβασ'
[αἶπος] ἀπότομον ὤρουσεν εἰς ἀνάγκαν,
ἐνθ' οὐ ποδὶ χρησίμῳ
χρῆται.—Œd. Rex., 873-879.

[2] πολλῷ τὸ φρονεῖν εὐδαιμονίας
πρῶτον ὑπάρχει· χρὴ δ' ἐς τοὺς θεοὺς
μηδὲν ἀσεπτεῖν· μεγάλοι δε λόγοι
μεγάλας πληγὰς τῶν ὑπεραύχων
ἀποτίσαντες
γήρᾳ τὸ φρονεῖν ἐδίδαξεν.—Antig., 1348-1353.

[3] μηδ' ὄγκον ἀρῃ μηδέν', εἴ τινος πλέον
ἢ χειρὶ βρίθεις ἢ μακροῦ πλούτου βάθει.
ὡς ἡμέρα κλίνει τε κἀνάγει πάλιν
ἅπαντα τἀνθρώπεια· τοὺς δὲ σώφρονας
θεοὶ φιλοῦσι καὶ στυγοῦσι τοὺς κακούς.—Ajax, 129-133.

There is no escape from punishment for any form of iniquity. Pindar ends a verse in a strain that reminds one of the First Psalm:—

"While he that walks sin's wandering way,
Ends not in bliss the changeful day." [1]

The criminal is followed by

"Vengeance, with hands that bear
The might of righteousness." [2]

If the murderer were to escape, atheism would be the result:—

"For if the dead, as dust and nothing found,
Shall lie there in his woe,
And they shall fail to pay
The penalty of blood,
Then should all fear of gods from earth decay,
And all men's worship prove a thing of naught." [3]

Such lofty and inspiring sentiments place their authors far above the nominally Christian writers who have felt the enervating breath of a materialistic or Pantheistic creed. Unhappily these sentiments are connected with other notions which operated to diminish their proper influence. The doctrine of an all-controlling Fate was one of these counteracting forces. The idea was entertained that a taint might cling to a particular family, like the race of Atreus, and blight one generation after another of its members. The Homeric theology contained the idea that the gods themselves tempt to sin, and spread a net to

[1] *οὐχ ὁμῶς πάντα χρόνον θαλλῶν ὁμιλεῖ.*—Isth. iii., Str. i.

[2] *Δίκα, δίκαια φερομένα χεροῖν κράτη*—Electra, 476.

[3] *εἰ γὰρ ὁ μὲν θανὼν γᾶ τε καὶ οὐδὲν ὢν*
κείσεται τάλας
οἱ δὲ μὴ πάλιν
δώσουσ' ἀντιφόνους δίκας,
ἔρροι τ' ἂν αἰδὼς
ἁπάντων τ' εὐσέβεια θνατῶν.—Electra, 244-250.

ensnare the objects of their dislike. This idea gradually disappeared from Greek thought, at least as far as its best representatives are concerned. But pure faith in a moral government was adulterated by the theory of Nemesis, which pursues the prosperous to their hurt and ruin. There is a certain measure of happiness which the gods accord to mortals. Whoever surpasses this measure is destined to have the cup dashed from his lips. The feeling that leads the peculiarly fortunate, at the height of their felicity, to be haunted with the apprehension of a reverse of fortune, might arise from the observation of life, and from an experience of the fact that the lot of men is mixed. But the Greeks held that the function of Nemesis goes beyond the chastisement of pride, and the punishment of prosperous ill-desert. The gods look with envy and disapproval upon the happiness of mortals, however innocent the sources of it may be, when it rises higher than a moderate limit. Herodotus dwells upon this idea. He tells the tale of Polycrates who, in consequence of his uninterrupted good fortune, threw his ring into the sea, that he might ward off greater disasters with which the envy of the gods might visit him.[1] The story of Crœsus which Herodotus narrates at length, is one of the marked illustrations of the vicissitude of fortune which is produced by the resentment of the gods. Æschylus is a witness to the prevalence of the tenet in a passage in which he expresses his own dissent from it:—

> "There lives an old saw, framed in ancient days,
> In memories of men, that high estate
> Full-grown brings forth its young, nor childless dies,
> But that from good success
> Springs to the race a woe insatiable.
> But I, apart from all,
> Hold this my creed alone:

[1] Book iii. 42 seq.

For impious act it is that offspring breeds
Like to their parent stock:
For still in every house
That loves the right their fate for evermore
Rejoiceth in an issue fair and good." [1]

So deeply seated among the ancients was the sense of the instability of fortune, as springing from the refusal of the divinities to tolerate in mortals a degree of happiness that seemed to encroach on their peculiar privilege, that a skeptic like Julius Cæsar, on the evening when he made his triumphant entry into Rome, as master of the world, crawled upon his knees up the steps of the capitol to make a propitiatory offering to Nemesis.

2. The number of the divinities is multiplied as time advances. The personifying impulse is not disposed to rest. Every perennial force, whether material or spiritual, is endowed with personal agency. Xerxes lashes the Hellespont, as an act of punishment. Xenophon, on his retreat with the ten thousand, placates Boreas who blew fiercely in the faces of his men. [2] As the gods become more exalted, intermediate powers are introduced as their agents, to span the gulf that separates the higher divinities from men. The cultus of the heroes, children of the gods or goddesses, grows in importance. The honors paid to the dead assume gradually the form of worship, the ceremonies of which are performed at their burial places. Below the gods, and along

[1] *παλαίφατος δ' ἐν βροτοῖς γέρων λόγος*
τέτυκται, μέγαν τελεσθέντα φωτὸς ὄλβον
τεκνοῦσθαι, μηδ' ἀπαιδα θνήσκειν·
ἐκ δ'ἀγαθᾶς τύχας γένει
βλαστάνειν ἀκόρεστον οἰζύν.
δίχα δ' ἄλλων μονόφρων εἰμί· τὸ δυσσεβὲς γὰρ ἔργον
μέτα μὲν πλείονα τίκτει, σφετέρᾳ δ' εἰκότα γέννᾳ.
οἴκων γὰρ εὐθυδίκων
καλλίπαις πότμος αἰεί.—Agamemnon, 727-737.

[2] Anab., iv. 5. 4.

with the heroes, are the demons, subordinate divinities, the instruments of divine intercourse with the world. Some of them are good, and some evil. The old methods of ascertaining the will of the gods, such as the movement of high-flying birds, which are near the sky, and atmospheric phenomena, as thunder and lightning, were still in vogue. Added to these supernatural signs, were the omens gathered from an inspection of the entrails of animals, it being supposed that the deity presided over the selection of them for sacrifice, and thus made known his mind. So, accidental occurrences, like the sudden, unexpected meeting of persons, and the test of the lot, had their religious interpretation. There was direct revelation, too, by prophecy, sometimes, as in the case of Cassandra in Æschylus, uttered in the ecstatic mood—the furor divinus—and sometimes, as in the case of Calchas and Tiresias, without this abnormal excitement. Oracles acquired a new and vast importance; and these are to be considered as mainly the fruit of enthusiasm, not of imposture. The oracle of Delphi exercised a great political influence, as exemplified in relation to such events as the battle of Marathon, and the creation of the Athenian marine. Its prestige naturally vanished with the downfall of Greek liberty, after it began, as Demosthenes expressed it, "to philippize," or to yield its authority to corrupt inducements.

3. The visible objects of religious regard were multiplied under the mingled impulses of art and piety, and the rites of worship ramified in all directions. The Apostle Paul found in Athens, on every hand, signs of an excess of devotion. The temples and households were filled with images of the gods. Sacred processions, festivals, amusements in which religious observances formed a part, were of constant occurrence. There were prayers in the family; thanks were rendered after meals, and in connection with

all such events as marriages, births, and safe returns from a journey. With expiatory sacrifices, ceremonies of purification, as lustrations, are connected,—a step in advance of Homer. The need of sincerity and spiritual feeling in approaches to the gods, was understood by thoughtful minds. They understood, too, that the conduct of the worshipper must be consistent with his act of devotion. Says Œdipus, in Sophocles :—

> "I pray ye, by the Gods, as ye have raised me,
> So now deliver me, nor, with outward show
> Honoring the Gods, then count the Gods as naught;
> But think that they behold the godly soul,
> Beholding, too, the godless: never yet
> Was refuge found for impious child of man." [1]

It is only in the case of human sacrifices, as in the memorable example of Iphigeneia, or in offerings substituted for these, that the idea of vicarious expiation appears. And human sacrifices, though they reach down into historical times, were more and more repugnant to Greek feeling. Glimpses of a truth not clearly defined to the author's own mind, occasionally appear; as in the Œdipus at Colonos, where we read :—

> "For one soul working in the strength of love
> Is mightier than ten thousand to atone." [2]

Excellence of character centred in *σωφροσύνη*,—the principle of moderation and self-government, through which

[1] *ἀνθ' ὧν ἱκνοῦμαι πρὸς θεῶν ὑμᾶς, ξένοι,*
ὥσπερ με κάνεστήσασθ' ὧδε σώσατε,
καὶ μὴ θεοὺς τιμῶντες εἶτα τοὺς θεοὺς
μοίρᾳ ποιεῖσθε μηδαμῶς· ἡγεῖσθε δὲ
βλέπειν μὲν αὐτοὺς πρὸς τὸν εὐσεβῆ βροτῶν,
βλέπειν δὲ πρὸς τοὺς δυσσεβεῖς, φυγὴν δέ του
μήπω γενέσθαι φωτὸς ἀνοσίου.—Œd. at Col., 275-281.

[2] *ἀρκεῖν γὰρ οἶμαι κἀντὶ μυρίων μίαν*
ψυχὴν τάδ' ἐκτίνουσαν, ἣν εὔνους παρῇ.
Œd. at Col. 499.

the individual keeps within limits, both as concerns others, and as regards the inward subordination of the parts of his own nature. This spirit involves temperance, or the due control of the appetites of sense, and justice which gives to the neighbor his due. In the tragedians and other classic writers of that period, the stern spirit of law prevails, and the requital of injuries is approved. Curses are poured out on enemies. Œdipus exclaims:—

"I did but requite the wrongs I suffered," [1]

and Creon says:

"I claim the right of rendering ill for ill." [2]

It was reserved for philosophy, at a later date, to broach a milder doctrine. Yet placableness and forbearance were not unknown to the Greeks of an earlier day. Thus Oceanus reminds Prometheus that "wise words are the healers of wrath." Ulysses says of Ajax:—

"I know of no man, and I pity him,
So wretched now, although mine enemy,
So tied and harnessed to an evil fate,
And thinking that it touches me as well;
For this I see that we, all we that live
Are but vain phantoms, shadows fleeting fast." [3]

At Athens, there was public provision for orphans and for the help of the poor. Feelings of compassion for the destitute, the aged, and the suffering, find beautiful expression in the best Greek literature.

[1] *δστις παθὼν μὲν ἀντέδρων.*—Œd. at Col. 271.
[2] *ἀνθ' ὧν πεποιθὼς ἠξίουν τάδ' ἀντιδρᾶν.*—Œd. at Col., 953.
[3] *ἐγὼ μὲν οὐδέν' οἶδ'. ἐποικτείρω δέ νιν*
δύστηνον ἔμπας, καίπερ ὄντα δυσμενῆ,
ὀθοίνεκ' ἀτῃ συγκατέζευκται κακῇ,
οὐδὲν τὸ τούτου μᾶλλον ἢ τοὐμὸν σκοπῶν.
ὁρῶ γὰρ ἡμᾶς οὐδὲν ὄντας ἄλλο πλὴν
εἰδωλ' ὁσοιπερ ζῶμεν ἢ κούφην σκιάν.—Ajax, 121-126.

Scattered up and down the poets are pathetic utterances of kindly feeling. Œdipus is touched with sorrow for others. He says:—

—"To use our means, our power,
In doing good, is noblest service owned." [1]

Theseus compassionates Œdipus, having been himself reared away from home, and having gone through many struggles. From no stranger in distress would he draw back; for, he says,

"I know that I am man, and I can count
No more than thou, on what the morrow brings." [2]

Œdipus feels that

—"They alone
Can feel for mourners who themselves have mourned." [3]

Deianeira in "The Maidens of Trachis" is smitten with compassion at the sight of captives:—

—"Sad pity creeps on me,
My friends, when I behold these wretched ones
In a strange land as homeless, fatherless;
And they who sprang, perchance, from free-born sires,
Now lead the life of bond-slaves." [4]

[1] ἀνδρα δ' ὠφελεῖν ἀφ' ὧν
ἔχοι τε καὶ δύναιτο κάλλιστος πόνων.—Œd. Rex, 315.

[2] ἐξοιδ' ἀνὴρ ὢν χὠτι τῆς ἐς αὔριον
οὐδὲν πλέον μοι σοῦ μέτεστιν ἡμέρας.
Œd. at Col., 567-568.

[3] τοῖς γὰρ ἐμπείροις βροτῶν
μόνοις οἷόν τε συνταλαιπωρεῖν τάδε.
Œd. at Col., 1135-1136.

[4] ἐμοὶ γὰρ οἶκτος δεινὸς εἰσέβη, φίλαι,
ταύτας ὁρώσῃ, δυσπότμους ἐπὶ ξένης
χώρας ἀοίκους ἀπάτορός τ' ἀλωμένας,
αἳ πρὶν μὲν ἦσαν ἐξ ἐλευθέρων ἴσως
ἀνδρῶν, τανῦν δὲ δοῦλον ἰσχουσιν βίον.
Maidens of Trachis, 298-302.

In contracting marriage, the female was passive; it was held to be her duty to live in retirement and in submission to her husband; the rule of divorce was extremely lax, nor was the man, like the woman, held to be bound to connubial fidelity. Yet the idea of a higher relation of fellowship and equality between husband and wife is not wholly wanting. Nothing can exceed the beauty of many passages in Æschylus and Sophocles, which touch upon the reciprocal love of parents and children, and brothers and sisters. Ismene, in Œdipus at Colonos, cries out:—

> "My father and my sister!
> Of all names sweetest." [1]

Clytemnestra exclaims:—

> "Though wronged, a mother cannot hate her children." [2]

Electra speaks sorrowfully of Orestes, and of

> —"All the nurture, now so profitless,
> Which I was wont with sweetest toil to give
> For thee, my brother." [3]

The subordination of the citizen to the state merged every other duty in patriotism. The Greek acknowledged the bond that united him to other branches of the Hellenic race; but between the Greek and the barbarian a great gulf was set. The former, in the proud consciousness of superior gifts of nature, of a higher culture, and of more humane customs, denied to the rest of mankind the consideration which he accorded to the people of his own

[1] *ὦ δισσὰ πατρὸς καὶ κασιγνήτης ἐμοὶ*
ἡδίστα προσφωνήμαθ'.—Œd. at Col., 324-325.

[2] *οὐδὲ γὰρ κακῶς*
πάσχοντι, μῖσος ὢν τέκῃ προσγίγνεται.—Electra, 770-771.

[3] *οἰμοι τάλαινα τῆς ἐμῆς πάλαι τροφῆς*
ἀνωφελήτου, τὴν ἐγὼ θάμ' ἀμφὶ σοὶ
πόνῳ γλυκεῖ παρέσχον.—Electra, 1143-1145.

lineage. After the attempt to enslave Greece, which led to the Persian wars, the hostility of Greeks to barbarians became a traditional sentiment. Greeks might hold one another in slavery, but captive Greeks might not be sold to barbarians.

There was a deeper apprehension of sin in the post-Homeric era. Sin was conceived of, not only as an infraction of the moral order, but as a rebellion against the gods,—as practical atheism, or ungodliness. Nor do the gods any longer tempt the innocent to sin. It is only those who have sinned whom they entice onward to the commission of further iniquities, by which their retribution is rendered more severe. This agency of the deities, by which sin is made itself a divine judgment, and the transgressor is made to wade deeper and deeper in the mire of guilt and suffering, is quite prominent in the post-Homeric writers.

4. That human life is replete with trouble and sorrow continues to be the subject of plaintive remark. It is an undertone in the literature of the most brilliant period of Grecian history. The chorus in Œdipus Tyrannus thus exclaims :—

> "Ah, race of mortal men,
> How as a thing of naught
> I count ye, though ye live;
> For who is there of men
> That more of blessing knows,
> Than just a little while
> To seem to prosper well,
> And, having seemed, to fall?" [1]

Ajax, in his wretchedness, looking on his child, says:

> [1] ἰὼ γενεαὶ βροτῶν,
> ὡς ὑμᾶς ἴσα καὶ τὸ μηδὲν ζῶσας ἐναριθμῶ.
> τίς γὰρ, τίς ἀνὴρ πλέον
> τᾶς εὐδαιμονίας φέρει
> ἢ τοσοῦτον ὅσον δοκεῖν
> καὶ δόξαντ' ἀποκλίναι?—Œd. Rex, 1186–1192.

—"Sweetest life is found
In those unconscious years ere yet thou know
Or joy or sorrow."[1]

Pindar sings:—

"But o'er men's hearts unnumbered errors hang;
Nor can dim Reason's glimmering show
The flowery path untrod by woe,
Or find the day's delight, that brings no sorrow's pang."[2]

And again:—

"'Tis not given for man to know
When pale death shall strike the blow,
Nor e'en if one serener day,
The sun's brief child, shall pass away
Unclouded as it rose. The waves
Of life with ceaseless changes flow,
And, as the tempest sleeps or raves,
Bring triumph or disaster, weal or woe."[3]

That "no man is to be thought happy until after his death" was one of the most familiar of proverbs, to illustrate the mutable lot of humanity.

Hades continued to be a region of gloom. It came to be considered a scene of trial and judgment, and of rewards, as well as of sufferings. The soul was no longer so identified with the body, as in Homer. Yet seldom is any bright

[1] ἐν τῷ φρονεῖν γὰρ μηδὲν ἡδιστος βίος,
ἕως τὸ χαίρειν καὶ τὸ λυπεῖσθαι μάθῃς.
Ajax, 554–555.

[2] —ἦτοι βροτῶν γε κέκριται
πεῖρας ὃν τι θανάτου,
οὐδ' ἀσύχιμον ἀμέραν ὀπότε, παῖδ' ἀλίου,
ἀτειρεῖ σὺν ἀγαθῷ τελευτάσομεν· ῥοαὶ δ'ἄλλοτ' ἄλλαί,
εὐθυμιᾶν τε μετὰ καὶ πόνων ἐς ἀνδρες ἔβαν.
Olymp. ii. Ant. ii.

[3] —ἀμφὶ δ' ἀνθρώπων φασὶν ἀμπλακίαι
ἀναρίθμητοι κρέμανται· τοῦτο δ'ἀμάχανον εὑρεῖν,
ὅτι νῦν ἐν καὶ τελευτᾷ φέρτατον ἀνδρὶ τυχεῖν.
Olymp. vii., Str. ii.

anticipation connected with death. The enthusiasm of Œdipus seems to intimate a happy hereafter; yet there we find no definite suggestion of such a prospect.[1] On occasions where we might look for some glowing expression of hope in reference to the departed, as in the funeral oration of Pericles for the fallen patriots, there is an ominous silence.[2] The consciousness of guilt left a sting in death. The Orphic and Eleusinian mysteries were a means of purifying the conscience, and of awakening more joyful hopes for the future. Underlying the former was the Pythagorean tenet of transmigration. The aim was to cleanse the soul from sin and guilt, and thus to give peace to the conscience, and a better hope. The Eleusinian ceremonies, acting principally upon the feelings, served to dispel the gloomy dread of the grave, and to infuse a more glad belief and anticipation respecting the destiny of the soul. The hopes thus engendered find expression in Pindar. In passages, which Plutarch cites in the "Consolation to Apollonius,"[3] the Poet describes the abode of the righteous, where there is no night, where grow the fairest blossoms and the most fragrant plants, and trees inhaling the sweetest perfume:

> "Death doth its efforts on the body spend,
> But the aspiring soul doth upward tend.
> Nothing can damp that bright and subtile flame
> Immortal as the Gods from whence it came." [4]

In the second Olympic Ode, the lot of the good, whose souls have thrice stood a trial on earth, and are now in the Happy Isle, among gentle breezes and "blooms of gold," is contrasted with the doom of the bad. In the tragic

[1] Œd at Col., 1611 seq. [2] Thucyd., ii. 35-46. [3] Consol. ad Apoll. xxxv.

[4] σῶμα μὲν πάντων ἐπεται
θανάτῳ περισθενεῖ, ζῶν
δὲ λείπεται αἰῶνος εἴδωλον·
[τὸ] γὰρ μόνον ἐστὶν ἐκ θεῶν.

poets, it is only the select few, like Agamemnon, who, being raised in the under world to the rank of heroes, and even invoked, have a blessed lot. But apart from the influence of the mysteries upon the initiated class, and as regards the mass of the people, it is probable that the Homeric notions still prevailed, and were the foundation of the popular beliefs respecting the dead. With the cultivated, with the exception of a select band of philosophers, the desire of posthumous fame took the place of the faith in a future, immortal existence of the soul.

CHAPTER IV.

THE POPULAR RELIGION OF THE GREEKS AND ROMANS AND ITS DECLINE.

It is natural to ask how the Greeks could ever have given credence to the myths which attributed gross immorality to the gods, and at the same time have continued to venerate them. How could men adore, and laud as just and good, beings to whom they imputed deeds of treachery, lust, and cruelty, such as, when done by men, they abhorred? In the history of religion it is often found that incongruous conceptions may abide in the mind without jostling each other. The myths in question might be credited, in an unreflecting age, without prompting to such an induction relative to the general character of the gods, as these stories would logically warrant. These exalted beings might be thought to stand on a different plane as to moral responsibility, and to enjoy a license not the privilege of mortals. Some might be content to leave the crimes and infirmities of the gods in the twilight of mystery, not allowing their general habit of reverence to be disturbed by their inability to solve difficulties. The ambition of the leading families in Greece to trace their descendants to the gods tended to multiply the tales relative to the amours of Jove, and of his Olympian companions. The combination of myths having a separate origin—the identification of deities having different names—had the same effect. Not an impure fancy chiefly, but circumstances attending the

growth of mythology in the form in which it was cast by the poets, had led to the creation of these offensive stories. [1] One main key to the solution of the problem just presented lies in the peculiar anthropomorphic idea of the government exercised by the dwellers upon Olympus. It was fashioned after the analogy of city governments so familiar to Greek experience. One civil administration might subvert another; individuals clothed with authority might occasionally abuse their power, and avail themselves of their extraordinary opportunities for the gratification of ambition and lust; yet, on the whole, justice was administered, society was protected, government was a blessing, and rulers were to be loyally and reverently supported. Zeus and the members of his great council might wrangle with one another, and the ruling body might be torn by faction, and its members do deeds of fraud and violence; yet, in the main, it was a righteous and wholesome sway which they exercised over men. The time must come, however, and did come, when the myths to which we refer, became repugnant to the moral sense, and men were reluctant to believe such things of their divinities. Then they were rejected as an invention of the poets, or explained away by some device of interpretation. This protest on moral grounds goes back as far as Pindar. He declares that nothing but what is becoming should be related of the heavenly powers. [2] He denounces as blasphemous the story of the cannibal feast spread for the gods by the father of Pelops. [3] Xenophanes also, in the sixth century before Christ, openly attacked on moral grounds the mythical tales of Homer and Hesiod. He also drew attention to the anthropomorphic character of the popular religion, as shown in the fact that the Ethiopians make

[1] Compare K. O. Müller, *Prolegomena*, Engl. transl., p. 294.
[2] Ol. Od. i. Str. ii. [3] Ibid. Ep. ii.

the images of their gods black and with flat noses, as the people are themselves; the Thracians, on the other hand, make their gods blue-eyed and red; and in general every nation copies its own physical characteristics. He said that if beasts were to draw a likeness of the gods, the horses would make them like themselves, and so oxen and lions would ascribe their own forms to the divinities. Xenophanes himself asserted the unity of God, according to a Pantheistic conception. Afterwards the philosophers, Socrates and Plato, and their contemporary, the orator Isocrates, deny that anything is true of the gods but what is honorable and worthy, and reject the immoral fables as the product of fiction.

But the entire fabric of mythology, being a creation of the fancy of rude and simple ages, was ill fitted to bear an examination. It must betray its weakness the moment it is exposed to the light of rational inquiry. The expansion of the Greek mind brought with it the spirit of investigation. Natural philosophy had another explanation to give for physical phenomena than that of the incessant interference of a crowd of personal divinities. Historical study dissolved many a sacred legend, taught men to call for proofs where no proofs could be forthcoming, and tended to inspire a general temper of distrust in regard to the popular creed. As civilization advanced, and men in large numbers were trained to use their reason in the complex affairs of peace and war, the weak places in the traditional faith must become more and more exposed to view.[1] Allegory was a natural method of treating what could not safely be made the object of a direct assault. Anaxagoras pronounced the several deities to be symbols of physical forces, and thus converted the whole mythology into a

[1] For a description of this intellectual change, see Grote's *Hist. of Greece*, i. ch. xvi.

scheme of natural philosophy. Metrodorus, on the contrary, resolved the popular system into a moral philosophy, by identifying the deities with abstract ethical precepts. These were not isolated individuals, but represented schools, or more general movements, of opinion. Anaxagoras, a man of great ability, asserted that the sun, instead of being alive, as was universally supposed, was a stone, incandescent and larger than the Peloponnesus. The moon, he said, was an earth, with heights and hollows. He denied, also, destiny—εἱμαρμένη—and pronounced it an empty word. He went so far, moreover, as to deny the reality of the signs and omens on which auguries were founded. When Lampon the diviner, predicted from the circumstance that a ram with one horn was found on the farm of Pericles, that his party would triumph over the opposite faction and obtain the government, the philosopher dissected the skull, and showed to the bystanders the natural cause of the phenomenon in the peculiar shape of the animal's brain. It is worth while to observe that Plutarch argues that both the philosopher, and the diviner were right. The divine agency had shaped the brain of the ram that it might serve as a sign of what was to occur. Prosecuted for impiety, Anaxagoras was delivered only by the strenuous exertions of Pericles.[1] Some, as Diagoras of Melos, in the latter part of the 5th century B. C., if the traditions about him are to be accepted, avowed a downright atheism. He is said to have indicated his general tone of feeling by throwing a wooden image of Hercules into the fire to cook a dish of lentils. Then, in the time of Alexander the Great, Euemerus arose, who broached the doctrine that the myths are exaggerations of veritable human history,—natural persons and events, raised by fancy to the height of the supernatural.

[1] Vita Periclis.

Zeus, for example, was once a king of Crete, and a conqueror. It was claimed that his grave had been found. His position and achievements as a god were the result of a poetic transformation. It belonged to historical inquiry to penetrate to the real nucleus at the centre of the mythical and legendary narratives. This naturalistic theory offered a plausible ground for many to stand upon, who shrank from a total rejection of the old traditions.

The dramas of Euripides, in connection with the way in which they were received, afford striking evidence that an era of skepticism was arising which provoked a reactionary hostility on the side of conservative and superstitious feeling. The irreverent and unbelieving utterances which the poet put into the mouths of some of his characters awakened the wrath of his auditors. A certain degree of liberty in this direction must be allowed to a dramatist, and had been exercised here and there by Sophocles, and, though to a less extent—if we except the Prometheus, where there was justification in the peculiarity of the theme, and in the final part of the trilogy—by Æschylus. In Milton's Paradise Lost, or in the "Two Voices" of Tennyson, the poet is not to be charged with all the sentiments uttered in the dialogue. But there was a skeptical tone in Euripides, a betrayal of sympathy on the part of the writer with the obnoxious sentiments expressed by the personages of the drama,—which, coupled with the increased sensitiveness of his audiences, excited their anger and caused them, on one occasion at least, to drown the voice of the actors with their indignant outcries. It was the age of the Sophists, and Euripides had caught the spirit of the time. Whatever merit may have belonged to individuals among the Sophists, however legitimate and useful their vocation as teachers may have been, there is no reason, notwithstanding the defence of them by Mr. Grote, to modify essentially

the verdict of the best of their contemporaries concerning their character and influence. Their method fostered a skepticism which tended not only to undermine the mythological system, but to subvert generally the foundations of religious truth. The maxim of Protagoras that man, meaning each individual, is the measure of all things, was an assertion of the relativity of knowledge, which strikes at the root of objective reality.[1] The cleverness and logical dexterity which their training was directed to produce, in the absence of a proportionate development of moral feeling, was unfavorable to positive convictions of any sort. The philosophical service of the Sophists was of a negative and destructive sort.[2] They pulled down, but could not build up. Hence their existence is an indication of the change which was passing over the Greek mind, and which their influence helped to accelerate.

The influence of historical curiosity, and the growth of a historical sense, in overturning the popular faith, were potent. This effect appears, in a certain degree, in Herodotus, who, with all his natural devoutness and credulity, is driven by his own reflection to subtract something from the legends; for instance, to reject the story of the miraculous labors of Hercules. In one remarkable passage Herodotus asserts, on the ground of what he had learned at Dodona, that the ancient Pelasgi, the ancestors of the Greeks, had given no distinct names or appellations to the gods, but had prayed to them collectively. Their names, the historian erroneously thought, came from Egypt. But as for the special epithets attached to them, and the func-

[1] Diog. L. ix. 51. (Ritter and Preller, *Hist. Phil.*, p. 132.) The maxim of Protagoras is confuted by Plato, in the *Theætetus*.

[2] For an impartial estimate of the influence of the Sophists upon Philosophy, see Zeller, *Phil. d. Griechen*, i. 244, seq. The views of Mr. Grote are confuted by Prof. Blackie in his *Horæ Hellenicæ*, p. 197, seq.

tions or occupations severally attributed to them—all this, he says, goes no further back than Homer or Hesiod.[1] Yet the comparatively recent date of this change appears not to have affected the credence which Herodotus gave to the body of the Homeric and Hesiodic system. In Thucydides, the historical feeling is much more apparent. Grecian antiquity is dealt with in a calm, judicial tone, which, whatever may be said of the particular results arrived at, is in marked contrast with the unquestioning credulity of a former day. There is a characteristic remark of this great historian, which follows his interesting account of the plague at Athens. There had been an ancient prediction, so the old men said, that two heavy judgments would come at once; a Doric war without, and a pestilence within, the walls. There had been a dispute whether the correct reading of the prophecy was *λοιμός*, a plague, or *λιμός*, a famine. The people concluded that *λοιμός*—a plague—was the right word; "but, in my judgment," says Thucydides, "should they ever again be engaged in a Doric war, and a famine happen at the same time, they will have recourse with equal probability to the other interpretation."[2] Thucydides records without comment the alarm occasioned in the army of Nikias by an eclipse of the moon, and the consequent delay of the commander, acting under the ad-

[1] Οὗτοι [Hesiod and Homer] *δέ εἰσι οἱ ποιήσαντες Θεογονίην Ἕλλησι, καὶ τοῖσι θεοῖσι τὰς ἐπωνυμίας δόντες, καὶ τιμὰς τε καὶ τέχνας διελόντες καὶ εἴδεα αὐτῶν σημήναντες.*—Lib. ii. 53. Grote regards Herodotus as here "recognizing Homer and Hesiod as the prime authors of Grecian belief respecting the names and generations, the attributes and agency, the forms and worship, of the gods." *Hist. of Greece*, i. 483. Blakesley (*Herodotus*, i. 207, n. 153) considers this a too sweeping judgment on the part of Grote, and would make Herodotus ascribe to the Poets the work of "giving a symmetry and consolidation to the popular creed and clothing it in the language of poetry."

[2] *ἦν δέ γε οἶμαι ποτὲ ἄλλος πόλεμος καταλάβῃ Δωρικὸς τοῦδε ὕστερος καὶ ξυμβῇ γενέσθαι λιμόν, κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς οὕτως φάσονται.*—Hist., ii. 54.

vice of soothsayers, to withdraw his forces—a delay which contributed to their destruction. The silence of the historian must be taken as equivalent to an explicit condemnation. The remarks of Plutarch, in his life of Nikias, on this event, are worthy of note. Before that time, he says, common people had learned that an eclipse of the sun is occasioned by an interposition of the moon. Anaxagoras had explained the cause of an eclipse of the moon, also; but his book was kept concealed, and was in the hands of but few. Hence, the fright of the Athenian army which looked upon such an occurrence as the prognostic of great calamities. "The world," says Plutarch, "could not bear that naturalists and meteor-mongers, as they were then styled, should seem to restrain the divine power by explaining away its agency into the operation of irrational causes and senseless forces acting by necessity, without anything of Providence, or a free agent.[1] For such attempts Protagoras was banished; and Pericles, with much ado, procured the release of Anaxagoras, when he was thrown into prison. Nay, Socrates, who never meddled with any of these points, was, however, put to death upon the charge of philosophizing." Plutarch, himself a devout heathen of the first century, was much too enlightened not to perceive the superstition of Nikias and his troops, as they had too much knowledge to be disturbed by an eclipse of the *sun*, which would have terrified their predecessors. Plutarch here lets fall a word which gives the real occasion of the death of Socrates. He abjured physical studies and speculations; he was a believer in the gods; he even adduced the doctrine of Anaxagoras about the sun as a proof of the vain and profitless character of such inquiries;[2] but his habit

[1] *οὐ γὰρ ἠνείχοντο τοὺς φυσικοὺς καὶ μετεωρολέσχας τότε καλουμένους*, etc. —xxiii. 16.

[2] Xenophon, *Mem.*, iv. 7.

of subjecting moral and political doctrine to the scrutiny of reason, and his logical fencing, savored of rationalism, and offended the populace. Aristophanes classified him with the Sophists; he was condemned as one of the corrupters of youth. Comedy took the side of conservatives, against the disintegrating tendency developed among intellectual men. But the Comedy itself, by the ridiculous aspect in which it exhibited the divinities, not to speak of its other characteristics, injured the cause which it pretended at first to serve.

Thucydides makes it clear that the Peloponnesian war had a fatal influence upon the national religion. The bonds of morality were relaxed. The obligation of an oath, the sanctity of which had ever been held in the highest reverence, was no longer regarded, when self-interest prompted its violation. The religion of Greece fell with its liberty, and shared in its political ruin. "For the Greek religion," says Curtius, "was not a supersensuous religion, reaching beyond the bounds of space and time, and inspiring hopes of a world hereafter; but it was interwoven in the closest way with actually existing conditions and circumstances; it was a national and a state religion, and its maintenance was the condition as well as the guaranty of the public weal. The national gods were so incorporated with the states in which they were worshipped, that they were held accountable for the commonwealth, and, therefore, the confidence in them was gone, when the commonwealth entrusted to their care was seen to fall."[1] The terrible failure of the Sicilian expedition under Nikias led to a contempt for prophecy, which in this case had been falsified, and for the religious strictness which had led to defeat. Democracy produced an impatience of all authority. Foreign divinities were brought in, and a struggle

[1] History of Greece, iii. 56.

of superstition and unbelief arose, like that which attended the decadence of the religion of Rome. Thenceforward, cultivated men resorted to philosophical discussion as a source of amusement and solace, while the common herd adhered to the ancient rites and forms, from which the life and spirit, and most of the power they had possessed to curb the passions, and to soothe and elevate the soul, had fled.

The Romans and the Greeks were descended from a common stock. The rudiments of their religion, like the foundations of their language, therefore, had been the same. Thus, in common with all the branches of the Indo-Germanic family, the progenitors of both peoples worshipped a god of the effulgent heavens, the Shining One, who thunders in the sky—Zeus, or Jupiter. But as the Romans differed from the Greeks, so their religious development was essentially diverse. The Greeks were quick, versatile, imaginative. Their senses and feelings were alive to the impressions of nature in its manifold forms. The Romans lacked imagination, and æsthetic power; but they had a sobriety, a dignity, and a moral sense, which we miss in the Hellenic character. The Greeks, moreover, were so placed, geographically, that their mental tendencies were stimulated by a maritime life, and by contact with the peoples inhabiting the neighboring islands, and the mainland of Asia and Egypt. How much their religion owed to Semitic, and other oriental influences, is a point not yet determined. The Romans, cut off from the marvels and adventures of the sea, and shut up to a simple agricultural life, gave to their religion no such poetic expansion as that which we find among the Greeks. In fact, they had no national epos. Heroic figures like Hercules, Ulysses and Æneas, are borrowed from the Greeks.

The Roman divinities were of different sexes, but were commonly childless. There existed only the elements of a cosmogony and theogony. The Romans were always great formalists. Their worship consisted in the punctilious observance of a carefully defined ritual. Their deities have not that concreteness, that vivid personality, which belongs to the gods of Greece. There was a class of beings—as Genii, Lares, Manes, Penates—who did not of themselves possess the distinct character of persons, but acquired it only as they were identified with individuals, nations, cities, and localities, or with definite functions and occupations of men.[1] The term *numen*, so frequently used to denote the exertion of power by a divinity, has a characteristic vagueness. At the dedication of temples, and on occasions of public calamity—for instance, when an earthquake occurred—the Romans either invoked the gods in common, or attached a proviso which rendered their supplications applicable to any god or goddess who might be concerned in the event.

At first the number of gods whom the Romans adored was small. But three causes conspired to multiply this number to an almost indefinite extent.[2] The first was the old custom of evocation, or the habit of inviting the divinities who protected the cities which they were besieging, to abandon them, and take up their abode at Rome, whither their worship was transplanted. To avoid a similar act on the part of their enemies, the Romans in early times kept the names of their own gods secret. Secondly, the qualities originally ascribed to their divinities were expressed in the substantive, instead of the adjective form; and this gave rise to a throng of deities extremely abstract in their character,—such as Æquitas, Clementia, Salus, Voluptas. Thirdly, the appellations of the gods were in part the same

[1] See Preller, *Röm. Mythologie*, p. 45.

[2] See Becker and Marquardt, *Röm. Alt.*, Th. iv. p. 21 seq.

among the Romans and the Italians, while the rites of worship were often dissimilar. Hence, when the Italian divinities were transported to Rome, this difference in the modes of worship led to an entire departure from the original notion of the divinity. Thus Juno was worshipped very diversely in the various Italian towns; and at Rome she was worshipped under different appellations and forms of ritual. The Roman religion, both as to the objects of religious homage, and the ceremonies and institutions of the system, underwent a vast expansion, in comparison with the primitive time when the deities were few, and were worshipped without the use of images. Yet the abstract character of the Roman gods, each fulfilling a certain function, makes their religion less distantly removed from monotheism, or monism, in the pantheistic or theistic form, than that of the Greeks.

But the Greek religion had been undergoing, for several centuries before Christ, an amalgamation with the Roman. Rome was early brought into intercourse with the old Greek cities of Southern Italy, which at length were incorporated under her rule. In the time of the Tarquins, the Sibylline books, which explained the rites proper to be practised in exigencies not provided for by the ordinary ritual, were introduced from Cumæ. Also, the worship of Apollo was brought from this oldest of the Greek settlements, and acquired a constantly increasing influence until at length this Greek god, whose healing power was supposed to go forth upon the body and the spirit, received honors second only to those paid to Jupiter. In early times, the Romans had resorted to the oracle at Delphi for counsel; and after the capture of Veii, they sent there a votive offering. Recognizing the Greeks as kinsmen, and identifying the Hellenic divinities with their own, they incorporated into their creed the myths and legends of the Greek my-

thology, and, more and more, elements of the cultus associated with them. This fusion went on at a rapid pace in the two or three centuries that immediately preceded the Christian era. To make the matter worse, it was only the shell of the old Greek religion that the Romans received. Losing their own religion, they received nothing real in exchange for it. The hollow, unbelieving spirit of the last age of the Republic was a verification of Cato's prediction, that when that race gave Rome its letters, it would corrupt all things.[1] Other causes conspired to undermine and degrade the Roman religion. The triumph of the Plebeians broke up the theocratical and patriarchal spirit that had prevailed in the community of Romans and Sabines which had grown up on the banks of the Tiber. Religion, like the state, imbibed a secular, worldly spirit. The decay and fall of the Roman religion date from the second Punic war; for up to this time the Hellenizing influence had been kept within bounds, and the simple, austere type of the national cultus had not been given up. From this time, foreign rites, which had been repugnant to the feelings of former generations, pushed into Italy and Rome, in spite of the resistance of the better class of citizens. The cultivated class, having caught the skeptical spirit from the Greeks, came at last to the point of regarding the established religion as a necessary part of the civil constitution, as indispensable and valuable for the vulgar, but as entitled to no credence. Ennius, who was born 239 B. C., to whom the Romans looked up as the father of their literature, made his countrymen acquainted with the theory of Euemerus; and this gained many adherents. The Roman literature, from the start, was the virtual ally of the skeptical tendency. The introduction of the Greek stage gave a finishing stroke to the separation of the liter-

[1] See Becker and Marquardt, p. 80.

ary and enlightened class from the popular creed. The representations in the theatre presented the old mythology in the characteristic features which rendered it absurd and incredible in the eyes of thinking men. The priests, instead of being chosen by their own body, were elected by the people. The spiritual offices became entirely secularized. They were filled by wealthy and ambitious citizens, who went through the prescribed ceremonies, as a matter of official routine, with an outward decorum, but without the smallest degree of faith or sincerity. The two main causes of the downfall of the old Roman faith were, first, the influence of the skeptical speculations of the Greeks, and, secondly, the political changes which robbed ecclesiastical personages of all the sanctity which had previously attached to them.

The deification of the Emperors was a suitable climax to the progressive degradation of the religion of Rome. In oriental countries, kings had received divine honors, under the idea, proper to despotism, that their power emanates directly from heaven. The hero-worship with which the Greeks and Romans were familiar, the belief in demons, an order of divinities concerned directly with the world, and the old Roman notion of genii, representatives of the gods, intermediate beings, exercising a divine guardianship and protection on earth, prepared the minds of men for this last act of servility, the apotheosis of their earthly rulers. Just as every individual was thought to have his genius who attended him invisibly from his birth through life, so there was a Genius Publicus—the guardian of the State—whose statue stood in the forum. Religious honors had been paid to genii; especially were there ceremonies of this kind on the birth-days of friends, or of individuals held in honor. Homage rendered to the genius of the Emperor was, therefore, natural to the Romans It was a

short step to identify the genius with the Emperor's own person. Augustus, and the Emperors after him, at their death were consecrated—canonized, as it were—or raised to the rank of immortals who were entitled to divine honors. By a vote of the Senate, followed by solemn ceremonies, they were enthroned among the gods. An eagle, let loose from the funeral pile, and flying upward, symbolized the ascent of the deceased to the skies. A Senator who swore that he saw Augustus, on the occasion of his consecration, mount to heaven, just as Romulus was supposed to have ascended, was rewarded by Livia with a gift of money. Divine honors began to be rendered to Julius Cæsar during his life-time. His birth-day and his victories were commemorated with religious services, a month was named for him, his bust was worshipped in the temple. After his death, sacrifices were offered up to him upon the altar. He was made a god, and went by the name of Divus Julius. The same kind of adulation was paid in larger measure to Augustus. A multitude of altars and temples arose in his honor in all parts of the Roman world. Especially in Greece and in the East, where the spirit of sycophancy was most rife, did the new cultus spread. Other members of the imperial family, women as well as men, received a like deification. The basest tyrants, like Nero and Commodus, were enthroned as objects of religious worship. To this depth of degradation the Roman religion had sunk. The worship of savage human tyrants was required by law. This was in keeping with the spirit which prompted the Senate, as Tacitus bitterly narrates, to decree offerings at the temples on account of brutal murders perpetrated by the orders of Nero.[1]

A deep sense of justice and of the obligations of law, was native to the Roman mind. Hence there had been a

[1] Ann. xiv. 64.

solemn faith in a moral government of the world. The Trojans in Virgil gave utterance to the sound Roman feeling, when they enforced their appeal for hospitality with the words :—

> "Si genus humanum, et mortalia temnitis arma,
> At sperate deos memores fandi atque nefandi."
> Æn. i. 542-544. [1]

The punishment of evil-doers was sure, whatever might be true of the rewards of the virtuous. These, the Greeks too had felt, were less certain than the penalties of wrong. Tacitus goes so far as to consider it proved by experience that the gods are not concerned about the protection of the innocent, but only about the punishment of the guilty.[2] The power of conscience is manifested in numerous examples; as in what the same historian says of the anguish of Tiberius.[3] "We talk," says Cicero, "as if all the miseries of man were comprehended in death, pain of body, sorrow of mind, or judicial punishment; which I grant are calamitous accidents that have befallen many good men; but the sting of conscience, the remorse of guilt, is in itself the greatest evil, even exclusive of the external punishments that attend it." [4] But Cicero expressed the fear that the loss of religious faith would so weaken conscience as to sap the foundations of ethical justice between man and man.[5]

The Roman statesmen and scholars, in the age when

[1] "But if menfolk and wars of men, ye wholly set at naught,
Yet deem the Gods have memory still of good and evil wrought."

[2] Hist. i. 4. 3. [3] Ann. vi. 6.

[4] Morte, aut dolore corporis, aut luctu animi, aut offensione judicii, hominum miserias ponderamus; quæ fateor humana esse, et multis bonis viris accidisse: sceleris est pœna tristis, et præter eos eventus qui sequuntur, per se ipsa maxima est.—De Legibus, ii. 18.

[5] Atque haud scio an, pietate adversus Deos sublata, fides etiam, et societas humani generis, et una excellentissima virtus, justitia, tollatur. —De Nat. Deorum, i. 2.

Christianity was introduced, looked on the popular religion as a political necessity, and defended, as well as practiced, the "pious fraud" in dealing with the multitude on this subject. Varro, a contemporary and intimate friend of Cicero, and called by him the most acute and learned of men, in his great work, the *Antiquities*, entered very fully into the history and description of the Roman religion. Augustine, who re-echoes the laudation which Cicero bestows on his erudition and acuteness, gives an account of his book, with copious extracts.[1] Varro distinguished three kinds of religion, "*mythical*, which the poets chiefly use; *physical*, which the philosophers use; and *civil*, which peoples use." He did not scruple to comment on the unworthy and absurd character of myths and legends of the popular faith. He went as far as he could; Augustine says, as far as "he dared," in this direction. The second kind of theology, the natural philosophy in its various schools, he describes without censure. Whatever sects it may give rise to, it lends no credence to fables. Civil theology is that which the state ordains, the worship which the laws prescribe. This is described by Varro in all its minute ramifications. By this system citizens are to abide. Yet, as Augustine shows, the contents of the legal religion are, to a large extent, identical with those of the religion of the theatre, as Varro aptly designates the vulgar faith. Objections that lie against the one are equally valid against the other. Varro himself, in common with many others, believed in one deity, an impersonal spirit immanent in the world, and not separable from it. Scholars like him, Augustine truly observes, set forth, side by side, the fabulous and the civil system of religion. The "former they dared to reject, the latter they dared not; the former they set forth to be cen-

[1] De Civ. Dei, Lib. vii.

sured, the latter they showed to be very like it; not that it might be chosen to be held in preference to the other, but that it might be understood to be worthy of being rejected together with it." Seneca, who was born a century after the birth of Varro, avowed in the plainest terms his contempt for the civil theology. His expressions on this subject we owe also to Augustine, as the work on Superstition, from which they are cited, is not extant.[1] Of the rites appointed by law, Seneca says: "All which things a wise man will observe as being commanded by the laws, but not as being pleasing to the gods." "And what of this, that we unite the gods in marriage, and that not even naturally, for we join brothers and sisters? We marry Bellona to Mars, Venus to Vulcan, Salacia to Neptune, Some of them we leave unmarried, as though there were no match for them, which is surely needless, especially when there are certain unmarried goddesses, as Populonia, or Fulgora, or the goddess Rumina, for whom I am not astonished that suitors have been wanting." To this Seneca adds: "all that ignoble rabble of gods which the superstition of ages has heaped up, we shall adore in such a way as to remember that their worship belongs rather to custom than to reality." The writings of Cicero are fruitful in illustrations of the prevalent skepticism. He twice refers to the witticism of Cato, who said that he did not see how the soothsayers could avoid laughing each other in the face. In Cicero's treatise *de Natura Deorum*, Cotta, who is introduced as one of the interlocutors, an orator and magistrate of eminent standing, distinguishes in himself the character of a philosopher, and that of a priest. He says, that before inquiring into the nature of the gods, it is best to inquire whether there are gods or not; and on this point he says: "It would be dangerous, I believe, to take

[1] De Civ. Dei, Lib. vi.

the negative side before a public auditory (in concione); but it is very safe in a conference of this kind and in this company."[1] In the first of the Tusculan Discussions occurs the dialogue between M, which stands either for Marcus, or Magister, and his Auditor: "M. Tell me, I beseech you, are you afraid of the three-headed Cerberus in the shades below, and the roaring waves of Cocytus, and the passage over Acheron, and Tantalus, expiring with thirst, while the water touches his chin, and Sisyphus

> "Who sweats with arduous toil in vain
> The steepy summit of the mount to gain."

Perhaps, too, you dread the inexorable judges, Minos and Rhadamanthus; before whom neither L. Crassus nor M. Antonius can defend you; and where, since the cause lies before Grecian judges, you will not even be able to employ Demosthenes; but you must plead for yourself before a very great assembly. These things, perhaps, you dread, and, therefore, look on death as an eternal evil. A. Do you take me to be so imbecile as to give credit to such things? M. What? Do you not believe them? A. Not in the least. M. I am sorry to hear that. A. Why, I beg? M. Because I could have been very eloquent in speaking against them."[2] Those who are familiar with

[1] Quæritur primum in ea quæstione, quæ est de natura Deorum, sintne Dei, necne sint. Difficile est negare, credo, si in concione quæratur; sed in hujusmodi sermone et consessu facillimum.—*De Nat. Deorum* i. 22.

[2] M. Dic, quæso, num te illa terrent? Triceps apud inferos Cerberus? Cocyti fremitus? travectio Acherontis?

> 'Mento summam aquam attingens enectus siti,'

Tantalus, tum illud quod,

> 'Sisiphus versat
> Saxum sudans nitendo neque proficit hilum,'

fortasse etiam inexorabiles judices Minos et Rhadamanthus? apud quos nec te L. Crassus defendet, nec M. Antonius; nec, quoniam apud Græcos judices res agetur, poteris adhibere Demosthenen; tibi ipsi pro te

Sallust may recall the account which he gives of the debate in the Roman Senate on the question how Catiline should be punished. Julius Cæsar opposed the infliction of capital punishment, on the ground that death puts an end to pain, since beyond it there is no room either for anguish or joy.[1] Both Cato and Cicero, in their speeches, refer to the doctrine of future retribution as an opinion held by the ancients, without attempting to defend it.

It must be observed that skepticism frequently did not stop short with the denial of the mythical divinities, and of the fables relating to them. It extended to the foundations of natural religion, the truth of the being of God and of a Providence The sneer of Pilate—what is Truth?—expressed a prevalent feeling of cultivated men, that the attempt to ascertain anything certain on these things is vain—the fit pursuit of visionaries. There were those who mingled with their scorn for the popular credulity the acknowledgment of one God, whom, however, they stripped of personal attributes. It was a sort of materialistic Pantheism. The elder Pliny, whatever may be his defects as a naturalist, and however inferior his work may be to kindred writings of Aristotle, was not only a man of unexampled industry, but also of a vigorous understanding. Near the beginning of his Natural History, he devotes a chapter to the subject of "God." "Whatever God be," he says, "if there be any other God [than the world], and wherever he exists, he is all sense, all sight, all hearing, all life [totus animæ] all mind [totus animi], and all within himself."[2] He asserts the folly of believing in

erit maxima corona causa dicenda. Hæc fortasse metuis, et idcirco mortem censes esse sempiternum malum. VI. A. Adeone me delirare censes, ut ista esse credam? M. An tu hæc non credis? A. Minime vero. M. Male hercule narras. A. Cur, quæso. M. Quia disertus esse possem, si contra ista dicerem. Tusc. I. v. vi.

[1] Sallust, *B. C.* 50.

[2] Nat. Hist., ii. 5.

gods, who are personified virtues, and vices, and even personified diseases, and in the marriages, quarrels, foibles, and crimes which are ascribed to divinities. The deification of men is the best kind of worship. "But," he proceeds to say, "it is ridiculous to suppose, that the great head of all things, whatever it be, pays any regard to human affairs. Can we believe—or rather can there be any doubt, that it is not polluted by such a disagreeable and complicated office?" It is difficult to determine, he thinks, which opinion, that which admits a divine agency with reference to human affairs, or the utter denial of it, is most advantageous, so multiplied and foolish are the extravagances of superstition. Our skepticism respecting God is increased by the deification of Fortune, who has become the most popular of divinities, "whom every one invokes." "We are so much in the power of chance, that chance itself is considered as a God, and the existence of God becomes doubtful." "There are others," Pliny goes on to observe, "who reject this principle, and assign events to the influence of the stars, and to the laws of our nativity; they suppose that God, once for all, issues His decrees, and never afterwards interferes. This opinion begins to gain ground, and both the learned and unlearned vulgar are falling into it. Hence we have the admonitions of thunder, the warnings of oracles, the predictions of soothsayers, and things too trifling to be mentioned, as sneezing and stumbling with the feet, reckoned among omens. The late Emperor Augustus relates that he put the left shoe on the wrong foot, the day when he was near being assaulted by his soldiers." "Such things as these," concludes Pliny, "so embarrass improvident mortals, that among all of them this alone is certain, that there is nothing more proud or more wretched than man." The lower animals never think about glory, or money, or ambition, and, above all, they never reflect on death.

Skepticism, in the absence of a ruling caste, such as maintains an esoteric system in Oriental countries, could not be confined to officials and educated persons. It must betray its existence, and to some extent communicate itself to other classes, in the stir and ferment of Græco-Roman society. To what extent had the leaven of unbelief thus worked its way downward into the lower ranks of society? This is a question difficult to answer. Undoubtedly there is a striking contrast between the impression made by the literature, which reflects the tone of the cultivated class, and that produced by the sepulchral and votive inscriptions which emanate from all orders of men.[1] If there be the spirit of incredulity in the one, there is, on the whole, in the other, the manifestation of an unquestioning faith. Yet, especially at the close of the Republican era, and prior to the reconstruction of society under the Emperors, skepticism had widely spread. Superstition followed in the wake of infidelity as its natural companion. The void left in the soul by the departure of the old faith was filled by new objects of belief, often more degraded than the old, which rushed in to fill its place. The eagerness of Romans for foreign rites, as the cultus of Isis and Serapis, which was partly due to this cause, prevailed in spite of efforts at legal suppression. Devotional practices and ceremonies, such as the old Romans would have despised, were imported from the East, and came into vogue. Magicians, sorcerers, and necromancers, swarmed in every part of the empire, and drove a lucrative trade. They stood in the path of the first preachers of Christianity, as we see in the book of Acts, and in the early Fathers. At the same time, a consciousness, vague and undefined it might be, that the old religion was gradually losing ground, imparted a fanatical tinge to the struggles that were made

[1] See Friedländer, *Sittengeschichte Roms.*, iii. 423, 424.

to uphold it. It was the bitterness that attends the defence of a sinking cause which is kept from downfall by artificial props.

The mischiefs and extravagances of superstition are depicted by Plutarch, in his famous Essay on this subject. Plutarch, unlike Pliny, was a religious man. By means of his Platonic eclecticism, he could believe in one supreme Deity, and yet find room for gods and demons in the capacity of subordinate agents. The tract, to which we refer, opens by affirming that from our ignorance of divine things there flow out two streams; "whereof the one in harsh and coarse tempers, as in dry and stubborn soils, produces atheism, and the other in the more tender and flexible, as in moist and yielding grounds, produces superstition." Superstition has one disadvantage compared with atheism, that the latter is not attended with any passion or perturbation of mind. Its effect is rather frigidity and indifference. The superstitious man is under the distracting influence of fear, and of a sort of fear that is attended with the dread of everything. It haunts him everywhere, whether he is awake or asleep, on the land or the sea. He flies to the next fortune-teller, or vagrant interpreter of dreams. He cannot use his reason when awake, nor dismiss his fears when asleep. Dreading the divine government as an inexorable and implacable tyranny, he is yet unable to escape from its presence. He quivers at his preservers and benign benefactors. Even at the altars, to which men betake themselves to revive their courage, he is full of trembling. The atheist is blind, or sees amiss, but he is not subject to a frightful passion. He sees not the gods at all, while the superstitious man mistakes "their benignity for terror, their paternal affection for tyranny, their providence for cruelty, and their frank simplicity for savageness and brutality." Afraid of the gods, he still fawns upon them,

and runs after them. He reviles himself as an object of detestation to heaven. "God," says Plutarch, "is the brave man's hope, and not the coward's excuse." Trust in him is inspiration to valor. A man would rather have his existence denied altogether, than to be thought of as vindictive, fickle and unstable. It is the foul and senseless excesses of superstition that breed atheism in the beholders. We should flee from superstition, yet not rashly, "as people run from the incursions of robbers or from fire, and fall into bewildered and untrodden paths full of pits and precipices. For so some, while they would avoid superstition, leap over the golden mean of true piety into the harsh and coarse extreme of atheism." [1]

Plutarch is one of the earliest representatives of that movement which aimed to find a *via media* between superstition and unbelief, and to reconstruct paganism by placing under it a monotheistic, or pantheistic foundation. A believer himself in the unity and personality of God, he explained what was repulsive in the mythological tales by the supposition of inferior demons, to whom much that had been attributed to the superior divinities was ascribed. In the second and third centuries, this general philosophical movement, which aimed at the rescue and elevation of the popular faith, secured many adherents among the educated heathen, and assumed the form of a reaction against the spread of Christianity.

Augustus had undertaken religious reforms as a part of his general scheme for the renovation of society and the restoration of order. His efforts were naturally directed in the main towards the re-establishment of religious observances. If this movement gained little sympathy in that frivolous and skeptical society, there were some, of whom Virgil may stand as an example, of a graver and

[1] De Superstit., 1, 3, 8, 14.

more serious turn, who sincerely desired to infuse a fresh life into the ancient forms. In the second century, the influence of philosophy, which inculcated in some form the divine unity, and the influence due to the introduction of other, especially oriental, objects and methods of worship, conspired to produce in the cultivated classes an idea of the essential identity of the various religions. God was conceived of as one being under various names, and the multitude of divinities below the Supreme were taken as representing the variety of His functions, or as subordinate instruments of His Providence. The old rites were left unaltered, but a new meaning was attached to them. This late revival of Paganism in a philosophical form, accompanied as it often was with a real devoutness, constituted a formidable obstacle to the progress of the Christian faith. At the same time, however, the failure of heathenism under its improved aspect to afford precise and satisfactory solutions to the most important problems, operated to prepare many thoughtful minds for the reception of the Gospel. The change in the apprehension of the old system acted in opposite directions, now as an obstacle, and now as a help, to the religion of Christ.

At no time was it a slight thing to break away from the old religion. To quote the language of Gibbon: "The innumerable deities and rites of polytheism were closely interwoven with every circumstance of business or pleasure, of public or private life; and it seemed impossible to escape the observance of them without, at the same time, renouncing the commerce of mankind, and all the offices and amusements of society."[1] But the spread of skepticism rendered the abandonment of the old system easier. It is possible to exaggerate, and, as we have said before, it is difficult to estimate exactly, the extent of this feeling in the

[1] Ch. xv. (Smith's ed., ii. 166.)

age of Cicero, and in that of Pliny. But this is clear, that the mythological religion had entered upon a process of decay and dissolution, which might, to be sure, be retarded by efforts on the side of conservatism, by ingenious combinations and artificial explanations, but which must eventually run its course. The superstition and unbelief to which we have referred are not indications of disease wholly; they are, likewise, indications of health. Superstition might, it is true, arise from an evil conscience, and unbelief might result from the insensibility engendered by a profligate life. But, as they existed in the Roman world, they sprang, in great part, from the fact that the human mind had outgrown the polytheistic religion which the imagination of former ages had created, and was waiting for something better. Superstition testified to the need of objects of faith, which lies deep in the heart, and which Christianity alone could satisfy. Skepticism arose from the insufficiency of the traditional beliefs to satisfy the craving of the spirit, ever reaching forth for some connection with the supernatural world. Christianity could never be evolved out of this unsatisfied yearning of the soul; but it was a hunger and thirst which prepared many minds to receive with open hands the bread of life.

In bringing to a close the two chapters in which we have considered the religion of the Greeks and Romans, a brief space may be given for an answer to the question: What relation of sympathy or affinity to Christian Revelation can the mythological religion sustain?

1. It was religion. The subjective sentiments which enter into religion, as fear, reverence, gratitude, dependence, adoration, the spirit of prayer and supplication to Deity, were there. These sentiments might lack purity, the object on which they should fasten might be, and was, very defectively conceived; "yet there was worship, in its kind

often very earnest." Plato, in the course of his fervent protest against Atheism, incidentally brings out this fact with impressive force. "I speak," he says, "of those who will not believe the words which they have heard as babes and sucklings from their mothers and nurses, who used them as charms, both in jest and earnest, whom also they have heard and seen offering up sacrifices and prayers—sights and sounds delightful to children—of their parents sacrificing in the most earnest manner on behalf of them and of themselves, and with eager interest talking to the gods, and beseeching them, as though they were firmly convinced of their existence; moreover, they see and hear the genuflexions and prostrations which are made by Hellenes and barbarians to the rising and setting sun and moon, in all the various turns of good and evil fortune, not as if they thought that there were no gods, but as if there were no suspicion of their non-existence."[1] In the light of such a description, who can doubt that an ardent and genuine devotion, for ages long, in the case of a multitude of heathen, entered into their religious services? The myths not unfrequently embodied truth of the most exalted character. A gifted Christian scholar, speaking of the "beautiful and sublime fable in the Theogony, of the espousal by Zeus of Themis, the moral and physical government of the world, by whom he begot the Destinies; and of Eurynome, of whom were born the Charites, "who lend a grace and charm to every form of life," says: "He who does not here recognize religion, genuine, true religion, for him have Moses and the prophets written in vain."[2]

2. There was a seeking after God in the heathen devotions.[3] The subjective sentiments which belong to religion,

[1] Laws, x. 888 (Jowett, iv. 397).

[2] K. O. Müller, *Prolegomena*, etc. (Engl. Transl.), p. 186.

[3] Acts xvii. 27.

could not reach their perfection of development, or meet with satisfaction, until the one object, worthy of them, who might be "ignorantly worshipped," was revealed in his true attributes. There was thus an unfulfilled demand in the religious nature, which impelled the soul of the earnest worshipper on the path towards a goal that was hidden from his sight, prior to the Christian Revelation.

3. The drift towards monotheism, which was due to the necessities of moral and religious feeling, as well as to intellectual progress, is discerned from the Homeric days. If Zeus mingled in human affairs, often displaying weakness and folly, there was another conception of him, as one who dwells in Æther, the father of gods and men, who flashes the lightning from the clouds, governs all, and accomplishes all his will.[1] More and more, as we advance towards the Christian era, the monotheistic tendency grows in strength.

[1] Compare K. O. Müller, p. 186.

CHAPTER V.

THE GREEK PHILOSOPHY IN ITS RELATION TO CHRISTIANITY.

THE Greek Philosophy was a preparation for Christianity in three ways. It dissipated, or tended to dissipate, the superstitions of polytheism; it awakened a sense of need which philosophy of itself failed to meet; and it so educated the intellect and conscience as to render the Gospel apprehensible, and, in many cases, congenial to the mind. It did more than remove obstacles out of the way; its work was positive as well as negative. It originated ideas and habits of thought which had more or less direct affinity with the religion of the Gospel, and which found in this religion their proper counterpart. The prophetic element of the Greek philosophy lay in the glimpses of truth which it could not fully discern, and in the obscure and unconscious pursuit of a good which it could not definitely grasp.

Socrates stands at the beginning of this movement. The preceding philosophy had been predominantly physical. It sought for an explanation of nature. The mystic, Pythagoras, blended with his natural philosophy moral and religious doctrine; but that doctrine, whatever it was, appears to have rested on no scientific basis. Socrates is the founder of moral science; and the whole subsequent course of Greek philosophy is traceable to the impulse which emanated from this sublime man. A parallel has more than once been drawn between Socrates and Jesus himself; nor are there wanting points of resemblance, which readily suggest themselves. More aptly was So-

crates styled by Marsilius Ficinus, the Florentine Platonist of the Renaissance, the John the Baptist for the ancient world. Respecting the relation of Socrates and of his teaching to Christianity, the following points are worthy of notice:—

1. The soul and its moral improvement was the great subject that employed his attention. He turned away from the study of material nature. He could not spare time for such inquiries; they seemed to him unpractical,—which was not so strange a judgment, considering the physical theories that prevailed; and they meddled with a province which it belonged to the gods to regulate. "As for himself," writes his loving disciple, Xenophon, "man, and what related to man, were the only subjects on which he chose to employ himself. To this end, all his inquiries and consideration turned upon what was pious, what impious; what honorable, what base; what just, what unjust; what wisdom, what folly; what courage, what cowardice; what a state or political community," and the like. [1] His great maxim —"know thyself"— called the individual to look within himself in order to become acquainted with his deficiencies, duties, and responsibilities. To probe the conceited and shallow, expose them to themselves, and by that process of interrogation which he called "midwifery," to elicit clear and tenable thinking, was his daily employment. Euthydemus, an ambitious young man, who thought himself fitted for the highest public office, after being examined by Socrates, "withdrew," Xenophon says, "full of confusion and contempt of himself, as beginning to perceive his own insignificance." [2] "Many," Xenophon

[1] *αὐτὸς δὲ περὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπείων ἀν ἀεὶ διελέγετο, σκοπῶν, τί εὐσεβές, τί ἀσεβές· τί καλόν, τί αἰσχρόν· τί δίκαιον, τί ἄδικον· τί σωφροσύνη, τί μανία· τί ἀνδρεία, τί δειλία· τί πόλις, τί πολιτικός· τί ἀρχὴ ἀνθρώπων, τί ἀρχικὸς ἀνθρώπων, καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων*, etc.—Mem., I. i. 16.

[2] *Καὶ πάνυ ἀθύμως ἐχων ἀπῆλθε καὶ καταφρονήσας ἑαυτοῦ· καὶ νομίσας τῷ ὄντι ἀνδράποδον εἶναι.*—Mem., IV. ii. 39.

adds, "who were once his followers, had forsaken him"[1] for this very reason that he laid bare their self-sufficiency, and their other faults. Who can fail to be reminded of the μετάνοια—the self-judgment and reform—which were required at the very first preaching of the Gospel?

2. Socrates asserted the doctrine of Theism, and taught and exemplified the spiritual nature of religion. It is true that he believed in "gods many and lords many." But he believed in one supreme, personal being, to whom the deepest reverence was to be paid. He presents the argument from design for the existence of God, appealing to the structure of the human body, and of the eye in particular, and to the various instances of adaptation in nature, precisely in the manner of Paley and other Christian writers. He argues with Aristodemus to show him the folly, being conscious of reason and intelligence himself, of supposing that there is no intelligence elsewhere. How irrational to disbelieve in the gods, because he cannot see them, when he admits the reality of his own soul, which is invisible![2] In looking at a book of Anaxagoras, Socrates had been struck with pleasure in finding that he admitted a supreme intelligence—νοῦς; but he was proportionately disappointed in discovering that nothing was said to be done by this being, except to give the initial motion to matter.[3] He taught the truth of a universal Providence. "He was persuaded," says Xenophon, "that the gods watch over the actions and affairs of men in a way altogether different from what the vulgar imagined; for while these limited their knowledge to some particulars only, Socrates, on the contrary, extended it to all; firmly persuaded that every word, every action, nay, even our

[1] Πολλοὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν οὕτω διατεθέντων ὑπὸ Σωκράτους οὐκέτι αὐτῷ προσῆεσαν.—Ibid., § 40.

[2] Mem., I. iv. 2 seq. [3] Ibid.

most retired deliberations, are open to their view; that they are everywhere present, and communicate to mankind all such knowledge as relates to the conduct of human life."[1] He had only one prayer, that the gods would give him those things that were good, of which they alone were the competent judges. To ask for gold, silver, or power, was to seek for a doubtful advantage. The poor man's gift was as acceptable to heaven, as the offerings of the wealthy. "The service," he said, "paid to the Deity by the pure and pious soul, is the most grateful sacrifice."[2] Not only as to offerings, but also as to all other things, he had no better advice to give to his friends, than that "they should do all things according to their ability."[3] He counseled absolute obedience to the Deity, and acted on this principle. It was no more possible to induce him to go counter to any intimation from the Deity respecting what should or should not be done, than to make him desert a clear, well-instructed guide for one who is ignorant and blind.[4] He looked with contempt, writes his faithful disciple, upon "all the little arts of human prudence," when placed in comparison with divine counsels and admonitions.[5] He chose his career in compliance with an inward call from God, which he did not feel at liberty to disregard. He abstained from any proposed action when he felt himself checked by a feeling within, which he considered to be the voice of the demon, or

[1] *καὶ γὰρ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι θεοὺς ἐνόμιζεν ὀνθρώπων, οὐχ ὃν τρόπον οἱ πολλοὶ νομίζουσιν. οὗτοι μὲν γὰρ οἴονται τοὺς θεοὺς τὰ μὲν εἰδέναι, τὰ δ' οὐκ εἰδέναι. Σωκράτης δὲ πάντα μὲν ἡγεῖτο θεοὺς εἰδέναι, τά τε λεγόμενα καὶ πραττόμενα καὶ τὰ σιγῇ βουλευόμενα, πανταχοῦ δὲ παρεῖναι, καὶ σημαίνειν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις περὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπείων πάντων.*—Mem., I. i. 19.

[2] *Ἀλλ' ἐνόμιζε τοὺς θεοὺς ταῖς παρὰ τῶν εὐσεβεστάτων τιμαῖς μάλιστα χαίρειν.*—Mem., I. iii. 3.

[3] Mem., I. iii. 3.

[4] Mem., I. iii. 4.

[5] *Αὐτὸς δὲ πάντα τανθρώπινα ὑπερεώρα πρὸς τὴν παρὰ τῶν θεῶν ξυμβουλίαν.*—Mem., I. iii. 4.

spirit, that attended him. These things belong to the character of Socrates; but, in this case, character and conduct are not to be separated from teaching. His spirit is well shown in the beautiful story of the Choice of Hercules, which he narrates to Aristippus, whom he would persuade to lead a manly and virtuous life.[1] There is reason to think that the "Apology" reports with substantial truth what Socrates said to his judges. After explaining how his plain dealing, in exposing to men their defects, and in unveiling false pretensions, made him many enemies, he says that he lamented this fact; "but," he adds, "necessity was laid upon me,—the word of God, I thought, ought to be considered first."[2] His immovable fidelity to his convictions of right was connected with his profound faith in the moral government of the world, and in the care of God for His servants. "A man"—so he spoke to his judges—"a man who is good for any thing ought not to calculate the chance of living or dying; he ought only to consider whether in doing any thing, he is doing right or wrong—acting the part of a good man, or of a bad."[3] "Be of good cheer about death, and know this of a truth—that no evil can happen to a good man, either in life, or after death. He and his are not neglected by the gods; nor has my own approaching end happened by mere chance. But I see clearly that to die and be released was better for me; and therefore the oracle"—that is, the demon who imparted only negative monitions—"gave no sign."[4]

[1] Mem., II. i.

[2] ὑμῶν δὲ ἀναγκαῖον ἐδόκει εἶναι τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ περὶ πλείστου ποιεῖσθαι. 21 E.—(Jowett, i. 336).

[3] Οὐ καλῶς λέγεις, ὦ ἀνθρωπε, εἰ οἴει δεῖν κίνδυνον ὑπολογίζεσθαι τοῦ ζῆν ἢ τεθνάναι ἀνδρα, ὅτου τι καὶ σμικρὸν ὄφελός ἐστιν, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκεῖνο μόνον σκοπεῖν, ὅταν πράττῃ τι, πότερον δίκαια ἢ ἄδικα πράττει, καὶ ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ ἔργα ἢ κακοῦ. 28 B.—(Jowett, i. 343).

[4] Ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑμᾶς χρή, ὦ ἀνδρες δικασταί, εὐέλπιδας εἶναι πρὸς τὸν θάνατον,

3. Socrates had a belief, though not a confident belief, in the future life and in the immortality of the soul. In the "Apology," he refrains from any positive, dogmatic utterance on this subject. The fear of death is unwise, "since no one knows whether death," which is apprehended as the greatest evil, "may not be the greatest good."[1] Such a dread implies a conceit of knowledge. He argues that either death is unconsciousness and a state of nothingness, an eternal sleep, or, for the good, a companionship with noble and glorious beings who have gone before us; and that, in either event, it is no evil. The last word in his address is: "The hour of departure has arrived, and we go our ways—I to die, and you to live. Which is better, God only knows."[2] But his last words to his friends were —for on this point we may trust the Phædo—a direction to make an offering for him to the god of healing, which implies an expectation of a blessing in store for him in another state of being.[3]

4. In the ethical doctrine of Socrates, virtue is identified with knowledge, with the discernment of the highest good. This is evident from the reports of Xenophon, as well as from Plato. No action was truly righteous that was not consciously so,—done, not from mechanical

καὶ ἔν τι τοῦτο διανοεῖσθαι ἀληθές, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἀνδρὶ ἀγαθῷ κακὸν οὐδὲν οὔτε ζῶντι οὔτε τελευτήσαντι, οὐδὲ ἀμελεῖται ὑπὸ θεῶν τὰ τούτου πράγματα· οὐδὲ τα ἐμὰ νῦν ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου γέγονεν, ἀλλά μοι δῆλόν ἐστι τοῦτο, ὅτι ἤδη τεθνάναι καὶ ἀπηλλάχθαι πραγμάτων βέλτιον ἦν μοι. διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ἐμὲ οὐδαμοῦ ἀπέτρεψε τὸ σημεῖον—41 C, D (Jowett, i. 355).

[1] *Οἶδε μὲν γὰρ οὐδεὶς τὸν θάνατον οὐδ' εἰ τυγχάνει τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ πάντων μέγιστον ὂν τῶν ἀγαθῶν, δεδίασι δ' ὡς εὖ εἰδότες, ὅτι μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν ἐστι.* Apol. 29 A. (Jowett, i. 343).

[2] *Ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἤδη ὥρα ἀπιέναι, ἐμοὶ μὲν ἀποθανουμένῳ, ὑμῖν δὲ βιωσομένοις. ὁπότεροι δὲ ἡμῶν ἐρχονται ἐπὶ ἄμεινον πρᾶγμα, ἄδηλον παντὶ πλὴν ἢ τῷ θεῷ.* 42. (Jowett, i. 316).

[3] Phæd., 118.

habit, but with a perception of its moral quality. Moreover, the perception of virtue could not fail to be attended with the practice of it. None who saw the highest good, would fail to choose it. It is probable that Socrates had in mind a theory like that of Locke who makes the will follow the last dictate of the understanding, or like that of Jonathan Edwards, that the will is as the greatest apparent good. Whatever is preferred is looked upon in the light of a good. Xenophon, in one place, states the doctrine in this way: "Socrates made no distinction between wisdom and a virtuous temper; for he judged that he who so discovered what things are laudable and good, as to choose them, what evil and base, as to avoid them, was both wise and virtuously tempered." [1] Nevertheless, the doctrine of Socrates, which Aristotle, also, attributes to him, would, if logically carried out, resolve virtue into an intellectual state, and subvert the ground of moral accountableness for evil-doing. It is plain that Socrates, notwithstanding counter elements in his teaching, and his practical earnestness, unwittingly laid the foundation of that intellectualism which made the highest spiritual attainments accessible only to the gifted few,—a spirit which pervaded the schools of Greek philosophy afterwards. His aim was a worthy one, to impart to ethics a scientific character; as it was his aim, generally, to rescue objective truth from the skepticism that would convert all verities into subjective notions, or feelings.

Yet Socrates was personally far from disposed to exaggerate the intellectual powers of man, or to overlook the limits of human reason. On the contrary, he was cha-

[1] *Σοφίαν δὲ καὶ σωφροσύνην οὐ διώριζεν, ἀλλὰ τὸν τὰ μὲν καλά τε καὶ ἀγαθὰ γιγνώσκοντα χρῆσθαι αὐτοῖς, καὶ τὸν τὰ αἰσχρὰ εἰδότα εὐλαβεῖσθαι, σοφόν τε καὶ σώφρονα ἔκρινεν.*—Mem., III. ix. 4. For further illustrative passages, see Ueberweg, *Hist. of Phil.*, i. 85.

racterized by a genuine humility. The Pythian prophetess had called him the wisest of men. He could explain this laudation only by the reflection that he was conscious of his ignorance. After talking with a politician, he said to himself: "He knows nothing, and thinks that he knows. I neither know nor think that I know. In this latter particular, then, I seem to have slightly the advantage of him."[1] After plying others with questions, he was led to the same conclusion. Simmias, in the Phædo, says that one who cannot learn the truth about the great matters connected with the soul and the future life, must take the best of human notions as a raft on which to sail through life, "if he cannot find some word of God which will more surely and safely carry him."[2] This reference to a possible divine revelation is quite in the Socratic spirit.

In passing to Plato, we do not leave Socrates; but it is not possible to draw the line, in the Platonic Dialogues, between the teaching of the master, and the ideas and opinions of the more speculative disciple. The elevated tone of the Platonic system, and its many points of congeniality with Christian truth, have always been recognized in the Church. Men like Origen and Augustine, among the Fathers, were imbued with the Platonic spirit. Not a few, as far back as Justin Martyr and as late as Neander, have found in the pure and lofty teaching of Plato a bridge over which they have passed into the kingdom of Christ. Turn where we will in these immortal productions, we are in the bracing atmosphere of a spiritual philosophy. We touch on some of the most important points which invite comparison with Christian doctrine.

[1] Apol., 21 (Jowett, i. 335).

[2] — *εἰ μή τις δύναιτο ἀσφαλέστερον καὶ ἀκινδυνότερον ἐπὶ βεβαιοτέρου ὀχήματος ἢ λόγου θείου τινὸς διαπορευθῆναι.* Phæd., 85 (Jowett, I. 434).

1. Plato's conception of God approaches but does not attain to that of Christianity. His sense of the mystery that surrounds the divine being is expressed in the Timæus, where he asks: "How can we find out the Father and Maker of all the universe? Or when we have found him, how shall we be able to speak of him to all men?" [1] Plato teaches that God is a Person, a self-conscious intelligence. No other interpretation of his doctrine can be consistently applied to his various utterances on the subject. When, in the Republic, he refers to the idea of the good as "that which imparts truth to the object and knowledge to the subject," [2] he is setting forth the final cause, which is also the moving spring, of divine action, and of human action so far as it is rational. In the Philebus, he speaks of Zeus as possessed of the mind and soul of a king, and affirms that mind rules the universe. [3] It is impossible to doubt his profound earnestness, when, in the tenth book of the Laws, he speaks of the "lost and perverted natures" who have adopted atheism, and describes it as a notion which superficial youth may take up, but which, as men advance in life, they abandon. It is with moral indignation that he comments on this disbelief in the existence of Deity, and on the skepticism which dreams that the gods stand aloof from human affairs, or can be bribed by offerings to withhold the retribution that is due to sin—as if they

[1] *τὸν μὲν οὖν ποιητὴν καὶ πατέρα τοῦδε τοῦ παντὸς εὑρεῖν τε ἔργον καὶ εὑρόντα εἰς πάντας ἀδύνατον λέγειν.*—Timæus, 28 (Jowett, ii. 524).

[2] *Τοῦτο τοίνυν τὸ τὴν ἀλήθειαν παρέχον τοῖς γιγνωσκομένοις καὶ τῷ γιγνώσκοντι τὴν δύναμιν ἀποδιδὸν τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέαν φάθι εἶναι.*—VI. 508 (Jowett, ii. 344). The interpretation given above seems to be most consistent with Plato's other teachings. By some the idea of the good is identified absolutely with God. See Butler's *Lectures on Ancient Phil.*, ii. 62, but also Thompson's Note. See, also, Ritter, *Hist. of Anc. Phil.*, ii. 284. For other views of the passage, see Zeller, *Gesch. d. Griech. Phil.*, ii. 208, 309, 310.

[3] Phileb., 30.

were ready to share with a robber his spoils. His doctrine is that an inward affinity between us and the gods leads us to believe in them and honor them.[1] But Plato did not escape from the dualism which clung to Greek as well as to Oriental thinking. Matter is eternal, and is an independent and a partially intractable material. God fashions, He does not create, the world. Then, side by side with the Supreme Being, is the realm of ideas, the patterns and archetypes of whatever comes to be, and which, it is clear not only from Plato himself, but also from the polemical attitude of Aristotle, are conceived of as substantial entities. By thus assigning to the ideas a kind of separate existence, Plato gave room and occasion for the pantheistic turn which his system assumed in the hands of professed Platonists of a later day.

Recognizing the gods of the popular creed, Plato discarded as false and impious the myths which attributed to them infirmities and crimes, and he would banish from the ideal Republic the poets who related these revolting stories. In the beautiful dialogue at the opening of the Phædrus, Socrates, who reclines upon the sloping grass, in the shadow of "a lofty and spreading plane-tree," on the margin of the Ilissus, and with his feet resting in its cool water, explains to his companions his reasons for rejecting the rationalistic solutions of Euemerus.

Of divine Providence, so far as the care of the individual is concerned, it is enough to quote this passage from the Republic, which sounds like Apostolic teaching: "This must be our notion of the just man, that even when he is in poverty, or sickness, or any other seeming misfortune, all things will in the end work together for good to him, in life and death: for the gods have a care of any one whose desire is to become just and to be like God, as far as

[1] Leges, x. 899 (Jowett, iv. 411).

man can attain his likeness, by the pursuit of virtue." [1] This faith in Providence led to the condemnation of suicide. Man has a post assigned him by heaven, and he has no right to desert it on account of any hardship that he suffers. "The gods are our guardians," says Socrates, "and we are a possession of theirs." [2] When one remembers how the opposite doctrine prevailed among the Stoics, one is struck with the deep religious feeling of Plato. But we miss in him, as in the ancient philosophers generally, any conception of the final cause of history, of a goal to which the course of history tends, such as we have in the Christian idea of the kingdom of God on earth; and hence there is wanting a broad and satisfying conception of the Providence of God as related to mankind. Hellenic pride, the Greek feeling of superiority to the barbarian, was one thing which stood in the way of an ampler idea of the plan of God respecting the human race. Plato was not emancipated from this feeling.[3] But, independently of all prejudice, the means of arriving at a larger view were not present on the plane of ancient heathenism. Here was a limitation which Plato could not surmount; but as to the moral government of God, under which the good are rewarded and the evil chastised and punished, both in this world and in the world to come—this is a conviction with which his mind is profoundly impressed. The rewards and punishments which we receive here, he says, are nothing "in comparison with

[1] Οὕτως ἄρα ὑπολῃπτέον περὶ τοῦ δικαίου ἀνδρός, ἐάν τ' ἐν πενίᾳ γίγνηται ἐάν τε ἐν νόσοις ἢ τινι ἄλλῳ τῶν δοκούντων κακῶν, ὡς τούτῳ ταῦτα εἰς ἀγαθόν τι τελευτήσει, ζῶντι ἢ καὶ ἀποθανόντι. οὐ γὰρ δὴ ὑπό γε θεῶν ποτὲ ἀμελεῖται ὃς ἂν προθυμεῖσθαι ἐθέλῃ δίκαιος γίγνεσθαι καὶ ἐπιτηδείων ἀρετὴν εἰς ὅσον δυνατὸν ἀνθρώπῳ ὁμοιοῦσθαι θεῷ.—X. 613 (Jowett, ii. 455).

[2] —τὸ θεόν τε εἶναι τὸν ἐπιμελούμενον ἡμῶν καὶ ἡμᾶς ἐκείνου κτήματα εἶναι. Phæd., 62 (Jowett, i. 406).

[3] Plato's objection to the distinction of Hellenes and Barbarians, in the Politicus (262), is on a logical ground; just as, in the context, he objects to the distinction of men and animals.

those other recompenses which await both the just and the unjust after death." [1]

2. Plato teaches the super-terrestrial properties and destiny of the soul. Man is possessed of a principle of intelligence—*νοῦς*—and is thus in the image of God. In a beautiful passage of the Phædo, the notion is confuted that the soul is a mere harmony of parts or elements, subject to the affections of the body. Rather is it a nature which leads and masters them—"herself a diviner thing than any harmony." [2] The soul is immortal. The inward life is "the true self and concernment of a man." [3] "Let each one of us," says Plato, "leave every other kind of knowledge, and seek and follow one thing only, if peradventure he may be able to learn and find also who there is that can and will teach him to distinguish the life of good and evil, and to choose always and everywhere the better life as far as possible." [4] There are two patterns before men, the one blessed and divine, the other godless and wretched. It is utter folly and infatuation to grow like the last. We are to cling to righteousness at whatever sacrifice. "No man," says Plato, "but an utter fool and coward is afraid of death itself, but he is afraid of doing wrong. For, to go to the world below, having a soul which is like a vessel full of injustice, is the last and worst

[1] *Ταῦτα τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὐδέν ἐστι πλήθει οὐδὲ μεγέθει πρὸς ἐκεῖνα ἃ τελευτήσαντα ἑκάτερον περιμένει.*—Rep., x. 614 (Jowett, ii. 456).

[2] Phæd., 94 (Jowett, i. 444).

[3] *—ἀλλὰ περὶ τὴν ἐντὸς ὡς ἀληθῶς, περὶ ἑαυτὸν καὶ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ.*—Rep. iv. 443 (Jowett, ii. 274).

[4] *—μάλιστα ἐπιμελητέον ὅπως ἕκαστος ἡμῶν τῶν ἄλλων μαθημάτων ἀμελήσας τούτου τοῦ μαθήματος καὶ ζητητὴς καὶ μαθητὴς ἔσται, ἐάν ποθεν οἷός τ' ᾖ μάθεῖν καὶ ἐξευρεῖν τὶς αὐτὸν ποιήσει δυνατὸν καὶ ἐπιστήμονα, βίον καὶ χρηστὸν καὶ πονηρὸν διαγιγνώσκοντα, τὸν βελτίω ἐκ τῶν δυνατῶν αἰεὶ πανταχοῦ αἱρεῖσθαι.*—Rep. x. 618 (Jowett, ii. 461).

of all evils."[1] He goes so far, in a remarkable passage in the Gorgias, as to say that a righteous man, if he has done wrong, will prefer to be punished rather than deprive justice of her due. "The next best thing to a man being just, is that he should become just, and be chastised and punished."[2] No Christian preacher can be more solemn and earnest than Socrates in what he is represented in the Phædo as saying relative to the duty of caring for the spiritual part of our being. "O my friends," he said, "if the soul is really immortal, what care should be taken of her, not only in respect of the portion of time which is called life, but of eternity! And the danger of neglecting her from this point of view does indeed appear to be awful."[3] The soul, it is urged, takes nothing with her into the other world but her nurture and education. The thought is like that of the Apostle—we brought nothing into the world, and take nothing out.[4] No Christian moralist can be more severe in his rebukes of the sensual, who "fatten, and feed and breed," and "fill themselves with that which is not substantial."[5]

3. Plato insists on the need of redemption. In one place he compares the soul, in its present condition, "disfigured by a thousand ills," to the sea-god Glaucus, "whose

[1] *αὐτὸ μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἀποθνήσκειν οὐδεὶς φοβεῖται, ὅστις μὴ παντάπασιν ἀλόγιστός τε καὶ ἀνανδρός ἐστι, τὸ δὲ ἀδικεῖν φοβεῖται· πολλῶν γὰρ ἀδικημάτων γέμοντα τὴν ψυχὴν εἰς Ἅιδου ἀφικέσθαι πάντων ἐσχατον κακῶν ἐστιν.*—Gorgias, 522 E. (Jowett, iii. 121).

[2] *ἐὰν δέ τις κατά τι κακὸς γίγνηται, κολαστέος ἐστί, καὶ τοῦτο δεύτερον ἀγαθὸν μετὰ τὸ εἶναι δίκαιον, τὸ γίγνεσθαι καὶ κολαζόμενον διδόναι δίκην.*—Gorgias, 527, B. (Jowett, iii. 125).

[3] *Ἀλλὰ τόδε γ', ἔφη, ὦ ἄνδρες, δίκαιον διανοηθῆναι, ὅτι εἰ περ ἡ ψυχὴ ἀθάνατος ἐστιν, ἐπιμελείας δὴ δεῖται οὐχ ὑπὲρ τοῦ χρόνου τούτου μόνον ἐν ᾧ καλοῦμεν τὸ ζῆν, ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ τοῦ παντὸς, καὶ ὁ κίνδυνος νῦν δὴ καὶ δόξειεν ἂν δεινὸς εἶναι, εἴ τις αὐτῆς ἀμελήσει.*—Phæd., 107 (Jowett, i. 458).

[4] 1 Tim., vi. 7.

[5] Rep., ix. 586 (Jowett, ii. 426).

original image can hardly be discerned because his natural members are broken off, and crushed, and in many ways damaged by the waves, and incrustations have grown over them of sea-weed, and shells, and stone, so that he is liker to some sea-monster than to his natural form."[1] But Plato's idea of the nature of redemption is faulty from the defect that belongs to his notion of sin. Redemption is not strictly moral, the emancipation of the will from the control of evil, although this element is not ignored; but it is the purification of the soul from the pollution supposed to be inevitable from its connection with matter. The spirit is to be washed from the effect of its abode in the body, its contact with a foreign, antagonistic element that defiles it. And what is the method of redemption? Sin being conceived of as ignorance, as an infatuation of the understanding, deliverance is through instruction, through science. Hence the study of Arithmetic and Geometry is among the remedies prescribed for the disorder of human nature. The intellect is to be corrected in its action. The reliance is predominantly upon teaching. Thus, Plato, through his dualism on the one hand, and the exaggerated part which he gives to the understanding in connection with moral action, on the other, fails to apprehend exactly both the nature of sin, and of salvation.

4. There is a Christian idea at the bottom of Plato's ethical system. Virtue he defines as resemblance to God according to the measure of our ability.[2] To be like God Christianity declares to be the perfection of human character. But there was wanting to the heathen mind, even in its highest flight, that true and full perception of the divine excellence which is requisite for the adequate realization of this ethical maxim. We cannot but wonder at

[1] Rep., x. 612 (Jowett II. 454).

[2] —*ὁμοίωσις θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν.*—Theæt., 176 A (Jowett, iii. 400).

hearing Plato say, almost by inspiration: "In God is no unrighteousness at all—He is altogether righteous; and there is nothing more like Him than he of us who is most righteous." "To become like Him is to become holy, just, and wise." [1] Yet, with Plato, justice is the crowning virtue, the highest attribute of character. It is Justice which keeps all the powers of the soul in harmony, and connected with this regnant virtue are Wisdom, Courage, and Temperance, corresponding respectively to the several functions, reason, the will with the higher impulses of the spirit, and the appetitive nature. Plato has only an occasional glimpse of the higher principle of Love, which Christianity makes the sum and source of moral excellence; it does not enter as an essential link in his system.[2]

Moreover, the possession of virtue in the highest sense is possible only to the philosopher. And Plato says that the philosophic nature is a plant that rarely grows among men.[3] In the ideal commonwealth, it is only the few who are endowed with philosophic reason. It is their prerogative to rule the many; and it is only the few who are capable of realizing the moral ideal in its perfection. How opposed is this to the Gospel, which offers the heavenly good to all! The idea of an intellectual aristocracy, with respect to which Plato stands on the common level of ancient thought, is made somewhat less repulsive by the duty which is laid upon the philosopher of descending "into the den," [4] and working among men, laboring "to make their ways as far as possible agreeable to the ways of God." [5]

[1] Ibid. (Jowett, iii. 400).

[2] The Symposium, which, though difficult of analysis, contains passages of great beauty, shows how far he went in this direction.

[3] Republic, B. vi. (Jowett, ii. 324).

[4] —*πάλιν καταβαίνειν παρ' ἐκείνους τοὺς δεσμώτας.* Rep. vii. 519 (Jowett, ii. 353).

[5] —*ἕως ἂν ὅτι μάλιστα ἀνθρώπεια ἦθη εἰς ὅσον ἐνδέχεται θεοφιλῆ ποιήσειαν.* *Repub.*, vi. 501 (Jowett, ii. 335).

Plato's Republic offers the finest illustration of the loftiness of his aspirations, and, at the same time, of the barriers which it was impossible for him to overpass. This work gives evidence of the yearning of his mind for a more intimate union and fellowship of men than had hitherto existed. How could this aspiration be realized? The only form of society in which he could conceive it possible for such a community to come into being, was the State. And, in order to give effect to his conception, individuality must be lost in the all-controlling influence and sway of the social whole. Plato says that in the best ordered state there will be a common feeling, such as pervades the parts of the human body; he uses the very figure of St. Paul when he says of Christians that they are members one of another. But this relation could never be produced by any form of political society. Besides this insurmountable difficulty, Plato does not escape from the pride of race. It is an Hellenic state, which he will found, and the Hellenes are not to treat the barbarians as they treat one another, the Hellenic race being "alien and strange to the barbarians." [1] The vision of the Republic must, therefore, stand as an unconscious prophecy of the kingdom of Christ. The ancient heathen world could not supply the conditions demanded for its fulfilment.

Aristotle, when compared with Plato, his great teacher and friend, presents fewer points of similarity to Christian teaching, for the reason that his mind is less religious, and that he confines himself more closely to this mundane sphere, and to the phenomena that fall directly under human observation. Aristotle was a Theist. He undertakes a scientific proof of the existence of a supreme intelligent

[1] —*Φημι γὰρ τὸ μὲν Ἑλληνικὸν γένος αὐτὸ αὑτῷ οἰκεῖον εἶναι καὶ ξυγγενές, τῷ δὲ βαρβαρικῷ ὀθνειόν τε καὶ ἀλλότριον.* Rep., v. 470 (Jowett, ii. 303).

Being, who must be presupposed as the first cause of motion. God is, in His nature, pure energy, not a mere potentiality; He is eternal, immaterial, unchangeable, incapable of motion; He is one being, a pure intelligence, leading a life of serene and blessed contemplation. [1] His conception, though lofty, is defective from a Christian point of view, since God is brought into no constant, living relation to the world, as its Creator and Ruler, and, especially, no place is found for His moral government.

Aristotle holds, likewise, to an immaterial, intelligent principle in man; but he leaves it doubtful whether this element of the soul is invested with individuality, and thus whether our personal life continues after death. Ethics, according to Aristotle, relates to human conduct, and does not concern itself with the end or rule of action which the gods adopt for themselves. He sets forth no general principle like that of Plato, that we are to imitate God as far as possible. And as the highest bond of unity is political, Ethics is treated as a subordinate branch of Politics. But within his own horizon, the perspicacity of this powerful thinker merits the admiration which has generally been bestowed upon it. He discerns and opposes the error of Socrates in confounding virtue with knowledge. He assigns to the voluntary faculty its proper place. If passion were caused by ignorance, he says, then ignorance ought to precede the passion, which is not the case—for example, when a man allows himself to be carried away by anger. Moreover, if sin were merely ignorance, there would be no ground for blame or punishment. As far as men are the authors of their character, they are responsible for the attraction which, in consequence of that character, evil assumes. Our vices are voluntary, and are not the less

[1] Aristotle, *Metaphys.*, B. xii., where the whole doctrine of God is systematically unfolded.

guilty, because they have become, through long indulgence and the power of habit, incurable. Luther attacked the doctrine of Aristotle that a virtuous principle is created by the doing of virtuous acts. The Reformer asserted that such acts presuppose a virtuous principle, and spring from it. It is true that Aristotle is acquainted with no transforming principle which may dictate conduct the reverse of what has existed hitherto; but, as Neander has pointed out, the doctrine of Aristotle as to the effect of moral action holds good when applied to the fortifying of a principle already implanted. One must be good in order to do good; but it is a case where the fountain is deepened by the outflow of its waters.

Passing by the discussion of the particular virtues, where much is said in harmony with Christian morals, we advert to the interesting passage, in the Fourth Book of the Nicomachean Ethics, where Aristotle describes the man of magnanimity, or noble pride. This portraiture of the ideal man contains many features which deserve approval, from a Christian point of view. Yet when such a man is represented as eager to do favors, but as ashamed to receive them, unwilling to stand in a relation of dependence on his fellow-men, and therefore scorning to be the recipient of benefits from them, we have a type of character at variance with the humility and fraternal fellowship which belong to Christian excellence. The character which is depicted by Aristotle in this remarkable passage, is grand in its outlines, but it lacks an essential element, the very leaven of Christian goodness, the spirit of love.

It is evident that Aristotle does not rise above the intellectualism, which excludes the mass of mankind, on account of an alleged incapacity, from access to the highest good. In his treatise on Politics he makes slavery to be of two kinds, one of which springs from violence, and the law of

war, and the other from the inferior mental powers of the enslaved. [1] This last species of servitude he defends, on the ground that the enslaved are not fitted by nature for any higher lot. Some are born to command; others are fitted only to obey. To these last, servitude is a benefit. As reason in the individual is to the lower faculties, and as the soul is to the body, so is the enlightened class in society to those beneath them. The latter perform the part of animated implements, guided and managed by the superior intelligence of their owners. [2] But in his Ethics, when he undertakes to explain the nature and foundation of friendship, he raises the question whether a man can have a slave for a friend, and betrays some perplexity in answering it. As being a mere animated tool, a slave cannot stand in the relation of friend; but, as a man, he may; and as such, may be the object of sincere attachment. [3] In this distinction, Aristotle shows a partial discernment of the incompatibility of slavery with the laws of nature, which, nevertheless, from the ancient point of view, he denied. [4]

At the close of his principal ethical treatise, Aristotle dilates with genuine eloquence on the lofty delight which belongs to intellectual contemplation, wherein man calls into exercise that part of his being in which he resembles the gods, and in this act must, therefore, be most pleasing to them. This is to live conformably to that which is highest in us, which is, to be sure, in bulk small, but in dignity and power is incomparably superior to all things

[1] B. I. 3, seq.

[2] *Καὶ ὁ δοῦλος κτῆμά τι ἔμψυχον.*—Polit., i. 3. *ὁ δὲ δοῦλος μέρος τι τοῦ δεσπότου, οἷον ἔμψυχόν τι τοῦ σώματος κεχωρισμένον δὲ μέρος.*—Lib., i. 7.

[3] *Ἡ μὲν οὖν δοῦλος, οὐκ ἔστι φιλία πρὸς αὐτὸν, ἢ δ' ἄνθρωπος· δοκεῖ γὰρ εἶναί τι δίκαιον παντὶ ἀνθρώπῳ πρὸς πάντα τὸν δυνάμενον κοινωνῆσαι νόμου καὶ συνθήκης· καὶ φιλίας δή, καθ' ὅσον ἄνθρωπος.*—Eth. Nic., viii. 22.

[4] With reference to occasional protests, in Antiquity, against slavery, see J. Barthelemy Saint Hilaire, *Politique d'Aristote*, i. ii. § 3 n.

besides. So doing, we, though mortal, put on, as far as may be, immortality. The exaltation of this kind of intellectual activity and joy above gratifications of an earthly sort is most impressively set forth. What Aristotle here describes, with so much depth of feeling, as the highest state of man, was necessarily conceived of, however, as the privilege of only a select few, while Christianity opens the door of access to the highest spiritual good, to all mankind. Nor does Aristotle connect this elevated form of activity, as it exists either in God or men, with a principle of beneficence which is a fountain of blessing, not to the subject alone, but to universal society. On the question whether personal consciousness survives death, the great question of the immortality of the soul, the writings of this Philosopher, as we have said, contain no clear and definite expression of opinion.

From the time of Aristotle, the speculative tendency declined, and Philosophy assumed a practical cast.[1] Its themes were virtue and happiness; its problems related to human life on earth. The later schools, for the most part, borrowed their metaphysics from their predecessors. Religious questions, such as the relation of Divine Providence to human agency, and to the existence of evil, became prominent. The individual was thrown back upon himself, and became an object of consideration, not as a member of the state, but as a man, a member of the human race. The causes of this great philosophical change were various. The fall of the Greek political communities, with the loss of freedom, the conquests of Alexander, and the intercourse of nations, East and West, with each other, the fusion of numerous peoples in the Roman Empire, were events which compelled this intellectual revolution. The old political organizations, in which the life of the individual centred,

[1] See Zeller, *Phil. d. Griechen*, iii. 1 seq.

were broken up. He was driven, almost, to look upon himself in a broader relation, as a citizen of the world. Moreover, the impulse which Socrates gave to ethical inquiry, although it was combined in him with a speculative element, and still more in Plato and Aristotle, continued to be potent, and became prevailing. The Stoic and Epicurean systems, antagonistic to each other as they appear to be, and as, in their particular features, they really are, manifest the same subjective character. Tranquillity and serenity of the inner life is the end and aim of both. Skepticism was the natural sequence of the stagnation of philosophical speculation, after the productive period was over, and of the mutual conflict of the various systems. Skepticism passed, by a natural transition, into eclecticism, which selected from each of the rival systems whatever might accord with individual predilection. Finally, the New Platonism was a form of mysticism affording refuge to the believing but perplexed inquirer.

The two systems which, on account of their influence, we have occasion here to consider, are the Epicurean and the Stoic. We begin with the former.

The theology of Epicurus was a scheme of practical atheism. The adherents of this school did not deny the existence of the gods, but they denied to them any interest, or concern, in the affairs of the world. The current ideas of this philosophy are embodied, with wonderful skill and beauty, in the poem of Lucretius, which has for its subject the Nature of Things. Regarding superstition as the great bane of mankind, he sets out to disabuse the mind of the beliefs that give rise to it. He adopts the atomic theory of Democritus, in accounting for the origin of the world:—

> "For never, doubtless, from result of thought,
> Or natural compact, could primordial seeds
> First harmonize, or move with powers precise;

But ever changing, ever changed and vext
From earliest time, through ever-during space,
From ceaseless repercussion every mode
Of motion, magnitude and shape essayed;
At length the unwieldy mass the form assumed
Of things created." [1]

The same power that began these movements carries them forward. The heavens and the earth, as they had a beginning, approach the epoch of decay and dissolution. The soul is material, and mortal; hence the dread of anything hereafter is needless and vain. All fear of the gods, with which men torment themselves, is irrational, since the gods stand aloof from men, and are absorbed in their own enjoyments. Such is the gloomy creed of the great Poet of the Epicurean sect. The end and aim of existence, according to this school, is pleasure. Socrates had held that man is made for virtue and for happiness, without defining accurately the relation of these two ends of our being. Plato, though not with entire consistency, gives the precedence to virtue, and teaches the doctrine of intuitive morals. Aristotle holds that happiness is the chief good, but distinguishes between higher and lower kinds of happiness. To ascertain what happiness man is made for, we must ascertain the function—the ἔργον—of a being endowed with reason. Virtue is the action which produces the highest happiness, the happiness proper to man; but

[1] "Nam certe neque consilio primordia rerum
Ordine se suo quæque sagaci mente locarunt
Nec quos quæque sagæi mente locarunt
Nec quos quæque darent motus pepigere profecto,
Sed quia multis modis multis mutata per omne
Ex infinito vexantur percitur plagis,
Omne genus motus et coetus experiundo
Tandem devenerunt in talis disposituras,
Qualibus hæc rerum consistit summa creata, *etc.*
B. i. 1021-1028.

then the highest happiness is defined as that which springs from virtue; nor does the Stagyrite extricate himself from this circle. The Epicureans resolved all good into pleasure. All special desires are to be subordinate to the general desire of happiness; and in this notion of happiness, the approbation of conscience is not included. Virtue, therefore, is a self-regarding prudence which so regulates the various propensities and cravings of human nature as to derive the highest pleasure in the aggregate. It is the control of a far-sighted expediency by which unruly instincts are kept in subjection. The founders of this school led virtuous lives, but the doctrine contained no motives of sufficient power to restrain the passions of men generally, and, in the progress of time, showed its real tendencies.

Stoicism existed in two forms; first, the original system of Zeno and Chrysippus, and, secondly, the modified Roman Stoicism of the first and second centuries of the Christian era. If we looked at the metaphysics of Stoicism, we should infer that this philosophy contained little or nothing in harmony with Christianity. It was a revival of the Heraclitic, or Hylozoist, Pantheism. Nothing exists but matter. The soul itself is a corporeal entity. The universe is one, and is governed by one, all-ruling law. Matter and the Deity are identical—the same principle in different aspects. The Deity, that is to say, is the immanent, creative force in matter, which acts ever according to law. This principle, developed in the totality of things, is Zeus. It is Providence, or Destiny. The universal force works blindly, but after the analogy of a rational agency. The world, proceeding by evolution from the primitive fire, eventually returns to its source through a universal conflagration, and the same process is to be renewed in an endless series of cycles. Fate rules all. The world is an

organic unity; considered as a whole, it is perfect. Evil, when looked at in relation to the entire system, is good. The denial of free agency, and of immortality, was a corollary. As to the personality of the minor gods, the old Stoics were vacillating. Now they are spoken of as functions of nature, and now as persons. But if personal, they share the fate of men; they disappear in the final conflagration.

It seems strange that any system of morals worthy of the name could co-exist with these ideas. The truth is, however, that the Stoics did not derive their Ethics from their physical and metaphysical theories, but borrowed these last from the pre-Socratic schools, without setting them in a vital connection with their ethical doctrine. Self-preservation, to be distinguished from the desire of happiness, they hold to be the original, fundamental impulse of all beings. The essential thing is to live according to nature. This is the great maxim of the Stoic Ethics.[1] By "nature" is meant the universal system in which the individual is one link; sometimes, however, the constitution of the individual is denoted; and sometimes the term is used in a more restricted way still, to denote the rational faculty by itself. But to live according to nature is the one supreme, comprehensive duty. Virtue springs from rational self-determination, where reason alone guides the will, and the influence of the affections and emotions is smothered. These are contrary to reason; they interfere with the freedom of the soul. No anger, no pity, no lenity, no indulgence—this was the pure creed of Stoicism. Apathy is the right condition of the soul, which should be moved only by reason. Knowledge is necessary to virtue, since right

[1] —*τέλος ἐστὶ τὸ ὁμολογουμένως τῇ φύσει ζῆν.* Teaching of Cleanthes, ap. Stob., *Ecl.* ii., p. 132 (Ritter and Preller, p. 380, where are the parallel statements of Chrysippus).

doing without rational insight does not fill out the conception of virtue. Hence the virtuous man is the sage, the wise man; every other is a fool. Virtue, too, if it exist at all, must exist as a whole. It is a single principle; and so, too, the vices are united. Hence the world is divided into two classes, the virtuous or wise, and the wicked or foolish.

This stern ideal of primitive Stoicism was softened by the doctrine of preferables. Virtue is the sole thing which is good in itself. But there are external things which are auxiliary to virtue, and these may be called good, in a secondary sense; and so external things which are unfavorable to virtue, may be termed evil. There is, also, a third class of neutral things, not being either advantageous or hurtful in this relation. Thus the Stoics discussed the question whether fame is a preferable. Chrysippus decided in the negative, and so did Marcus Aurelius in one of the most interesting passages of his "Meditations."[1] A class of conditional duties, or middle duties, resulted from the doctrine of preferables. Then the doctrine as to the affections was softened. Their first beginnings were allowed; and certain emotions were admitted to be desirable. So, different grades, or stages in the attainment of virtue, were conceded to exist.

Stoicism was cosmopolitan. It brought in the idea of a citizenship of the world. There is one community, one state, one set of laws. To this one state, all particular states are related, as are the houses in a city to one another. The sage labors that all may recognize themselves as one flock, and dwell together under the common rule of reason. "My nature," says Marcus Aurelius, "is rational and social; and my city and country, so far as I am Antoninus, is Rome; but so far as I am a man, it is the

[1] vi. 16, 18 (Long's Translation, pp. 166, 167).

world."[1] A Stoic, writes Epictetus, "when beaten must love those who beat him, as the father, as the brother, of all."[2] One must give himself up with perfect resignation to the course of the world. There is a rationality and wisdom in it; hence the duty of perfect, uncomplaining submission to things as they occur. All things are divided into two classes, the things that are within our power, and the things that are beyond our power. With regard to everything that falls under the latter category, "Be prepared," says Epictetus, "to say that it is nothing to you."[3] "You must accuse neither God nor man. You must altogether control desire; and you must transfer aversion to such things only as are controllable by will."[4] "That," says M. Aurelius, "is for the good of each thing, which the universal nature brings to each. And it is for its good at the time when nature brings it."[5] "I say then to the universe, that I love as thou lovest."[6]

The Roman Stoicism departed in certain particulars from the rigid system of the founders of the sect. There is a recognition, though not distinct and uniform, of the personality of God, of the reality of the soul as distinct from the body, and of the continuance of personal life after death. In Seneca, the Stoic philosophy appears in a very mitigated form. Self-sufficiency gives way to a sense of weakness and imperfection, which is not far removed from

[1] *ἡ δὲ ἐμὴ φύσις λογικὴ καὶ πολιτική. πόλις καὶ πατρὶς, ὡς μὲν Αντωνίνῳ, μοι ἡ Ῥώμη, ὡς δὲ ἀνθρώπῳ, ὁ κόσμος.* Meditations, vi. 44 (Long, p. 178).

[2] *—καὶ δαιρόμενον φιλεῖν αὐτοὺς δαίροντας ὡς πατέρα πάντων, ὡς ἀδελφόν.* Discourses, III. xxii. 54 (Carter's translation, Boston Ed., 1866, p. 250).

[3] *—πρόχειρον ἐστω τὸ διότι οὐδὲν πρὸς ἐμέ.* Encheirid. i. (Carter, p. 376).

[4] *οὐ θεῷ ἐγκαλοῦντα, οὐκ ἀνθρώπῳ· ὀρεξιν ἁραί σε δεῖ παντελῶς, ἐκκλισιν ἐπὶ μόνα μεταθεῖναι τὰ προαιρετικά.* Discourses, III. xxii. 13 (Carter, p. 244).

[5] *Συμφέρει ἑκάστῳ, ὃ φέρει ἑκάστῳ ἡ τῶν ὅλων φύσις. Καὶ τότε συμφέρει, ὅτε ἐκείνη φέρει.* Meditt. x. 20 (Long, p. 259).

[6] *Λέγω οὖν τῷ κόσμῳ ὅτι σοι συνερῶ.* Meditt. x. 21 (Long, p. 259).

Christian feeling. He declares that there is no possibility of a sinless character among men; we are to follow the gods as far as human infirmity will allow. He paints the struggle of the soul, aspiring heavenward, with the flesh which clogs and enchains it.[1] There is a paragraph in his treatise on Clemency, in which he describes the sinfulness of mankind in language which reminds one of the Apostle Paul. He calls upon us to imagine a populous, crowded city, through the streets of which the multitudes are hurrying. What a solitude and desolation would be there, if none were left except those whom a strict judge could acquit of guilt! The judge and the accuser themselves are involved in condemnation. We have all sinned. Not only so, but we shall sin to the end of life.[2] Like Plato, he ascribes the creation to the goodness of God. The first essential of worship is to believe in the gods, and to imitate their excellence. Men are the children of God.[3] The sufferings of good men are the fatherly chastisement inflicted by Him. It is good for men to be afflicted; those who have not experienced adversity are objects of pity. A divine spirit dwells within the soul as a watchman and protector. From God nothing can be concealed. Seneca says that when he retires to his bed at night, he reviews his words and conduct for the entire day.[4] Meditation and self-examination are inculcated

[1] Omne illi cum hac carne gravi certamen est, ne abstrahatur et sidat; nititur illo unde dimissus est: ibi illum æterna requies manet, e confusis crassisque pura et liquida visentem. (ad Marc., xxiv.)

[2] Peccavimus omnes: alii gravia, alii leviora, alii ex destinato, alii forte impulsi, aut aliena nequitia ablati; alii in bonis consiliis parum fortiter stetimus, et innocentiam inviti ac renitentes perdidimus. Nec delinquimus tantum, sed usque ad extremum ævi delinquemus. C. vi.

[3] de Prov. I. Quoniam quidem bonus ipse tempore tantum a Deo differt, discipulus ejus, æmulatorque, et vera progenies. Cf. *de Benef.* ii. 29: Cogita quanta nobis tribuerit parens noster.

[4] de Ira., iii. 36. "Nihil mihi ipse abscondo, nihil transeo."

with all the urgency of a Christian preacher. It is well for each one to have a faithful confidant and counsellor to whom he can unburden the secrets of his heart. "Pray and live," he says, "as if the eye of God were upon you."[1] "Live every day as if it were the last."[2]

The obligation to cherish just and human feelings is frequently asserted by Seneca. "You must live for another," he says, "if you would live for yourself."[3] "Nature," he says, "bids me assist *men;* and whether they be slaves or free, whether of gentle blood or freedmen, whether they enjoy liberty as a right or a friendly gift, what matter? Wherever a *man* is, there is room for doing good."[4] He condemns gladiatorial shows.[5] He says: "live with an inferior, as you would have a superior live with you."[6] He declares that "slaves are our fellow-servants," and are to be kindly treated.[7]

The coincidences between the moral teaching of Seneca and that of the New Testament are numerous and striking.[8] That only a pure mind can comprehend God; that in the intent of the heart guilt lies; that a wise man, when he is buffeted, will imitate Cato, who, when he was smitten on the mouth, refused to avenge himself; that we should be

[1] Sic vive cum hominibus, tanquam Deus videat. Ep. x.

[2] Sic ordinandus est dies omnis, tanquam cogat agmen, et consumet atque expleat vitam. Ep. xii.

[3] Ep. xlviii. Alteri vivas oportet, si vis tibi vivere.

[4] de Vita beata, 24. Hominibus prodesse natura jubet: servi liberine sint, ingenui an libertini, justæ libertatis, an inter amicos datæ, quid refert? ubicumque homo est, ibi beneficio locus est.

[5] Epist., vii.

[6] Sic cum inferiore vivas, quemadmodum tecum superiorem velles vivere. Ep. xlvii.

[7] Servi sunt? immo conservi, si cogitaveris tantumdem in utrosque licere fortunæ. Epist., xlvii.

[8] See Dr. Lightfoot's Essay, *Philippians*, p. 281 seq., where the references are given, and the parallel references to the New Testament.

gentle to enemies; that we should follow the example of the gods who "soften the ground with showers," and do good without the hope of reward; that we should avoid the manners and dress of an ascetic, and do nothing to attract praise; that we should seek after true riches, and invest our good deeds as a treasure buried in the ground; that we should not mark the pimples of others when we are covered with countless ulcers; that we should expect from others what we have done to others; that we should give as we should wish to receive; that good does not grow out of evil, more than a fig from an olive-tree; that hypocrites are miserable and filthy within, though adorned without, like their own walls; that words must be sown like seed, which, though small at first, unfolds its strength and spreads into the largest growth; that it is madness to embark on distant hopes, and to say: "I will buy," "I will build," "I will lend out," "I will demand payment," "I will bear honors;" that the gods are not honored by fat victims, but by the pious and upright intent of the worshipper; that love cannot be mingled with fear; that our life is a pilgrimage in a strange land, and our bodies tabernacles of the soul; that good men toil, they spend and are spent; that the evil man turns all things to evil; that to obey God is liberty; that the whole world is the temple of the immortal gods; that God must be consecrated in the heart of each man; that God is near thee, with thee, within thee; that He should not be framed out of silver and gold,—these are among the sayings of the Roman Philosopher which recall parallel statements in the New Testament.

The personal character of Seneca fell short of his own exalted standard of independence and excellence. But in Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius, the noblest principles were exemplified as well as taught. The former excels all other

Stoic writers in the terseness and vigor of his utterances, which often startle the reader from their resemblance to New Testament teaching. The meditations of Marcus Aurelius likewise abound in passages which a Christian believer can read with earnest sympathy. In these writers, Stoicism, while it retains its fundamental ideas, has lost much of its austerity, and breathes a gentler spirit.

The resemblance between certain sentiments in the later Stoics, and passages in the New Testament, has given rise to the suggestion of an influence from one side to the other. The accordance, as regards phraseology as well as thought, is most striking in the case of Seneca. A fictitious correspondence, consisting of fourteen letters, between Paul and the Roman Philosopher, was composed, probably in the fourth century, either for the purpose of recommending Seneca to the esteem of Christians, or of exciting them to a study of his writings. By some, Seneca is thought to have been acquainted with Paul, and to have derived from him, and from other New Testament authors, sentiments and expressions of the kind already quoted. But the earlier writings of Seneca must have antedated the circulation of the Gospels in Rome, and the Epistle to the Hebrews, to which the passage respecting the chastisement of God's children bears the closest resemblance. [1] Some of the sentences which remind us of Christian teaching are drawn by the Roman Stoic from Plato, and other earlier writers. Morover, these choice doctrines, which we have cited, stand in connection with principles at variance with Christian truth, which prove incontestably that Seneca was not a Christian disciple. The phrases which are parallel in form to statements in the New Testament, often have in Seneca an entirely different setting. They rest upon metaphysical and theological dogmas widely diverse from the doctrines

[1] See Lightfoot, p. 289.

of Christianity. We may reasonably assume a familiarity on the part of Paul with Stoic ideas and phrases, since Tarsus was a prominent seat of Stoic teaching. The quotation in Acts xvii. 28, is from the hymn of Cleanthes, and from the Stoic-Poet, Aratus, who was connected with Tarsus. The Stoic description of the Sage, the Apostle applied in a higher and truer sense to the Christian believer. In the believer alone were true liberty, kingship, and the other lofty attributes imputed to the Sage, realized. The ethical terms and conceptions of Stoicism were widely diffused. While it is not impossible, therefore, that Seneca, it may be through intercourse with Christian slaves, had gained some knowledge of the moral teaching of the Gospel, we are not justified in affirming with any confidence that this was the case. [1]

It is worthy of note that there are so few allusions to Christians in the heathen writers of the first and second centuries. There is no mention of them whatever in Plutarch, but one reference to them in Epictetus, and but one in Marcus Aurelius. It is thought by some scholars, however, that Stoicism was affected indirectly by Christian teaching, and caught up from the atmosphere induced by the Gospel, peculiarities most accordant with Christian feeling. It is undeniable that, from the second century onward, there was an amelioration of sentiment, and a corresponding softening of the rigor of laws, on the heathen side. Thus, the laws bearing on domestic relations, on the

[1] The necessity of supposing an acquaintance with Christianity on the part of Seneca, as the solution of the peculiarities in his teaching to which we have referred, is opposed by Baur in his able essay, *Seneca u. Paulus*, in Hilgenfeld's *Zeitschr. f. wissenschaftl. Theol.* i. 1848, and by Denis, *Hist. des Théories et Idées morales dans l'Antiq.* The opposite opinion is advocated by Schmidt, *Essai Hist. sur la Soc. Civile dans le Monde Romain* etc, p. 378, and by Troplong, *De l'Influence du Christianisme sur le Droit Civil des Romains*, p. 77.

prerogatives of husbands, fathers, and masters, became more nearly conformed to Christian ideas. There was, moreover, a general progress of humane feeling. Epictetus condemns slavery as growing out of a higher regard for "the unjust laws of men long dead" than for "the divine laws."[1] Nerva, Trajan, and other Emperors, and subordinate magistrates in cities, provided funds for the sustenance of poor children. Unquestionably, Stoicism had an influence in producing this improved tone of feeling, which is seen in laws and social customs. A learned French writer observes: "The Jurists who flourished after Cicero were in general inspired by Stoicism, which gave them severe and precise rules for the conduct of men to each other. The whole moral and philosophical part of Roman Law, from Labeon that Stoic innovator, to Caius and Ulpian, is drawn from this school, the partiality to which grows from day to day among the choice men who shine forth here and there in the imperial period."[2] Mr. Maine has remarks of a like tenor.[3] The question is, how far this widening of sympathy, which we see in Stoicism, sprang from the indirect effect of Gospel teaching upon the general currents of thought outside of the pale of the Church. That a party may be thus affected by its antagonists is a familiar experience. For example, none will deny that the English Church was materially influenced by the Methodist movement which it so generally opposed. Without denying that an influence of the character described may have reached, to some extent, cultivated men in the Roman Empire, who knew little directly of the Gospel, or knew it only to oppose it, we must guard against attributing too much to such a modifying agency. It is an evident fact that the tendency of political events and of philosophic thought—we might say, of the whole

[1] Diss., i. 13. [2] Troplong, p. 53. [3] Ancient Law, ch. iii.

course of history, had been to engender a more cosmopolitan view, a more catholic sympathy. The early masters of Greek Philosophy, and none more decidedly than Aristotle, had inculcated the obligation of mutual love among citizens of the same community. With the fall of these communities, there came in the Stoic conception of the universal city, coterminous with mankind. As the privileges that belonged to Rome were more and more imparted to the nations subject to her, Rome was conceived of by many as a realization of the universal city, as the common country of the race. We find these conceptions in Roman writers from the time of Cicero; and along with this general notion of a universal state, we find, in theory at least, a wider spirit of humanity. It is not from any Christian influence that Lucan, who died, A. D. 65, calls upon mankind to lay down the weapons of war and to love one another,[1] and that Plutarch affirms that man has his country in whatever part of the earth he may find himself.[2]

The letters of the younger Pliny afford fine illustrations of this more benevolent and refined tone of sentiment.[3] We can account, then, for the elevated, philanthropic expressions of men like Seneca, and for the broader spirit of the Stoic lawyers, by a providential development within the limits of heathenism itself.

When we bring the Stoical Philosophy into comparison with Christianity, we discern some marked characteristics of a general nature which they have in common. First, Stoicism was an eminently practical system. It sought to

[1] Tunc genus humanum positis sibi consulat armis,
Inque vicem gens omnis amet. Phars. i. 60.

[2] de Exil.

[3] See, for example, his Letter on the death of his slaves, to Paternus (viii. 16), or his Letter occasioned by the death of the daughter of Fundanus (v. 16).

determine how men should live, and how they could be prepared to bear trouble, and to die, with composure. Secondly, like Christianity, it exalted inward, or spiritual excellence. All outward things are counted as nothing. The Stoic held power, fame, wealth, even health and life, as possessions to be resigned without a murmur. Independence, inward freedom, was deemed the pearl of great price.[1] And thirdly, there are special injunctions, in which the Stoic teachers approach near to the precepts of the Christian religion.

The differences between Stoicism and the Gospel are equally apparent:—

1. Stoicism makes virtue the ethical end. But Christianity, while giving the first place to holiness, is not indifferent to happiness. Love, the essential principle in Christian morals, is itself a source of joy, and seeks the happiness of its object. The Cynics were the precursors of the Stoics, and the leaven of Cynicism was never wholly expelled from the Stoic teaching. We find when we scrutinize the Stoical idea of virtue that it is practically self-regarding. It is not the good of others, but a subjective serenity, which is really sought for. There is a more benevolent feeling in the later type of Stoicism, but this involves a partial desertion of the characteristics of the school.

2. The Stoic definition of virtue is formal, not material. It gives a certain relation of virtue, but not its contents. What that life is which is conformed to nature, and swayed by reason, is not contained in the definition.

3. We are furnished with no concrete or exact conception of "nature." "Live according to nature," we are told; but no criterion is afforded for distinguishing between the original nature of man, and the corruption resulting from

[1] See the noble chapter of Epictetus, on Freedom, *Diss.* iv. 1.

human perversity and sin. It is remarkable that Seneca acknowledges the need of a moral ideal, a pattern by which we can shape our conduct. He advises us to revolve the examples of good men and heroes, like Cato, in order to draw from them guidance; though he admits their imperfection, and consequent insufficiency for this end. Christianity, alone, supplies this need, by presenting human nature in its purity and perfection, in the person of Christ.

4. Stoicism supposes a possible incompatibility between the welfare of the individual and the course of the world. It implies a discordance in nature, which is in violation of a primary assumption that the system is harmonious. For the Stoics justified suicide. Zeno and Cleanthes destroyed their own lives. Seneca praises Cato for killing himself. "If the house smokes, go out of it," [1] is the laconic mode of advising suicide in case one finds his condition unbearable,—a phrase which we find in Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius. There might be situations, it was held, when it is undignified or dishonorable to continue to live. Poverty, chronic illness, or incipient weakness of mind, were deemed a sufficient reason for terminating one's life. It was the means of baffling a tyrant, which nature had given to the weak; as Cassius is made to say:

> —"Life, being weary of these worldly bars,
> Never lacks power to dismiss itself." [2]

Seneca says that a man may choose the mode of his death, as one chooses a ship for a journey, or a house to live in. Life and death are among the *adiaphora*—things indifferent, which may be chosen or rejected according to circumstances.

[1] Καπνὸν πεποίηκεν ἐν τῷ οἰκήματι; ἂν μέτριον, μενῶ· ἂν λίαν πολὺν, ἐξέρχομαι.—Epict., Discourses, I. xxv. 18 (Carter, p. 72). The same simile is frequently used. Compare Seneca, Epp. xvii., xxiv., xxvi.

[2] Shakespeare, *Jul. Cæsar*, Act i. Sc. i.

How contrary is all this to the Christian feeling! The Christian believes in a Providence which makes all things work together for his good, and believes that there are no circumstances in which he is authorized to lay violent hands upon himself. There is no situation in which he cannot live with honor, and with advantage to himself as long as God chooses to continue him in being. Hence, in the Scriptures there is no express prohibition of suicide, and no need of one.

5. Stoicism exhibits no rational ground for the passive virtues, which are so prominent in the Stoic morals. There is no rational end of the cosmos; no grand and worthy consummation towards which the course of the world is tending. Evil is not overruled to subserve a higher good to emerge at the last. There is no inspiring future on which the eye of the sufferer can be fixed. The goal that bounds his vision is the conflagration of all things Hence there is no basis for reconciliation to sorrow and evil. Christianity, in the doctrine of the kingdom of God, furnishes the element which Stoicism lacked, and provides thus a ground for resignation under all the ills of life, and amid the confusion and wickedness of the world. For the same reason, the character of Christian resignation is different from the Stoic composure. It is submission to a wise and merciful Father, who sees the end from the beginning. Hence, there is no repression of natural emotions, as of grief in case of bereavement; but these are tempered, and prevented from overmastering the spirit, by trust in the Heavenly Father. In the room of an impassible serenity, an apathy secured by stifling natural sensibility, there is the peace which flows from filial confidence.

6. Much less does Stoicism afford a logical foundation for the active virtues. The doctrine of fatalism, if consistently carried out, paralyzes exertion. And how is the

motive for aggressive virtue weakened, when the ultimate result of all effort is annihilation—the destruction of personal life, and the return of the universe to chaos!

7. The cosmopolitan quality of Stoicism was negative. Zeno's idea of a universal community, transcending the barriers imposed by separate nationalities, shows that the ancient order of things failed to satisfy the spirit, aspiring after a wider communion. Seneca says: "We are members of a vast body. Nature made us kin, when she produced us from the same things, and to the same ends." "The world is my country, and the gods its rulers." There is a vast commonwealth, in which are comprised gods and men, and which is coextensive with the world. "Virtue," he says, "is barred to none: she is open to all, she receives all, she invites all, gentlefolk, freedmen, slaves, kings, exiles alike."[1] Sentences like these indicate that the limitations essential to ancient thought, which knew no fellowship broader than that of the state, were broken through. But such a community as Zeno and Seneca dreamed of, did not and could not arise, until the kingdom of Christ was established on earth. Then these obscure aspirations, and grand but impossible visions, became a reality.

8. The predominant motive which the Stoic moralists present for the exercise of forbearance and the kindred virtues, is not love, but rather fealty to an ideal of character, the theory that sin is from ignorance, and is involuntary, which turns resentment into pity, and the consideration that everything is fated, and, in its place, useful. The offender is often regarded with a feeling akin to disdain. The ten reasons which M. Aurelius addresses to himself as motives to forbearance are, that it is nature that orders all things; that men are under compulsion in respect of opinions; that men do wrong involuntarily, and in igno-

[1] De Benef. iii. 18.

rance; that thou, also—addressing himself—doest many things wrong, and art disposed to other faults, but art withheld from timidity or some other unworthy motive; that one must know much in order to pass a correct judgment on another; that, when vexed, one should remember that "man's life is only for a moment, and after a short time we are all laid out dead;"[1] that no wrongful act of another brings shame on thee; that anger and vexation give more pain than the actions that provoke them; that benevolence is invincible, and that evil is overcome by patience and kindness; and that to expect bad men not to do wrong is madness. Among these considerations are some on which the New Testament also insists. The sweeping remark, which is sometimes heard from the pulpit, that the duty of forgiving injuries was not known to the heathen moralists, is not true. The younger Pliny recommends forbearance and forgiveness. Plutarch, in his book on the delay of Providence in punishing the wicked, assigns among the reasons for this course, the desire on the part of God to give room for repentance, and to furnish an example of a forbearing and placable disposition. Clemency is an impulse of human nature as truly as resentment. Christianity introduced no new element into the constitution of the soul. It gave new motives for the exercise of forbearance, and, by its power to conquer selfishness, imparted to the benevolent sentiments a control which had not belonged to them before. It is evident that the false metaphysics of the Stoic school played an important part in producing the temper of forbearance which they inculcated. Sin is ignorance, sin is fated, sin is for the best, anger disturbs the peace of the soul,—these are prominent among the motives for the exercise of forbearance. "If a right choice," says Epictetus,

[1] —ἀκαραῖος ὁ ἀνθρώπειος βίος, καὶ μετ' ὀλίγον πάντες ἐξετάθημεν.—L. xi. 18 (Long, p. 281).

"be the only good, and a wrong one the only evil, what further room is there for quarreling, for reviling? About what can it be? About what is nothing to us. Against whom? Against the ignorant, against the unhappy, against those who are deceived in the most important respects."[1]

9. The self-sufficiency of Stoicism stands in direct opposition to Christian humility. The independence of the individual, the power to stand alone as regards men and the gods, is the acme of Stoical attainment. The Stoic felt himself on the level of Zeus, both being subject to fate; and he aimed to find the sources of strength and peace within himself. Christianity, on the contrary, finds the highest good in the complete fellowship of man, sensible of his absolute dependence, with God. The starting-point is humility, a feeling the very reverse of Stoical pride and self-dependence. It is a noteworthy but not inexplicable fact, that while many from the Platonic school, in the first centuries, became Christian disciples, very few Stoics embraced the Gospel. Notwithstanding the many points of resemblance and affinity, there was a radical antagonism between the two systems.

The Greek Philosophy reached the limit of its development in New Platonism, as taught in the first centuries of the Christian era by Plotinus, and his successors, Porphyry and Jamblichus, and by Proclus, the last eminent representative of this school.[2] Skepticism, the consequence of the bewildering conflict of philosophical theories, left no resting-place for minds of a religious turn. Their natural

[1] Εἰ δ' οἷα δεῖ προαίρεσις, τοῦτο μόνον ἀγαθόν ἐστι. καὶ οἷα μὴ δεῖ, τοῦτο μόνον κακόν· ποῦ ἔτι μάχη; ποῦ λοιδορία; περὶ τίνων; περὶ τῶν οὐδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς· πρὸς τίνας; πρὸς τοὺς ἀγνοοῦντας, πρὸς τοὺς δυστυχοῦντας, πρὸς τοὺς ἠπατημένους περὶ τῶν μεγίστων. Discourses, IV., v. 32. (Carter, p. 332).

[2] Plotinus was born A. D. 204, and died A. D. 269.

refuge was in mysticism, where feeling and intuition supersede the slow and doubtful processes of the intellect. Plotinus found in Platonism the starting-point and principal materials for his speculations; although the reconciliation of philosophies, and especially of the two masters, Plato and Aristotle, was a prominent part of his effort.

With Plotinus, the absolute Being, the antecedent of all that exists, is impersonal, the ineffible unity, exalted above all vicissitude and change. The idea of a creative activity on the part of God is thus excluded. Emanation, after a Pantheistic conception, would seem to be the method by which the universe originates from the primary being; yet this notion is discarded, since it would imply division in this being, and the imparting of a portion of its contents. Matter is evil, and the original fountain of evil. The human soul finds its purification only in separating itself from the material part with which here it stands in connection. The highest attainment and perfect blessedness lie in the ecstatic condition, in which the soul rises to the intuition and embrace of the Supreme Entity, sinking for the time its own individuality in this rapturous union with the Infinite

While the Platonic idea of resemblance to God, as the life and soul of virtue, is held in form, its practical value is lost by this sacrifice of personality in the object towards which we are to aspire. The civil virtues[1]—wisdom, courage, temperance and justice—are retained; but higher than these are placed the purifying or cathartic virtues, by which the soul emancipates itself from subjection to sense; while the highest achievement is the elevation to God, where the consciousness of personal identity is drowned in the beatific contemplation of the Supreme.

[1] πολιτικαὶ ἀρεταί.

This kind of rapture is possible only to elect spirits, who are qualified by superior endowments for so lofty an ascent. The supercilious tone of the ancient philosophy, the notion of an oligarchy of philosophers, to whom the common herd are subservient, is thus maintained to the full in this final phase of Greek thought. "The life of worthy men," says Plotinus, "tends to the summit and that which is on high." The life which is merely human is two-fold, "the one being mindful of virtue and partaking of a certain good; but the other pertaining to the vile rabble, and to artificers who minister to the necessities of more worthy men."[1] Asceticism was the natural offspring of a system in which all that is corporeal is evil. Superstition, especially in the form of magic and sorcery, was likewise conspicuous in Jamblichus, and in the other later devotees of this school.

Christianity holds to a possible illumination of the human mind, and to a blessed communion with God. But this is not a boon open only to a few who are raised intellectually above the rest of mankind. The egoistic absorption of the individual in his own mental states, where the idea of doing good is banished from thought, or supplanted by a contempt for mankind generally, is antagonistic to the spirit of the Gospel. Self-purification is an end which the Christian sets before him; but he pursues it, not in the way of mystic contemplation, but by the daily practice of all the virtues of character.[2]

What were the actual resources of Philosophy? What power had it to assuage grief, and to qualify the soul for the exigencies of life, and to deliver it from the fear of

[1] —*τοῖς μὲν σπουδαίοις πρὸς τὸ ἀκρότατον καὶ τὸ ἄνω, τοῖς δὲ ἀνθρωπικωτέροις, διττὸς αὖ ὢν, ὁ μὲν μεμνημένος ἀρετῆς μετίσχει ἀγαθοῦ τινος, ὁ δὲ φαῦλος ὄχλος οἷον χειροτέχνης τῶν πρὸς ἀνάγκην τοῖς ἐπιεικεστέροις.*—Enn., ii. 9.

[2] Compare Neander, *Wissenschaftl. Abhandll.*, p. 213.

death? An instructive answer to this inquiry may be gathered from the works of Cicero. Whatever were his faults as a man, in the writings of no Roman of that age does there breathe a more enlightened spirit. The Stoic conception of the universal city is a familiar thought to him. That the individual is to live for mankind, and to restrict his sympathies by no narrower limit, he expressly affirms. Humanity, in the sense of a philanthropic regard for the race, is a word frequently upon his lips. Antitheses like that of Greek and Barbarian, he declares to be contrary to truth and nature. A good man is not even to requite injuries, but to confine himself to the restraint of the aggressor. In his political course, however, and in dealing with ethical questions in the concrete, Cicero too often failed to exemplify these liberal maxims. There is a like failure to realize practically his religious theories. In his work on the Nature of the Gods, and in that on Divination, he shows the folly of polytheism, and of the cultus connected with it. He wishes that it were as easy to discover the truth as to confute error.[1] He is a Theist, preferring to follow Plato in the belief in a personal God, rather than the Stoics in their dogma of the impersonal spirit of nature. He finds in the wonderful order of the world irresistible evidence of the supreme Mind. He sees a corroboration of this faith in the concurrent judgments of men, as evinced in the universal prevalence of religion. Equally strenuous is he in maintaining that the soul is immaterial and immortal.[2] But we have the opportunity of testing the character of his convictions when he is brought into circumstances of keen distress. What was the practical force and value of these opinions? He composed the Tusculan Discussions when he was sixty-two

[1] de Nat. Deorum, i. 32.

[2] E. g. Disp. Tusc. I. xxvii. xxviii.

years of age, after the death of his beloved daughter Tullia. Just after this heavy bereavement, he wrote a treatise on Consolation, for the purpose of alleviating his sorrow,—a treatise which is lost, but the general character of which he describes. The topics of the Tusculan Discussions are the Contempt of Death, on Bearing Pain, on Grief of Mind, on other Perturbations of Mind, on the Sufficiency of Virtue to make a man happy. In the perusal of these writings, we are struck with the distinctness with which the problems of life—the practical necessities of the soul, exposed as it is to affliction, and looking forward to death —are discerned and stated. We are equally impressed with the effort that is put forth to find a ground of rest. Ingenious reflections are brought forward, remedies against grief, which in Christianity are collateral and quite secondary to the main sources of consolation. He says: "There are some who think with Cleanthes that the only duty of a comforter is to prove that what one is lamenting is by no means an evil. Others, as the Peripatetics, prefer saying that the evil is not great. Others, with Epicurus, seek to divert your attention from the evil to good. Some think it sufficient to show that nothing has happened but what you had reason to expect; and this is the practice of the Cyrenaics. But Chrysippus thinks that the main thing in comforting is to remove the opinion from the person who is grieving, that to grieve is his bounden duty. There are others who bring together all these various kinds of consolation, as I have done myself in my book on Consolation; for as my own mind was much disordered, I have attempted in that book to discover every method of cure."[1] "The principal medicine to be applied in consolation is to maintain either that it is no evil at all, or a very inconsiderable one; the

[1] B. ii., §§ 31, 32.

next best to that is to speak of the common condition of life, having a view, if possible, to the state of the person whom you comfort particularly. The third is that it is folly to wear yourself out with grief which can avail nothing." He says in another place: "In order to persuade those to whom any misfortune has happened that they can and ought to bear it, it is very useful to set before them an enumeration of other persons who have borne similar calamities." [1] To be sure, Cicero argues eloquently for the existence of God, and for the immortality of the soul. But when he is himself plunged into affliction, we find that neither he, nor his intimate friends who strive to console him, recur to truths of this nature. There is a striking contrast between the discourses composed for the public eye, and the familiar letters which passed between him and these friends. His correspondence with Servius Sulpicius, after Tullia's death, is an impressive illustration of the small degree of practical power which these religious opinions or speculations had over the minds of such men. The Letter of Condolence which Sulpicius writes to Cicero is marked by refinement and tenderness. He adverts to the fall of the Republic, an event which had filled the cup of grief to the brim, so that no new event could increase the weight of calamity that had fallen on his friend; to the ruins of four renowned Grecian cities, of which Corinth was one, which had met his eyes upon a recent voyage, and which brought to mind disasters compared with which any loss that an individual could suffer is small; [2] to the fact that Tullia had lived to witness her father's public honors and fame; to the circumstance that Cicero, who had sought to console others,

[1] B. iii. 29.

[2] Cœpi egomet mecum sic cogitare: Heus! nos homunculi indignamur, si quis nostrum interiit aut occisus est, quorum vita brevior esse debet; quum uno loco tot oppidorum cadavera projecta jacent?—*Serv. Sulpicius Ciceroni*, F., iv. 5.

would be charged with inconsistency if he himself gave way to sorrow. These are among the prominent thoughts in this remarkable letter. Cicero, in his Reply, dilates upon the peculiar circumstances of aggravation that belonged to his affliction, being deprived, as he was, of the occupation and diversion which arise from official employment, and left without a solace at home.[1] In neither of these letters is there the slightest reference to God, or to a future life. Cicero's treatise on Old Age is another monument of the vain attempt to elevate considerations which, when merely subordinate and auxiliary, have their value, into prime sources of consolation. How current the consolatory reflections were, which are recited by Cicero, in his moral treatises, is evident from their familiar use by other writers. Plutarch, in his Letter of Consolation to Apollonius, who had lost a son, and in his Letter to his own wife after the death of his daughter, a child two years of age, incorporates some of these reflections. As usual, he inveighs against that Stoical apathy which "can never happen to a man without detriment; for as now the body, so soon the very mind would be wild and savage." "A wise and well-educated man," he observes, in the first of these Letters, "must keep his emotions within proper bounds. It is no unusual thing for a man to be afflicted; Socrates was right in saying that if all of our misfortunes were laid in one common heap, most people would be content, instead of taking an equal share, to take their own and depart; the sufferer endures nothing but what is common to him with other men; how irrational to wonder when that perishes which by nature is perishable; we must call to mind the reasons which we have urged to our kinsmen when they were in trouble, and apply them to ourselves—these thoughts have

[1] When in exile, Cicero conceived of his calamities as altogether exceptional.—See *Epistt. ad Atticum*, iii. 10, 15.

a prominent place in Plutarch's Epistle. He intermingles references to the Providence of God which may have ordained for us what is best, and to the possible felicity of another state of being. But the doctrine of the future life, even in Plutarch, is not set forth as a firm conviction, but only as a probability; and he makes an argument in behalf of serenity, on the hypothesis, which is admitted to be not absolutely disproved, that death is the dissipation of our being, and the termination, therefore, of pain as well as of joy. Even outside of the limits of the Stoical school, there was a tendency to make much of natural fortitude and manliness as a means of counteracting sorrow. Plutarch himself says, that when evil comes "one must put on a masculine brave spirit, and so resolve to endure it." [1] Plato says that the principle which inclines us to recollection of our troubles and to lamentation, is "irrational, indolent, and cowardly." We are not, "like children who have had a fall, to be keeping hold of the part struck and wasting time in setting up a howl." Hence the emotional nature must not be indulged. For this reason the dramatic poets must be excluded from the Republic. This poetry "feeds and waters the passions instead of withering and starving them." It evokes pity by showing us the calamities of others, and the result is that when we are afflicted we pity ourselves. [2] The Stoic element which entered into the character of Socrates, an element which is quite discernible in Plato's account of his apology to his judges, crops out occasionally in the Platonic dialogues, though connected with other tenets not consonant with the Stoical system.

In Cicero's time, and in the century that followed, faith in the immortality of the soul is mostly confined to minds imbued with the Platonic influence. We have adverted to

[1] Consol. ad Apoll., 4.
[2] Republic, x. 606. (Jowett, ii. 448).

the gloomy disbelief that prevailed in a class of whom the elder Pliny is an example.[1] The Epicureans were avowed free-thinkers, and at the close of the civil wars, the Epicurean creed was popular at Rome. We have already adverted to the fact that Julius Cæsar, in an address to the Senate against the infliction of capital punishment upon the associates of Catiline, maintained that death would be a less severe penalty, since it would end all life and sensation; the idea of a survival of the soul he treated as a chimera.[2] Tacitus, who was not without a belief in the existence of the gods, and in their providential agency, shows himself to be a doubting adherent of the opinion of Chrysippus that the souls of the most worthy survive until the final conflagration. In the beautiful apostrophe with which he closes the Life of Agricola, he desires that "if there be any habitation for the shades of the virtuous; if, as philosophers suppose, exalted souls do not perish with the body;" the illustrious dead may repose in peace, and recall his kindred from vain laments to the contemplation of his virtues.

In the second century, along with the revival of the ancient religion, and the restoration of political order, philosophy played a more important part as an educator among the Romans than it had ever done before.[3] There had been not only a popular dislike of philosophers, but also a strong prejudice against any absorbing devotion to philosophical study, which was felt by persons like Tacitus, on the ground that it diverted men's minds from the affairs of state, and made them poor citizens. For political reasons partly, from a sense of the dangerous tendency of philosophical thinking, philosophers had been repeatedly banished from

[1] See above, p. 132. [2] Sallust, B. C. 50.

[3] See, on this subject, Boissier, *La Religion Romaine*, etc., ii. 410 seq.

Rome in the course of the first century; but, after the death of Domitian, philosophy not only gained a toleration, but often received an effective personal patronage from the Emperors. There was still a popular antipathy from the supposed uselessness of studies and discussions of this nature, and from the Pharisaical character of many who were devoted to them. There was, also, a vehement opposition from the rhetoricians like Quintilian, who had to defend themselves against censorious criticism, and who claimed that ethics was embraced in their own art, since virtue was an essential quality of a true orator. A great number of the noblest minds embraced Stoicism, though the systems of Epicurus, and the Eclectic school were not without numerous adherents. Philosophers taught in schools, delivering lectures which were often received with great applause, and taking under their oversight the entire conduct of the young men who adopted them as guides in the formation of character. Their exactions were sometimes severe, and their rebukes faithful. Besides the work of philosophers in this public capacity as the heads of schools, they exerted their influence in a more private relation. They were sometimes received into the families of the great in the character of spiritual advisers. As a pastor or confessor, the philosopher solved questions of duty, gave counsel, and administered consolation, in the household where he took up his abode. In certain cases, he accompanied to the place of execution, and soothed in the last moments of life, persons sentenced to death, ostensibly for political offences. If these household instructors, like chaplains in great families in more modern times, were, according to the descriptions of Lucian, occasionally subject to indignities, there is no doubt that not unfrequently they held a dignified and useful position. Princes associated with these philosophers for the sake of their instructive companionship.

There was a certain class of philosophers, the Cynics, who engaged in a distinctively missionary work. Like mendicant friars, they perambulated the streets and highways, offering their doctrine and their rebukes to whomsoever they chose to address. Hated and despised as they were, not unfrequently with good cause, there were not wanting among them individuals of a mild spirit, and of disinterested, noble aims. Epictetus, in one of his Discourses, has sketched the ideal of the Cynic Missionary.[1] He who takes upon him this work, it is said, must not do it without divine guidance. He must not presumptuously take this office upon himself. He must divest himself of discontent, and of all the excitements of passion. He must purify his mind; learn to despise the body, and give up all dread of death. He must be, and feel himself to be, a messenger from Zeus to men, and must tell them the truth at all hazards. He must give up house, land, property, and external comforts of all sorts, and take up with the hardest fare. He must not return evil for evil, but as a brother love those who beat him. He must, as the servant of Zeus, be indifferent to Cæsar or to Proconsul. He must be without the distraction of worldly care—Epictetus uses the same word (ἀπερισπάστως) with Paul (1 Cor. vii. 35) —that he may be entirely attentive to the service of God; and for this reason he must abstain from marriage. He must have a sound bodily constitution, so that his pure doctrine and exalted standard may not be attributed to the accident of bodily infirmity. He must be endowed with natural tact and acuteness. He must, above all, be free from every vice, with his reason clearer than the sun. Few, if any, fulfilled the lofty ideal which the Stoic sage presents of one who undertakes to reform and guide his fellow-men. Yet it is interesting to know that such an

[1] Diss., iii. 22.

ideal was exhibited, and that, here and there, an individual was found who made some near approach to the realization of it.

Philosophy yielded a certain amount of strength and solace to able and cultivated men; an increased amount, we may say, among the Romans, in the second century, as compared with the age that witnessed the introduction of Christianity. The Stoics looked forward to a continuance for an indefinite, though limited period, of personal life beyond the grave. Platonists may not unfrequently have cherished a larger hope. But it must be remembered that philosophy exerted no appreciable influence on the mass of mankind, either in the way of restraint or of inspiration. They were left in the adversities of life, in sickness, in bereavement, and in death, to such consolation as was to be drawn from the old mythological system. The epitaphs in memory of the dead in some cases betray a crass materialism, in other cases a bitter and resentful despair; while many express a hope in behalf of the beloved who are gone, which is slow to be extinguished in the human heart.

When we look back upon the ancient philosophy in its entire course, we find in it nothing nearer to Christianity than the saying of Plato that man is to resemble God. But, on the path of speculation, how defective and discordant are the conceptions of God! And if God were adequately known, how shall the fetters of evil be broken, and the soul attain to its ideal? It is just these questions that Christianity meets through the revelation of God in Jesus Christ. God, the Head of that universal society on which Cicero delighted to dwell, is brought near, in all His purity and love, to the apprehension, not of a coterie of philosophers merely, but of the humble and ignorant.

There is a real deliverance from the burden of evil, achieved through Christ, actually for Himself, and potentially for mankind. How altered in their whole character are the ethical maxims which, in form, may not be without a parallel in heathen sages! Forgiveness, forbearance, pity for the poor, universal compassion, are no longer abstractions, derived from speculation on the attributes of Deity. They are a part of the example of God. He has so dealt with us in the mission and death of His Son.[1] The Cross of Christ was the practical power that annihilated artificial distinctions among mankind, and made human brotherhood a reality. In this new setting, ethical precepts gain a depth of earnestness and a force of impression which heathen philosophy could never impart. We might as well claim for starlight the brightness and warmth of a noon-day sun.

[1] See Col. iii. 12; Eph. iv. 32; 1 Pet. ii. 18; 2 Cor. x. 1; Luke xxii. 27; John xiii. 14; 1 John iii. 16; 2 Cor. viii. 9; Eph. v. 2; Phil. ii. 7; and the New Testament *passim*.

CHAPTER VI.

THE STATE OF MORALS IN ANCIENT HEATHEN SOCIETY.

BENEATH the tranquillity that prevailed under the rule of Augustus Cæsar, there appeared appalling signs of exhaustion and decay in the central portions of the Roman Empire. The world was weary of strife, and resigned itself to the sway of a master who was supported by a standing army of 340,000 men, and who, by absorbing the various magistracies in his own person, knew how to combine the substance of absolute power with the forms of republican government. But the decay of that virile energy, the loss of that virtue, which had carried Rome forward on its career of conquest, were visible on every hand. The civil wars, from the time of Sylla, had desolated the most flourishing regions of the Empire. The wars in Gaul had been attended with an enormous destruction of life in that country. Of these wars Plutarch says that Cæsar had not pursued them for ten years "when he had taken by storm 800 towns, subdued 300 states, and of the 3,000,000 of men who made up the gross sum of those with whom at several times he engaged, he had killed 1,000,000, and taken captive a second."[1] This loss of population was partially made up by the large influx of Roman colonists. There were countries, like Sicily and Egypt, whose extraordinary fertility enabled them to recover rapidly from the devastating effects of war, and to furnish supplies of food to provinces whose agriculture was blighted. Greece, as a

[1] Vita Cæsaris.

consequence of the Macedonian and Roman wars, was covered with ruins. The most of her renowned cities were reduced to villages. Corinth only, favored by its situation, rose from its ashes, and gained rapidly in population and wealth—the increase of luxury and profligacy keeping pace with its growth. The nobler qualities of the Hellenic race had vanished. Still proud of their blood, dexterous, supple, unprincipled, and accomplished in the art of catering to the appetite for amusement and sensual indulgence, they swarmed in Italy and Rome, and infected the whole atmosphere of domestic and social life with their pestiferous influence. Juvenal pours out his wrath at seeing "a Grecian capital in Italy,"[1] and his scorn at

> "The flattering, cringing, treacherous, artful race,
> Of fluent tongue, and never-blushing face,
> A Protean tribe, one knows not what to call,
> That shifts to every form, and shines in all."[2]

"Greece," he says, "is a theatre where all are players;" this versatile, insincere, sensual race "make all parts their

[1] ——"non possum ferre, Quirites,
Græcam urbem." Sat. iii.

[2] These lines of Gifford are a free paraphrase of the original: —

"Ingenium velox, audacia perdita, sermo
Promptus, et Isæo torrentior: ede quid illum
Esse putes? quemvis hominem secum attulit ad nos:
Grammaticus, Rhetor, Geometres, Pictor, Aliptes,
Augur, Schœnobates, Medicus, Magus: omnia novit:
Græculus esuriens in Cœlum, jusseris, ibit." Sat. iii. 73-78.

A more literal rendering is that of Madan:—

"A quick wit, desperate impudence, speech
Ready, and more rapid than Isæus. Say—what do you
Think him to be? He has brought us with himself what man you please:
Grammarian, Rhetorician, Geometrician, Painter, Anointer,
Augur, Rope-dancer, Physician, Wizard: he knows all things.
A hungry Greek will go into heaven, if you command."

own;" they cast an enchantment over all, and defile whatever they touch.

The population of Italy, like that of Greece, was diminishing. The slaughter of men in battle was a cause, but not the chief cause, of this remarkable fact. The country was blighted by slavery, to which more than to any other agency the fall of Rome was eventually due. In the room of the farmers who had once owned the soil which they tilled, and who had filled the Roman armies with hardy soldiers, were the few great proprietors, each with his throng of bondmen who toiled in the fields with fetters on their limbs. Thus the race of independent Italian yeomen was extirpated. It was one consequence of this calamitous change, that numerous acres, which had previously been cultivated with the plough and the spade, were turned into grazing land. The grain and the wine which had once been produced at home were now imported from abroad. Moreover, the small land-owners who had been left, were expelled from their homes, in large numbers, to give place to the disbanded soldiers of the legions of Augustus. These, disinclined to labor, and having no relish for their new abodes, parted with their property—thus enlarging further the estates of the great slave-holders—and resorted to Rome, to swell the multitude of vagabonds who rushed to the Capital from all quarters, for purposes of pleasure or crime, or in order to feed at the public crib. The population of Rome exceeded 1,000,000, and, in the first half of the second century, probably rose to double this number."[1] In the vast throng that crowded its narrow streets, which ran between houses built higher than in other ancient cities, were mingled the costumes of every nation, and the confused accents of a

[1] See Friedländer, *Sittengeschichte Roms.*, i. 54 seq., where the calculations of Bunsen, Zumpt, Marquardt, and others are considered.

hundred dialects. No small fraction of this motley populace was made up of the scum of all the provinces. Juvenal complains that

> "Long since the stream that wanton Syria laves,
> Has disembogued its filth in Tiber's waves." [1]

A host of adventurers had come to insinuate themselves into the confidence of the great, and to step into their shoes.[2] Not less than 200,000 persons were supported by donations of money and provisions from the government. To these we are to add legions of mendicants, who picked up their living by beggary or theft, and lodged at night in the porticoes of temples and of other public edifices. There was never a more terrible contrast between the extremes of wealth and poverty, the opulence and luxury of the few, and the destitution of the many. Slavery had rendered all manual industry disreputable. Even Cicero takes this view, making an exception only in favor of the fine arts, where money is not the sole object of pursuit. Ordinary trade is stigmatized as unworthy; teaching, and commerce on a large scale, he regards as not unbecoming.

Of course, in forming an estimate of the state of morals at any given time, caution is requisite. The vehement rebukes of an austere philosopher, and the humorous exaggerations of a satirist, cannot be literally taken. We must guard against generalizing from exceptional instances of depravity. In the worst times of Rome, there were men of probity, and women of unsullied virtue. There were families bound together by tender affection. There were brave and generous actions, and examples of high courage

[1] "Jam pridem Syrus in Tiberim defluxit Orontes
Et linguam et mores et cum tibicine chordas
Obliquas nec non gentilia tympana secum
Vexit et ad Circem jussas prostare puellas." Sat. iii. 62–65.

[2] Viscera magnarum domuum dominique futuri." Juvenal, *Sat.* iii. 73.

and self-sacrifice for the public good. There were not wanting individuals to protest against the baseness and corruption of their age. And we must not overlook the extent of profligacy that may exist in our own day, in Christian countries, and especially in populous cities. But when all allowances are made, there can be no doubt that ancient society, at the particular period of which we are speaking, presented a scene of unexampled demoralization. "To see the world in its worst estate we turn to the age of the satirists and of Tacitus, when all the different streams of evil, coming from east, west, north, south, the vices of barbarism and the vices of civilization, remnants of ancient cults, and the latest refinements of luxury and impurity, met and mingled on the banks of the Tiber."[1] Some scholars have been disposed to deny that the mythological religion, through the stories of vice and crime perpetrated by the objects of worship, tended to corrupt the popular mind. It has been claimed that the noble and beautiful forms which art gave to the divinities must have exerted on their beholders an elevating influence. But these same divinities were believed to be capable of the worst forms of iniquity. What must have been the effect of this belief on the young? It is idle to call in question the judgment of Aristotle and Plato on this point. The latter, speaking of the stories in Homer about the heroes, as well as the deities, says: "They are likely to have a bad effect on those who hear them; for everybody will begin to excuse his own vices when he is convinced that similar wickednesses are always being perpetrated by the kindred of the gods."[2] But Homer was the

[1] Professor Jowett, *Epistles of St. Paul*, p. 75.

[2] Καὶ μὴν τοῖς γε ἀκούουσι βλαβερά· πᾶς γὰρ ἑαυτῷ ξυγγνώμην ἕξει κακῷ ὄντι, πεισθεὶς ὡς ἄρα τοιαῦτα πράττουσί τε καὶ ἔπραττον καὶ οἱ θεῶν ἀγχίσποροι, Διὸς ἐγγύς, etc. Rep. iii. 391 (Jowett ii. 216). See, also, Aristotle, *Polit.* vii. 17.

one school-book of Grecian youth. Euthyphro justifies his treatment of his own father by appealing to the example of Zeus; and Socrates, denying that the story is true, says that his rejection of these impious myths was at the bottom of the charge of impiety which was commonly brought against him.[1] The causes of social demoralization in the age of Augustus were manifold; of the fact there is abundant evidence. When the Apostle Paul, in the opening of his Letter to the Romans, describes the hideous vices that prevailed among the heathen, he speaks as an eye-witness.[2] That terrible indictment is not more severe than the indignant assertions of Seneca. He compares society, where every one makes his profit by injuring somebody else, to the life of gladiators, who live together to fight each other. "All things," he says, "are full of crimes and vices. More is perpetrated than can be removed by force. There is a struggle to see which will excel in iniquity. Daily the appetite for sin increases, the sense of shame diminishes. Casting away all respect for right and justice, lust hurries whithersoever it will. Crimes are no longer secret; they stalk before the eyes of men. Iniquity has so free a course in public, it so dominates in all hearts, that innocence is not only rare—it does not exist at all. It is not a case of violations of law in individual cases, few in number. From all sides, as at a given signal, men rush together, confounding good and evil."[3] He then proceeds to specify, in a long catalogue, the

[1] Euthyph., 5. (Jowett, i. 305.)

[2] Rom. i. 24–32.

[3] "Nunquam irasci desinet sapiens, si semel coeperit; omnia sceleribus et vitiis plena sunt; plus committitur, quam quod possit coercitione sanari. Certatur ingenti quodam nequitiæ certamine: major quotidie peccandi cupiditas, minor verecundia est. Expulso melioris æquiorisque respectu, quocunque visum est, libido se impingit; nec furtiva jam scelera sunt; præter oculos eunt; adeoque in publicum missa nequitia est, et in omnibus pectoribus evaluit, ut innocentia non rara, sed nulla

forms of iniquity, some of them revolting and unnatural crimes, which exhibited themselves on every hand. We must allow something for the spirit of declamation that belongs to the Roman philosopher; yet his testimony is borne out in its general tenor by other evidence. The contrast between the Rome of an earlier age, and Rome as it had then come to be, through these social evils, was a theme of indignant and sorrowful remark. It is true that the Roman community at the outset was virtuous. The people were temperate, industrious, and, after a manner, conscientious. The domestic, as well as the public virtues, prevailed. But after the power of Rome had spread, after the conquest of Carthage and Corinth, followed by the subjugation of the East and of Egypt; after the incoming of wealth, the acquaintance with Asiatic luxury and vice, the committal of the young to Greek pedagogues, the spread of Greek mythology and art, and the introduction of the Greek stage, the old Roman character was broken down. The absence of a certain refinement, which belonged to the Greeks even when they were steeped in sensuality, led to an indulgence in loathsome excesses, such as gluttony, to which we find the Romans addicted.

In considering the state of morals among the ancient nations, we single out certain topics for special remark.[1]

sit. Numquid enim singuli et pauci rupere legem? Undique, velut signo dato, ad fas nefasque, miscendum coorti sunt." *De Ira*, ii. 8.

[1] On the morals of the ancient heathen society, see Tholuck's Essays in Neander's *Denkwürdigkeiten*, vol. i. (1823); translated in the *Bibl. Repository*, vol. ii. Those essays, though presenting a mass of unquestionable facts, were designed to exhibit the dark side of heathenism. The more pleasing features of ancient society Neander was to present in another essay, which, however, was not written. A plea for the beneficial influence of Greek art was made by F. Jacob, in his essay *Ueber die Erziehung d. Hellenen zur Sittlichkeit*, translated in the *Classical Studies* published by Sears, Edwards, and Felton (Boston, 1843). See, however,

1. *Immoralities connected with worship.* Among various nations of antiquity, human sacrifices were in vogue. The Tyrians and Carthaginians threw children into the fire as an offering to Moloch. The Druidical priests in Gaul slaughtered human victims. In pre-historic times, human sacrifices had been practised by the Greeks and Romans. The far-famed story of Iphigenia is an illustration of this primitive custom. In later ages the Greek and Roman feeling did not countenance this sort of brutality. Yet isolated examples are recorded of the revival of the horrible custom. In the year 227 B. C., when it was found in the Sibylline books that Gauls and Greeks were destined to overpower the city, the Romans, in order to verify the prediction and thus to save themselves from ruin, caused a man and woman of that nation to be buried alive in the forum. It is said that Sextus Pompeius, at a time when a storm had shattered the fleet of his enemy, caused living men, as well as horses, to be cast into the sea as an offering to Neptune. A decree of the Senate, B. C. 95, had abolished human sacrifices; but the elder Pliny tells us that in his time they were still occasionally made. There seems to be reason to believe, although the fact has been doubted by some, that Augustus, after the surrender of Perusia, caused 300 captives to be sacrificed on the altar of Julius. [1]

Licentiousness entered into the rites of heathen worship. Prostitution was not made a part of religious service among the Babylonians and other Semitic peoples alone.

Gieseler's criticism upon Jacob's view, *Kirchengesch.* I. 29, n. 1. There is a full discussion of the subject by Dr. Döllinger in his *Heidenthum u. Judenthum.* But the facts adduced by this learned writer are not always strictly verifiable. Lampoons and gossip were not more trustworthy in ancient times than they are now. Compare the anecdotes of Julius Cæsar taken up by Döllinger (p. 719) from Suetonius, with the remarks of Merivale, *History of the Romans,* ii. 390.

[1] Suet., *Octav.* 15, Seneca, *de Clem.*, i. 11 ("post Perusinas aras").

It was practised, likewise, in honor of Aphrodite at Corinth. The indecent songs, symbols, and revelry, which attended the Bacchanalian and other festivals, cannot be mentioned in detail. The Bacchic orgies were carried by the Greeks to Etruria, and being thence transferred to Rome, led to most indecent and iniquitous excesses; so that the consuls, in the year 189 B. C., interfered to suppress ceremonies that involved murder, as well as gross debauchery. At that time, seven thousand persons in Rome were united in the practice of these frightful orgies. Livy states that subsequently a Prætor condemned to death, in one year, 3,000 persons on the charge of poisoning, where crime was mixed up with religion.[1] The Romans, notwithstanding their earlier regard for decency, admitted rites of an opposite character. Mythological stories, which were adapted to excite the baser propensities, were represented in pictures and statues, and swelled the tide of corruption which beat with ever increasing force against the ancient barriers of chastity and order.

2. *The character and position of women.* In Greece, women enjoyed relatively less freedom, and less influence in their families, in the age of Pericles than in the Homeric period. Little pains were taken with their education. Before their marriage, they were kept in seclusion, and under watch. After their marriage, they managed their households, governed their children and slaves; but they had their own apartments, separate from the husband, and seldom left their dwellings. They ate at the same table with their husbands, but did not do this when he had guests, nor did they go out with him when he took meals with his friends abroad. The purity of the wife and mother was guarded by strict laws; but the utmost laxity in this respect was allowed to males. Higher ideas

[1] Livy xxxi. 8–19. See Döllinger, p. 482.

in regard to the education of females, and the relation of the wife to the husband, are found in Plato and Plutarch.[1] But Plato was so far governed by the prevalent view that the prime object of the marriage relation was to raise up citizens, strong in body as well as of sound mind, and was so oblivious of the spiritual nature of marriage, that he makes a community of wives one characteristic of the ideal republic. Cultivated Greeks made companions of the hetæræ, or courtesans, who were sometimes witty and educated. So innocent was the occupation of this class of persons deemed to be that we find Socrates making a visit to Theodota, who was one of them, and giving her advice on the best means of prosecuting her business of winning and keeping "friends."[2] The profligacy that reigned in the declining age of Grecian history is illustrated in the story of Phryne. This famous courtesan amassed such wealth that she could offer to build the walls of Thebes. Praxiteles and Hyperides were among her adorers; and when she was charged with Atheism, the latter secured her acquittal by bidding her unveil her bosom to the eyes of the judges. Finally at Eleusis, in the presence of myriads of spectators from all Greece, she personated Venus by entering naked into the waves.

In Rome, the wife from the first had a higher position in the household. Notwithstanding the absolute authority in the family, which was conceded to the husband, she was more his companion. Matrons of the type of Cornelia were a subject of patriotic pride. Matrimonial fidelity was for a long period remarkably observed. The Romans boasted that for the first five hundred years of their history, there was no instance of divorce. But the old sentiments rapidly passed away under the influence of Hellenism, and in the general decline of Roman character. As

[1] Plutarch, *de Amore*, 24, 25. [2] Xenophon, *Mem.*, iii. 11.

early as 131 B. C., Metellus Macedonicus, who was held in general admiration for his honorable domestic life, in a speech described marriage as an oppressive burden which citizens would gladly be clear of, but which they were bound to undertake from a sense of duty.[1] Divorce became more and more common. Marcus Cato did not hesitate to part from his wife, with the consent of her father, and to hand her over to his friend, Hortensius; and then, after his death, to marry her again.[2] The form of marriage which involved the stricter legal and religious sanctions, gradually disappeared, and marriages without the *manus*, admitting of easy separation, became universal. Divorces came to be events of every-day occurrence. Cicero divorced his wife, with whom he had lived for thirty years, and married a young woman of wealth. Her, also, he soon divorced. Seneca speaks of "illustrious and noble" women who reckoned time not by the number of the consuls, but by the number of their successive husbands.[3] Meantime, seduction and adultery spread until Roman society had become a sink of pollution. "Liaisons in the first houses," says Mommsen, "had become so frequent, that only a scandal altogether exceptional could make them the subject of special talk; a judicial interference seemed now almost ridiculous."[4] The Roman aristocracy, in the warm season, flocked to the watering-places of Baiæ and Puteoli, where women mixed in political intrigues, and, with young effeminate Roman fops at their side, devoted themselves to the amusements and vices peculiar to these places of fashionable resort. The stage acquired an irresistible fascination, and women belonging to high families appeared upon it as dancers. It was one feature of this

[1] See Mommsen, iii. 502.
[2] Plutarch, *Cato Min.*, vii. 57.
[3] De Beneficiis, iii. 16.
[4] Mommsen, iv. 618.

demoralized condition of society that men refused to marry. They preferred an illicit gratification of the senses, and shrank from the burdens incident to a connection with such women as were open to their choice, addicted as they were to habits of profuse expenditure. The efforts of Augustus to promote marriages by legal enactments, which offered bounties to those who would take wives, had little effect. Where marriages took place, the children were few in number, and parents preferred, for pecuniary reasons, to remain almost or altogether childless. Such parents could quote the authority of Cato who said, that it was the "duty of a citizen to keep great wealth together, and therefore not to beget too many children."[1] If a tithe of what Juvenal and contemporary writers say on this matter is true, licentiousness pervaded all ranks of Roman society. The example was furnished in the imperial family. One has only to remember the almost incredible wickedness of Messalina, the wife of Claudius I., as she is described by Tacitus, to learn to what an unexampled abyss of profligacy a Roman woman of the highest rank could descend.[2] The multitudes of slaves presented an ever present temptation to sensual indulgence. This degradation of woman, this all-pervading impurity, belonged to the provinces as well as the capital.

3. *Luxury and Extravagance.* Friedländer maintains that the common representations on this point are exaggerated.[3] Too much has been built upon exceptional incidents of wild extravagance, as, for example, the stories of costly pearls dissolved, and swallowed from the goblet, in some fit of mad caprice. The monstrous prodigality of certain emperors, as Nero and Caligula, is not to be attri-

[1] Mommsen, iv. 613.

[2] Tacitus, Annal. xi. 26, 27; Dio Cassius, lx. 18, 31.

[3] See *Die Sittengesch. Roms.*, iii. 1 seq.

buted to their subjects, nor even to other emperors, some of whom, like Vespasian, were noted for frugality. If the Romans sought for new delicacies for the table, one consequence was that they were led to naturalize in Italy a great variety of animals and plants which are useful for food. Even the vine, with the art of cultivating it, had been transplanted at an earlier day from Greece. What was censured by the men of austere views is often something connected with food or dress which no one objects to at present. For example, Pliny and Seneca inveigh against the use of snow for cooling drinks, as an unnatural luxury. It was then something new; but so far from being considered a superfluity, ice has become an article of indispensable convenience, especially in southern latitudes. The entertainments of the higher class of Romans, their wardrobes, their silver, and jewels, when compared with what is witnessed now among the rich, hardly justify the ordinary judgment. Neither were the incomes of rich persons in private life then larger than the incomes of individuals of the same class in Europe and America now. Anecdotes relating to Roman habits may create astonishment, when in truth due examination will show that they are not without a parallel in modern society. It must be remembered, however, that the Romans had been a frugal people, living upon the products of their own soil. The influx of commodities from every quarter of the globe, through conquest and commerce, produced a vast and rather sudden revolution in their habits. It may be true that bills of fare of grand feasts at Rome do not display a more profuse variety of meats and viands than a Lord Mayor's dinner. But unless all testimonies are false, there was a coarse appetite for food, a gluttony, which finds no analogy in the higher circles of modern society. To pay two hundred and fifty dollars for a single fish—the mullet—was

no doubt unusual; yet occasional instances of this kind throw light upon the drift of social habits at the time when they occurred. The humorous passage in which Juvenal describes the assembling of the chiefs of state, at the call of Domitian, to determine how a turbot should be cooked, is equally significant.[1] The reader of Cicero's letters will remember the description of his reception of Julius Cæsar at his country villa, where it is incidentally mentioned that the Dictator took an emetic in connection with his dinner.[2] It was no uncommon thing for Roman gentlemen to take this method of relieving the stomach of its contents, in order that they might indulge the appetite with impunity, or prolong the pleasures of the table beyond the wants or capacity of nature.[3] There is no evidence that this loathsome custom was, usually at least, from a sanitary motive, not connected with intemperance in eating. Suppers were extended far into the night. Female slaves waited on the tables, attired in a way to excite the passions of the guests whom they served; and when they were inflamed with wine, dancing-girls were introduced, and a scene of coarse revelry ensued. The enormous expenditure in baths, in villas with their gardens and fish-ponds, in magnificent sepulchres, and in works of art of every description, needs no illustration. The sumptuary laws which were frequently issued, but which were violated by those who made them, testify to a general sense of the fact that a headlong passion for luxurious living was breaking through the bounds of propriety and of traditional custom. Speaking of the later days of the Republic, Mommsen says:[4] "Extravagant prices, as much as

[1] Sat. iv.

[2] This passage is quoted in Forsyth's *Life of Cicero*, ii. 167.

[3] Compare Seneca, *ad Helviam:* "Vomunt ut edant, edunt ut vomant."

[4] Vol. iii. p. 501.

100,000 sesterces (£1,000) were paid for an exquisite cook. Houses were constructed with special reference to this object." "A dinner was already described as poor, at which the fowls were served up to the guests entire, and not merely the choice portions." "At banquets, above all, the Romans displayed their hosts of slaves ministering to luxury, their bands of musicians, their dancing-girls, their elegant furniture, their carpets glittering with gold, or pictorially embroidered, their rich silver plate." Luxury went on increasing in defiance of all laws designed to curb it. It should be observed that the period when luxury and extravagance were at their height includes the latter days of the Republic, and the century that followed the battle of Actium, extending to the reign of Vespasian.

4. *Unnatural Vice and Pollution.* In any comparison of ancient society with Christian times, it is impossible to pass over in absolute silence practices too revolting to admit of more than a passing allusion.[1] The unnatural sensuality on which the Apostle Paul poured out his indignant reprobation, in the first chapter of the Epistle to the Romans, prevailed to a frightful extent among the Greeks, and was taught by them to the Romans. In Greece the passion for beautiful boys (*παιδεραστία*) was relieved, in some slight degree, of its grossness, by an infusion of æsthetic sentiment. This kind of love, springing in part from the adoration of beauty, assumed all the characteristics of a sentimental attachment between persons of different sexes. Assiduous devotion to the object beloved, rivalship, jealousy, despair—all the phenomena of courtship and love—were connected with this unnatural relation, and served to cloak, even to the eyes of philosophers, the shameless indecency that belonged to it. There is scarcely a writer of Greece who

[1] The facts and the evidence are presented by Döllinger and by Tholuck. See above, p. 197, n. 1.

directly condemns it. One effect of it was to disincline men to marriage, as both Plato and Plutarch remarked; and so this disgusting vice contributed to the reduction of the population of Greece, as well as to the moral ruin of her people. Like most other Greek vices, this form of impurity took root and flourished in Rome. Statesmen, judges, generals, and emperors were guilty of it. At the end of the sixth century, A. U. C., Polybius states that many Romans paid as high as a talent ($1000) for a beautiful boy. Cicero speaks of a case in which the sons of Senators, and youth from the highest families, obtained from the judges an acquittal, which a bribe of money could not procure, by this species of prostitution. Slaves were more commonly the victims of this base affection. All pains were then taken to stunt their growth and preserve their fresh and effeminate appearance; and the same thing was done in the case of free persons. The fact that stories imputing the vice of which we are speaking to a man like Julius Cæsar, were in circulation, and formed a matter for jesting,[1] even if the stories were false, shows the measure of toleration that was granted to practices which in modern times, would render the perpetrator of them an outcast and an object of loathing.[2]

5. *Infanticide.* That sense of the sacredness of human life which prevails at the present day, is due to Christianity, and did not exist in the same degree among the nations of antiquity. We might refer to the cruelty that belonged to ancient warfare, as an illustration. The lives, as well as the property, of the captured were a forfeit to the conqueror, and those who were spared were sold into slavery. The surrender of a town, especially if it had made a stubborn resistance, was the signal for an indiscriminate mas-

[1] Suetonius, *Cæsar*, 49, 73.

[2] See Prof. Jowett's remarks *Epistles of St. Paul*, p. 75.

sacre. Little heed was paid to the distinction between combatants, and the peaceful inhabitants for whom they fought—a distinction which a Christian civilization has at length fully established. A scene like that witnessed at the sack of Magdeburg by Tilly would have caused no surprise in ancient times. It would have been a merciful treatment of a conquered town. How often do we meet in the writers of antiquity statements of which the following is a specimen: "When our soldiers had entered the town, Cæsar sold at auction the entire spoil. He was informed by the purchasers that the number of heads"—people sold to the Roman merchants as slaves—"was fifty-three thousand."[1]

Practices like these might be the natural result of the prevalent ideas of the treatment due to an enemy. But the custom to which we have now to advert could plead no such apology. It rested upon other, and, to say the least, equally repulsive maxims.

The right of parents to destroy the offspring which it was not thought expedient for them to bring up, was recognized in law and practice. Sometimes such children were left by the Greeks to perish by starvation in some desolate place; sometimes they were killed outright. The moral teachers of Greece did not rise above the popular feeling on this subject. Aristotle approves of the custom of exposing infants where it is desired to prevent an excess of population; and, if, in any state, this is forbidden, he recommends abortion as a substitute.[2] Plato, in the Republic, holds that children of bad men, illegitimate children, and children of parents too far advanced in years, should be destroyed by exposure; the state is not to be burdened with them.[3] Among the Romans there had

[1] Bell. Gall., ii. 23.
[2] Aristot., *Polit.* vii. 14, 10.
[3] Rep., v. 459, 460.

been originally a law forbidding the destruction of infants; but this law became practically obsolete. This kind of murder was tolerated and practised. Suetonius, describing the popularity of Germanicus, states that on the occasion of his death, and in honor of him, new-born infants were exposed.[1] Abortion, which was sanctioned by Aristotle and Plato, became very common among the Romans, to escape the pains of child-birth, and especially to get rid of the trouble of rearing children. Customs which found their only apology at the start in the ancient feeling that the state must be furnished with the right number of able-bodied citizens, came to rest at last upon the cruel and ignoble desire to avoid the burdens of the family.

6. *Slavery.* In the principal states of Greece the number of slaves was far in excess of that of the free population. In Attica, at the beginning of the fourth century, B. C., there were 20,000 free citizens, 10,000 foreign settlers who were protected by the State, and 400,000 slaves. In Sparta, the number of actual slaves was relatively less, but if all whose condition differed little from that of servitude were counted, the ratio of freemen to bondmen was not materially different. In Corinth there were said to be 46,000 slaves, and on the island of Ægina, at one time, 470,000; but this must have been before Athens became the centre of commerce.[2] There were great slave markets, as Ephesus, Samos, Athens,—which supplied all Greece. Strabo

[1] Caligula, 5.

[2] This is the statement of Ctesicles (ap. *Athen.* vi. p. 272 c.: see Smith, *Dict. of Gr. and Roman Antiq.*, p. 1035.) Döllinger (*Judenth. u. Heidenth.*), p. 674,) is probably wrong in excluding female slaves from this estimate. Slaves being reckoned as property, all were counted. Not so in the case of citizens and metics. Boeckh (*Public Economy of Athens*, p. 55) estimates the number of slaves in Athens, including women and children, at 365,000. Compare the discussion in Wallon, *Hist. de L'Esclavage dans l'Antiquité*, vol. i. c. viii.

states that in his time tens of thousands of slaves were landed by the Cilician pirates on the island of Delos, in one day. The treatment of slaves by the Greeks was milder than by the Romans.[1] Only those who labored in the mines worked in fetters; but this class were numerous. The Spartan Helots, who were serfs, attached to the soil, were treated with cruelty in later times, when there was more fear from their insubordination. Thucydides says that on one occasion ten thousand of them were persuaded to come forward by the promise of emancipation, and were then treacherously murdered.[2] Slaves in Greece always testified under torture. The master might not kill his slave, but he could beat him so far as to make him a cripple. There was no protection for the chastity of female slaves. When weary of them, their owners might let them or sell them to houses of prostitution.

The stern character of the Roman law appeared in the powers which it gave to the slaveholder.[3] He was clothed with absolute authority; he could beat, maim, and kill his slave with impunity. The slave could own no property, he could contract no marriage; whatever connection he was allowed to form with a woman was dissolved at the command of his owner. Slaves, when they were allowed or forced to give testimony, were examined under the torture. If a master was murdered by a slave, the vengeance of the law was visited upon all the slaves of his household, who were crucified without mercy. Slaves were brought from all directions, but in the largest numbers from Asia. When King Nicomedes of Bithynia was called upon by

[1] On the whole subject of slavery among the Greeks, see Becker, *Charicles*, Th. ii., p. 20 seq.

[2] Hist., B. iv. 80.

[3] Upon the characteristics of Roman slavery, see Becker, *Gallus*, *Excurs.* iii.

Marius to furnish his contingent of auxiliaries, he answered that all his able-bodied subjects had been dragged off into slavery by Roman tax-gatherers. Every Roman of moderate means felt a pride in owning at least a few slaves. There were individuals who owned from ten to twenty thousand, most of them field hands. A freedman in the reign of Augustus, who had lost many slaves, was still able at his death to leave 4,116. Many households were possessed of as many as 500. The slaves in a family were divided into groups, to each of which a special function was assigned. Among them were included carpenters, secretaries, physicians, and architects. The architects and carpenters of Crassus numbered 500. There was nothing to prevent an irritable or drunken master from wreaking his resentment upon a slave, except the pecuniary loss, which, as the market was glutted, was usually small. A slave who had given offence might be sent to the arena, or flung to the fishes. The females appear to have been as cruel and oppressive in the treatment of their servants as the men. Juvenal speaks of those who hire a beadle by the year to lash their servants, and let him go on with his work until he drops the scourge in weariness. A woman of hot temper orders a slave to be crucified without caring to inquire whether he may not be innocent. A petulant female lays the whip over the bare shoulders of the trembling maid who is dressing her hair.[1] Cato's mode of treating his slaves is well known. To prevent them from conspiring together, he sowed dissension and fomented quarrels among them. After a supper where he had sat with his guests, he took his whip and chastised the servants who had failed to do their part to his satisfaction. Worse than all, the old slaves, who could no longer work, he sold for what he could get for

[1] Sat. vi.

them. Generally speaking, slaves were considered, and justly considered, as at heart enemies of the master. In the country, they worked by day in chains, and at night were lodged in the *ergastula*—apartments excavated under ground. Slaves were numerous almost everywhere in the Roman empire, but nowhere was the number so great in proportion to the population as in Rome. Zumpt estimates that at the beginning of the Christian era there were two slaves to one freeman. When we consider the almost irresistible tendency to demoralization among the slaves themselves, the temptations to perfidy, licentiousness, and almost every other vice to which they were exposed, and when we consider the baleful influence which fell, from the unlimited control of all these human beings, upon the masters, and the contamination of the young by their familiarity with slaves, from the beginning of life, we shall feel that the amount of evil resulting from Roman slavery is beyond calculation.[1]

7. *Roman Amusements,—the Stage, the Circus, and the Arena.*[2]

The vast proletariate in Rome were not only hungry, and needed to be fed, but were idle, and needed to be amused. Bread and games—*Panem et Circenses*—were the two things to which they felt they had a right. But the public shows and games became an engrossing passion of the entire populace. The emperors found it well to occupy thus the attention of the people, who were diverted in this way from thoughts of liberty. The great gatherings in the circus and amphitheatre took the place of the assemblies where the Romans had chosen their magistrates

[1] Compare Wallon, ii. c. ix. (Influences de l'Esclavage sur les classes libres).

[2] See, on this whole topic, Friedländer ii. 263–481 (Die Schauspiele), from whom many of the statements which follow have been drawn.

and regulated public affairs. The battles of the arena supplied the place of the contests by which Rome had extended her sway over the world. The exciting performances in the Circus between the Palatine and Aventine, reminded the spectators of the triumphal processions, laden with the spoils of kingdoms, which, for a succession of centuries, had marched over the same ground. In these public places, the emperors showed themselves to their subjects and heard from them expressions of popular feeling.

The theatre was too tame to rival the more stirring exhibitions of the circus and the arena. Yet theatrical performances had a powerful attraction, and exerted a vast influence. The character of these went from bad to worse. Tragedy, which interested only a minority of cultivated persons, could scarcely maintain itself, and found itself obliged to depend for what success it had upon showy scenic representations, in which elephants, giraffes, and other animals, with gorgeously attired men and women, passed in glittering procession across the stage. The Greek comedy, and the Roman plays of the same order, had a larger measure of popular favor. The subjects of the comedy were borrowed largely from the licentious stories of the Greek mythology. But the Pantomime gradually usurped the place of almost every other species of dramatic performance. The art of expression through movement and gesture was carried to a marvellous perfection. The dancers were beheld with an enthusiasm which knew no bounds; and as the mimes were commonly of an unchaste and even obscene character, they had the most corrupting effect upon the morals of women and of youth.

The Circus, in Julius Cæsar's time, furnished seats for 150,000 men. Titus added seats for 100,000 more, and in the fourth century there were places for not less than

385,000.[1] Here were foot-races, feats upon horse-back, such as may be seen in the modern circus, and other like amusements. But the chief thing was the chariot race. About this contest the most interest was gathered. The several combatants were put in, and the chariots and horses owned, by companies—four in number—and thus arose the factions of the circus, each having its characteristic color, and enlisting with the most ardent feeling in behalf of its favorite. Thus the keenest excitement, such as might be evoked by matters of grave and serious moment, was kindled in all classes by a horse-race. When nobles of ancient lineage, and emperors themselves, when even women, entered personally into the contests of the circus and the amphitheatre, the prostration of Roman dignity and virtue seemed complete.

The gladiatorial contests, in which living men, often in large numbers, were set to fight in deadly combat with one another, and with wild beasts, for the amusement of spectators of both sexes, and of every age and rank, are a most impressive sign of the state of moral feeling in the society which beheld these bloody games with increasing delight. It was not until five hundred years after the building of the city, that these games were introduced from Campania and Etruria. They took place in connection with funeral ceremonies, and in honor of deceased friends. First, in 264 B. C., at the obsequies of D. Junius Brutus, three pairs contended in the cattle market. In 216 B. C., at the funeral of M. Æmilius Lepidus, 22 pairs contended in the forum. In 174 B. C., Titus Flaminius, on the death of his father, caused 74 pairs to fight for three days. As the passion for these contests increased, demagogues and magistrates vied with each other in their efforts to minister to it. Julius Cæsar, as Ædile (65 B. C.), caused not less than 320 pairs

[1] Friedländer, ii. 294 (3d ed.).

to fight. At the games which Augustus instituted in his reign, 10,000 men joined in these combats. Trajan, in 106 A. D., after his victories on the Danube, caused gladiatorial fights to be continued for four months, in which 10,000 combatants took part. Besides the games which were given by public authority and by the emperors, there were others, often on a large scale, which were provided by private individuals at their own expense. The amphitheatres, with their circular walls and elliptical arena, grew in their dimensions as the relish for these games increased, until, in the last decade of the first century, the gigantic Coliseum arose, the stupendous ruins of which still remain. The gladiators were condemned criminals, prisoners of war, slaves, and others who were hired, or volunteered, to fight. In the first century, a master might sell his slaves for this purpose. It was a common punishment for slaves who had incurred the displeasure of their owners. Gangs of gladiators were kept by private persons, and either exhibited by them, or let to such as wished to hire them. In some cases they broke out in fierce mutiny; in other cases they manifested a strong attachment to their owners. In the last days of the Republic, they often served their masters as body-guards, or braves. The emperors established gladiatorial schools in various places for the training of combatants for the arena. Immense edifices were constructed for this purpose, each of these establishments being provided with a corps of officials for its management, and with physicians, surgeons, fencing-masters, workmen for the manufacture and repair of weapons, and other persons employed in various capacities. The gladiators were subjected to a rigid training, and a careful diet, and lodged in cells from which they could not escape.[1] On the day before they were

[1] In the ruins of Pompeii, skeletons of gladiators have been found with

to enter the arena, they were treated to a supper in common. There some sent messages, which probably might be the last, to their friends, others gave themselves up recklessly to the gratification of the appetite, and Christians turned the occasion into a fraternal love-feast. Almost incredible statements are made as to the number of animals which were brought into the amphitheatre to be hunted there, and to mangle and devour human beings. In the festival of a hundred days for the dedication of the Coliseum, Titus is said to have brought into the arena 5000 wild beasts of every kind. In the festivals lasting for four months, under the auspices of Trajan, in 106 A. D., 11,000 tame and wild animals were slain. It had created astonishment when Sylla presented a hundred lions; but this achievement was of little account in comparison with what was done afterwards. Animals were hunted and caught in the remotest regions; even the crocodile and hippopotamus, and other beasts extremely difficult to transport, as the giraffe, were brought together for the amusement of the Roman populace. The arrangements of the amphitheatre were adapted to excite in the highest degree, and almost to bewilder, the spectators. The citizens were obliged to wear the white toga. The lower seats were set apart for the senators, in the midst of whom was the gallery of the imperial family; next above them were the equestrian order; higher still the body of citizens, the women sitting apart from the males; and to the topmost benches the rabble were admitted. Over the immense multitude, who thus encompassed the arena, was stretched an awning, parti-colored and reflecting its various hues upon the ground beneath. Strains of instrumental music preceded and accompanied the contests, which were intro-

iron fetters upon them, who, not being able to fly, were slowly buried under the ashes of Vesuvius.

duced by a procession of gladiators around the arena, when the greeting may have been addressed to the Emperor: "Ave, Cæsar, Imperator, morituri te salutant!" When a combatant was struck down, the victor appealed to the assembly of spectators to decide the fate of his fallen antagonist. Menials touched the slain with hot irons to see that death was not simulated. They were dragged out to the dead-room, where those in whom life was not extinct were despatched. At intervals, servants appeared to spade up the ground, saturated with blood, and to spread over it a new coating of sand. The diversions of the amphitheatre were far from being limited to conflicts between men, or between men and animals, or among animals themselves. By ingenious and elaborate machinery, a stage could be made to rise from beneath the ground, and then suddenly, with the men, and beasts and whatever else was upon it, to sink out of sight. At the appointed moment, a platform would fall to pieces, and the man, who was standing upon it, would drop into a cage of wild beasts, and be instantly torn in pieces before the eyes of all. The boys and girls would be pleased with the gilded apparel and bright crown of one who came forward in the arena, when they would see the flames burst forth from his dress, and behold him leaping and writhing in agony until death ended his torture.[1]

The Romans were not satisfied with seeing men engage in mortal combat in pairs and squads. They wanted to see earnest fighting, and bloodshed on a larger scale. Spectacles of this nature, therefore, were presented to them. Julius Cæsar celebrated his triumph by an actual battle of this sort in the Circus, where there fought on each side 500 footmen, 300 cavalry, and 20 elephants with men in

[1] Plutarch, *de sera Numinis Vindicta*, 9.

towers upon their backs. This was only one of a series of bloody encounters between large bodies of men, which the emperors caused to take place for the diversion of the populace. Julius Cæsar, in the year 46 B. C., as a part of his triumphal games, caused a lake to be dug out on Mars' Field, and a sea-fight to take place upon it between a Tyrian and an Egyptian fleet, in which were a thousand soldiers, and two thousand oarsmen. Augustus gave another sea-fight, upon an artificial lake, made in Cæsar's garden, on the other side of the Tiber, where three thousand soldiers were engaged. These and various other battles upon the water were thrown into the shade by the great sea-fight which Claudius caused to take place on Lake Fucinus, at the completion of a public work there, where, under the eyes of an innumerable multitude that covered the neighboring shores and hills, two fleets, with nineteen thousand armed men on board, engaged in a sanguinary combat. Over this struggle, where mimicry and stern reality were blended, the Emperor presided, with Agrippina, clad in a mantle refulgent with gold, at his side.[1]

It must be remembered that the gladiatorial games instituted by the emperors and other high officers of state, were not the only contests of this kind. Similar exhibitions on private account, and on a larger or smaller scale, were very frequent in Italy and elsewhere. Among the most durable monuments of antiquity are the amphitheatres which are found wherever the Roman rule extended.

The Greeks were at first averse to these exhibitions, where the human form was gashed and mangled. But this repugnance diminished with familiarity. Josephus tells us that, in Judea, Herod Agrippa had 700 pairs contend in one

[1] See the description of Tacitus, *Annal.*, xii. 56.

day.[1] In all the provinces of the empire, these brutal and brutalizing spectacles were exhibited. The Latin writers, with the exception of Seneca in a single passage, give them their approval. Abhorrent to the spirit of Christianity, they were denounced by Christian teachers from the outset. Constantine was the first to condemn them in an edict. But this inhuman diversion continued at Rome until the reign of Honorius (404 A. D.). Telemachus, an Asiatic monk, leaped into the arena to separate two combatants, and was stoned to death by the people, who were angry at this interference with their pleasure. But he was honored as a martyr, and the laws of Honorius, prohibiting these contests, were obeyed.[2]

One may ask how it was possible for men and women to enjoy spectacles of agony and death, the bare narrative of which excites an emotion of horror. We may be aided in some slight degree to comprehend this, by recollecting how throngs will gather now to witness a bull-fight or a prize-fight; and still more, by the scenes that took place formerly in connection with public executions. But Christianity has so far modified the sentiments that no modern custom can afford more than a faint parallel to the brutality of the amphitheatre. What a ghastly impression is made when we find Ovid, at a time when the sexes were not seated apart, speaking of this as a fit place for the lover to prosecute his suit: he can discuss the programme with his companion, say soft things in the intervals between the combats, and join her in a wager as to the result of the contest which ends in the butchery of one or the other of the combatants.[3] We can account for such a state of things only by the fact that the gladiators were considered as condemned or worthless men, for whose lives nobody cared. Human rights

[1] Antiq., xix. 7, 5.

[2] Theodoret, *H. E.*, v. 26.

[3] Ars Am. i., 164 seq.

and human equality were the vague theories of a few philosophers. International law existed only in its rudiments. Luxury and vice had dulled the appetite for diversions less terrible and exciting.

Such was the state of society in the first century. Nor was there wanting a consciousness of the decay and approaching ruin of all things which men had most valued. The noblest men took refuge in Stoicism; and suicide was frequent among them. A vein of melancholy runs through the histories of Tacitus. Repeatedly he adverts to the wrath of the gods against the Roman state, as a fact to be taken for granted. He apologizes for the interminable catalogue of crimes and sufferings which he is compelled to record. "The more I meditate," he says, "upon the events of ancient and modern times, the more I am impressed with the capricious uncertainty which mocks the calculations of men."[1] He was oppressed by the contemplation of the gloomy drama of human history. It was not a period of hope, but of sadness and despair. The world seemed to have stopped its motion and to have begun to dissolve itself into the primitive chaos. An incurable internal disease had fastened upon the Roman State, and what was there beyond it?

Licentiousness and cruelty, the two characteristic vices of ancient society, which produced a brood of unnatural sins and crimes, did not prevail, to be sure, in an equal degree in the different periods of ancient history. Under Trajan and the Antonines there was a better state of things than existed in the era which we have chiefly considered

[1] Mihi, quanto plura recentium seu veterum revolvo, tanto magis ludibria rerum mortalium cunctis in negotiis observantur. Quippe fama, spe, veneratione, potius omnes destinabantur imperio, quam, quem futurum principem fortuna in occulto tenebat." Annal. iii. 18.

in this chapter. When we go back to an earlier period, to the age, for example, when Athens was in its glory, there is likewise presented a less revolting picture. And yet we must join in the verdict of a scholar, not wanting in catholicity of judgment, "that if the inner life had been presented to us of that period which in political greatness and art is the most brilliant epoch of humanity, we should have turned away from the sight with loathing and detestation. The greatest admirer of heathen writers, the man endowed with the finest sensibilities for beauty and form, would feel at once that there was a great gulf fixed between us and them, which no willingness to make allowance for the difference of ages and countries would enable us to pass."[1] This disparity between heathen and Christian society, it cannot be denied, is mainly due to the fact that under the one the objects of worship were the imperfect creatures of human fancy, and worship was itself largely sensuous, while under the other the objects of religious faith correspond to the true ideal of perfection, and worship rises to an unseen world.

[1] Professor Jowett, *Epp. of St. Paul*, p. 77.

CHAPTER VII.

THE SOCIAL AND RELIGIOUS CONDITION OF THE JEWS AT THE BIRTH OF CHRIST.

On the eastern borders of the Roman empire, inhabiting a narrow strip of territory, dwelt a people who defied every attempt to break up their national feeling, and, in spite of a subjection to foreign domination, which had lasted for more than five hundred years, still confidently believed that they were the predestined conquerors and rulers of mankind. The germ of this great hope, which had grown into an absorbing, passionate expectation, antedated their existence as a nation. It lay in a divine purpose revealed to their progenitor, Abraham, that his posterity should be as the stars for multitude, and that from them a blessing should go forth to all other nations. Such was the prospect that was opened to the soul of the Patriarch, a faithful worshipper of the only true God, in the midst of the spreading idolatry. Of the Hebrew people, as of no other, was it true that, from the beginning of their career, religion was consciously the one end and aim of their being. That the true religion might both attain to its perfect development, and gather all mankind under its sway—this may be said to be the idea of their history. Their abode for several centuries in Egypt, following upon the nomadic life which they had previously led, brought them into contact with what was even then an ancient and civilized people. From the Egyptians they learned the mechanical arts; but from the

seductions of their religion the Hebrews were saved by the hostile relations that sprang up in consequence of the oppression with which they were treated. Moses, their deliverer, stands also at the head of the prophets, the interpreters of the will of God, who came forward from time to time, as the exigencies of an age might require, to give expression to whatever was deepest and holiest in the religious life of the people, and by impassioned rebuke, exhortation, and command, to purify their conduct and exalt their enthusiasm.

With the legislation of Moses, the Jewish commonwealth began. Now for the first time they became a political community. They were to stand under the special protection and guidance of God, who was not, however, a national God, in the narrow sense of heathenism, but the Supreme Creator and Ruler of the whole earth. Thus their religion was distinguished from every other ancient faith by being, of necessity, exclusive, and intolerant of dissent. They were to be witnesses for God, a nation of priests, set apart from other peoples by virtue of this relation, and by the unique polity under which they were to live. In keeping the divine law, they fulfilled their part, and acquired a title to the promises connected with obedience. This covenant between them and Jehovah was the *magna charta* of the Hebrew nation. For about 450 years, after entering Palestine, they lived in a kind of theocratic state, governed by judges, who arose in different places, and from time to time, under the impulse of a divine call to exercise the functions of leadership. Anarchy led to the popular demand for a monarchical system. Danger from foreign enemies called for a firmer political organization; and to this motive was added the consideration that while Samuel, the last and most eminent of the judges, had grown old, his sons were not worthy to succeed

to his power. Accordingly, in 1099 B. C., Saul was crowned king. The Theocracy, however, did not cease with this change. Side by side with the kings, stood the prophets to utter the divine will to ruler and subject, to curb and rebuke, as well as to stimulate and uphold the temporal power. Nor did the monarchy operate to quench the higher hopes of Israel.

Under David and Solomon the boundaries of the kingdom were carried to the Euphrates and the confines of Egypt. This vast extension of power seemed to foretoken the realization of the promise. Jerusalem, which had been conquered from the Canaanites by David, became, with its palace and temple, the centre of sacerdotal and regal splendor. But not one of the kings was the man demanded by the deepest purposes and aspirations that were latent in the religion of Jehovah. Hence, the Messianic hope, while it acquired a new definiteness through the type and precursor which the monarchy furnished, remained unfulfilled.[1] Moreover, the temporal grandeur of the kingdom, with the luxury and corruption that were incidental to it, menaced that pure religious development which was the heaven-appointed work of the nation. Solomon built the temple, and elevated the priesthood and worship of the Sanctuary. He excited, also, among the people a relish for wisdom, of which he was venerated as the founder and master, in all subsequent times.[2] His reign became, in after times, a symbol of earthly glory and riches. But his magnificence was costly, and involved the burdensome taxation of his subjects. His son, Rehoboam, arrogantly spurned the petitions for relief which were presented to him by the disaffected people; and the ten tribes north of Judea, partly for this reason, and partly from tribal jealousy and from a

[1] Ewald, *Gesch. d. Volkes Israel*, iii. 12.

[2] Ewald, iii. 435.

continued attachment to the house of Saul, renounced their allegiance. The kingdom was thus divided forever. This was in 975 B. C. From this time, monarchy among the Hebrews approaches its dissolution. It rose to full vigor under the auspices of David; its era of splendor was the reign of Solomon; but its third and final period, though much longer than either of the others that preceded it, was one of decline. Israel, the northern division, fell a prey to Assyrian invasion. Samaria, the capital, was taken by Shalmaneser in 722 B. C., and a multitude of Israelites were deported from their country. In their room, heathen were introduced, and hence the Samaritans, being of mixed descent, as well as separated from the temple, were ever after counted as aliens and foes. Their position could not be more completely or concisely expressed than in the words of the Evangelist: "For the Jews have no dealings with the Samaritans."[1] Judea, nearly a century and a half later, followed the fate of Israel. In 588 B. C. Jerusalem was captured by Nebuchadnezzar, King of Babylon, and the principal inhabitants carried off into exile. This terrible catastrophe did not crush the faith and hope which had animated the Jewish heart through all preceding vicissitudes of the national history. Rather was it true that just in this era, before and during the Exile, the spirit of prophecy rose to its loftiest height. There was a faithful body who were inspired with the unconquerable conviction that the kingdom of God, now trampled in the dust, was imperishable, and that its adversaries would be broken in pieces.

The monarchy had fallen. It had given the people of God a name and fame among the nations. It had aided, in many ways, in the preservation and development of the national religion. Compare the Songs of Deborah with the

[1] John iv. 9.

Psalms of David.[1] But the monarchy embodied an element of force through which the religion could neither attain to its perfection in the conceptions and life of the people, nor diffuse itself abroad upon the earth. The civil unity of the nation was now broken in pieces. Nothing was left to them in their helplessness but to fall back upon the truths of that religion, and the succor of God. To no earthly power could they look for sympathy or help. Thus religion assumed its rightful supremacy as the one peculiar possession and glory of the people. The prophetic activity was left to exert itself with unimpeded power. Henceforward, the work of the nation could no longer be limited by its own borders. "Israel, after having once been thrown into the great stream of universal history, though only as a spiritual power, could never again withdraw from the midst of all the nations, and build for itself a close and strong kingdom similar to the other greater or smaller empires of the world."[2] But the religion had not yet ripened into its universal form, the prerequisite of its universal diffusion. A consciousness of this imperfection was attended with two results. First the yearnings of the people reached out with a new earnestness towards the Messiah of the future; and, secondly, the longing for a return to their own land, and to their life as a community there, held possession of their minds.

The fall of Babylon, in 536, brought to them deliverance. They had been usually treated more as colonists than captives; but, mingled as they were with the heathen, they were subject to strong temptations to compromise or give up their faith and observances. It was that part of the people which had sternly withstood these enticements, that chose to avail themselves of the permission of Cyrus to

[1] Ewald, *History*, iii. 58. (Engl. transl.)
[2] Ewald v. 36. (Engl. transl.)

return to their own land, and rebuild the sacred places. Their zeal for the law had been sharpened by the experiences of the exile. In them the mingled sentiments of religion and patriotism burned with intense ardor. There was really a sifting of the nation, for the number that remained were to those that returned to the old home and sanctuary as six to one. In the first caravan were 42,360, besides servants. Other bodies followed later, under Ezra, B. C. 458, and under Nehemiah, B. C. 445. The temple rose from its ruins, and the rites for which the devout had longed were restored in all their strictness.

The People of God were now once more a community, within the borders of their own land. But they were no longer independent. The restoration of the monarchical theocracy—the kingdom of David—was out of the question. Their religion had been preserved; to rescue and fortify this chief and characteristic possession had necessarily become the supreme object of pursuit. In reorganizing society, they fell back upon ancient laws, the primitive constitution, which formed the covenant with Jehovah, for the violation of which, as they deeply felt, these heavy penalties had fallen upon them. Everything favored the legal and ritualistic spirit. Under its influence, prophetic activity was repressed. After the Exile, ensued the government of the Hagiocracy. It availed to fortify the ancient faith against the inroads of heathenism. It invested as with a thick crust the spiritual life which it sought to protect. Yet in the long interval between the Return from Babylon and the Consummation through the appearance of the Messiah, while the nation was under a succession of foreign masters, not only did the body of religious doctrine expand itself, in many points legitimately, but the Gospel element, if one may so term it, was rife within the bosom of the community, and struggling to liberate itself

from the bondage of the letter and of the priesthood. There is a striking resemblance between the ancient Church in this period, and the Christian Church under the hierarchical organization of the middle ages, when the purer principle of Christianity was imprisoned, as it were, yet acquiring the strength through which at length it burst its bonds. The closing part of this interval in Jewish history, when the influence of Hellenism was most active, is not without points of parallelism with the age of the Renaissance.

The Jews, though restored to their old home, had not gained their independence. The chosen people, separated from the heathen, and receiving their laws directly from Jehovah, were still subject to the foreigner. But as long as the mild rule of Persia continued, there was less reason to complain. Cyrus was regarded as a providential man, raised up by Providence for the emancipation of his people.[1] Their local institutions, and, above all, their religion were left untouched. But after the great campaign of Alexander (334-323 B. C.), their lot, under the Greek domination, became a bitter one. The grand effort which he made to hellenize the Eastern nations, to diffuse the Greek language, customs, and manners, and thus to create a homogeneous empire, was carried forward by his successors, the Seleucids, who reigned in Syria. Palestine became the prize, and frequently became the theatre, of contest between these princes and the Ptolemies of Egypt. It fared comparatively well under the Ptolemies, who were patrons of learning and commerce. But at length it fell permanently under the sway of Syria. The Jews found themselves surrounded and invaded by Gentilism. Their little territory was bounded on three sides by Greek cities. It seemed as if the streams of trade, commerce, conquest would overwhelm

[1] Is. xliv. 28, xlv. 1.

them; as if the contagion of perpetual intercourse with the heathen would infect their religious system to such a degree as to destroy its characteristic features. It was a new chapter in the long conflict with heathenism, which more than once seemed about to sweep away their creed and worship, or to sap their foundations. The foreign, Greek-speaking Jews, although, in the main, steadfast, interposed, on the whole, a less firm barrier in the way of heathen innovations. In Judea itself, there was a party lukewarm in its faith, and disposed to give way to the foreign influence. But these perils rendered the majority of the people the more immovable in their resistance, the more punctilious and rigid in their observance of the law, and the more zealously hostile to the pollutions of heathenism. The crisis came when Antiochus Epiphanes, embittered by his failures in conflict with Egypt, and with a despot's impatience at seeing any obstacle in the way of his capricious will, determined to break down the wall of separation between the Jews and the rest of his subjects, and to exterminate their worship. He so far succeeded that, in 168 B. C., he set up an altar of Jupiter—the "abomination of desolation"—in the temple, and even compelled the Jewish priests to immolate swine. Then occurred the Maccabean revolt. Mattathias, the father of the Asmonean family, of priestly descent, dwelling at the town of Modin, refused to take part in the idolatry required by the king, and, with his five sons, armed with cleavers, cut down the apostate Jew at the altar on which he was attempting to offer idolatrous sacrifice. Then followed a heroic contest with the whole power of Syria. "We fight," said Judas Maccabeus, "for our lives and our laws." "It is better for us," he said, "to die in battle than to behold the calamities of our people and our sanctuary. Nevertheless as the will of God is in heaven, so let Him

do."[1] Judas recovered the temple, but fell in battle, in 160 B. C., and all was, for the time, lost. Jonathan, his brother, took his place. He was seized treacherously, and murdered, in 143 B. C. Simon was the next champion from this family; and under him, after a long alternation of triumph and defeat, the victory was achieved, the Syrian yoke was cast off, and the Jews were free. Simon was made governor and high-priest, uniting thus in himself civil and ecclesiastical jurisdiction; and this power was to descend in his family "until a faithful prophet should arise."[2] In 135 B. C., Simon was assassinated by his son-in-law Ptolemæus, who failed to profit by his crime. John Hyrkanus, the son of Simon, a vigorous prince, reigned until 105 B. C. From this time, civil and foreign wars, occasioned largely by the misdeeds, or inefficiency, of his degenerate descendants, weakened the land. In the year 78 B. C., by the death of Alexander Jannæus, the kingdom fell into the hands of his widow, Alexandra, called by the Jews, Salome, who made her eldest son, Hyrcan II., high priest. The contest between him, and his brother Aristobulus II., which broke out in open war, on the death of their mother (69 B. C.), cost the Jews their liberty. Hyrcan II., who had been prevailed on to abdicate, was put forward and supported by Antipater, a proselyte and prince of Idumea, which Hyrcan I. had annexed to Judea. Pompey, who was fresh from the conquest of Asia, gladly intervened to settle the strife. Judas Maccabeus had entered into an alliance with the Romans;[3] and the treaty, which had been signed by his envoys in the senate house, had been renewed with his successors. The subjugation of Asia Minor and of Syria could not fail to change the relation of the Jewish kingdom to the conquering empire, and

[1] 1 Macc. iii. 21, 59, 60.
[2] Macc. xiv. 41.
[3] Josephus, *Antiq.*, xii. 10.

to transform allies into subjects. The resistance of Aristobulus gave occasion for an attack upon Jerusalem. In the capture, 12,000 Jews were slain. When the soldiery rushed into the temple, the priests went on with the sacrifices which they were offering, and were slaughtered at the altars where they served. Pompey and his officers made their way into the inner sanctuary, the Holy of Holies, and were astonished to find there no image of a divinity.[1] After the battle of Pharsalia, Hyrcan II., the nominal ruler, under the general superintendence of the Governor of Syria, together with Antipater in whose hands the weak Hyrcanus left the reins of authority, went over to the side of Julius Cæsar. Antipater died in the year 43 B. C.; and three years later, by the favor of Mark Antony, with the assent of Augustus, Herod, his son, was made king.[2] It was not, however, until three years later, that he overcame the opposition of Antigonus, supported by the Parthians, and Jerusalem fell into his hands. Antigonus, the son of Aristobulus II. and the last of the Asmonean princes, was beheaded. Herod had to quell the resistance instigated by the Pharisees, which he succeeded in doing by the most rigorous measures; and the opposition of adherents of Antigonus in Jerusalem he put down, after the Roman method, by a proscription, in which forty-five persons from opulent and noble families were executed. Besides the formidable elements of disaffection within his kingdom, he was endangered by the enmity of Cleopatra, and maintained his good standing with Antony only by surrendering at her demand important parts of his dominion. After the battle of Actium, he repaired to Rhodes to make his peace with Augustus, whom he adroitly contrived to conciliate and gratify, and by whom he was confirmed in the enjoyment of his kingly authority. On the death of Herod in the

[1] Joseph., *Antiq.* 4, 4.

[2] Joseph., *Antiq.* xiv. 14, 4.

year when Christ was born—that is, 4 B. C.—Augustus, contrary to the earnest wishes of the people, who preferred to come directly under the Roman authority, allotted the kingdom to the three sons of Herod, Judea falling to Archelaus. But, ten years after, he was dethroned from his office of Tetrarch, and banished to Vienne in Gaul. Judea, being annexed to the Province of Syria, was now governed by Procurators, Pontius Pilate receiving this office in the year 26.

For upwards of thirty years, in addition to the Roman domination, the Jewish people had to endure the tyranny of Herod. His physical vigor, his military talents and energy, his quick sagacity and adroitness were conspicuous. He was not without a predilection for philosophy and history, and a love of art. With the wild, ungoverned passions which betokened his barbarian extraction, he had a shrewdness which taught him to choose the best means for the accomplishment of his purposes, and, if occasion required, to bend to circumstances. His servility to the Romans, upon whose favor his power wholly depended, was in contrast with his imperious temper where he had less to fear. His whole career shows his ability as a ruler, but displays equally his ambition, cruelty, and sensuality. Herod had successively ten wives. The second was Mariamne, grand daughter of Hyrcan II. His jealousy of the Asmonean house, and his vindictive temper, led him to perpetrate a series of murders in his own family. He destroyed the father of his wife; and then in the year 30 B. C., when he was going to meet Augustus, and knew not how he would fare at the interview, he caused her grandfather, the aged Hyrcan II., to be put to death. Then he caused Aristobulus, her youthful brother, to be drowned, as if by accident, in the bath; and when called to account by Antony, escaped by the free use of mo-

ney.[1] Then in a fit of jealous passion, he slew Mariamne herself, of whom he was ardently fond, and for whom, when the deed was done, he poured out frantic lamentations—where

> "Revenge is lost in agony
> And wild remorse to rage succeeding." [2]

Her mother Alexandra shared her fate. His sons by Mariamne, Alexander and Aristobulus, who had been educated at Rome, were the next victims; and, finally, Antipater, the son of Doris, his first wife, and one whose plots had brought on these tragedies, was himself ordered to execution.

Herod was a professed adherent of the Jewish religion. He rebuilt the old temple of Zerubbabel in a style of magnificence; and in order that no unconsecrated hands might be employed upon it, the structure was reared by a thousand priests, clad in white garments, who had been trained for the work.[3] He was careful not to outrage the sensibilities of the people to such a degree as to rouse them to a combined and desperate resistance. But they hated him and his government. He was not a Jew by descent, but an Idumean proselyte, whose profession of Judaism was a matter of policy, and not of conviction. He cringed before his Roman superiors, whose yoke rested heavily upon them. They saw the taxes which he wrung from them, lavishly expended upon objects identified with heathenism, or given to curry favor with his heathen patrons and masters. He even made contributions for the support of the Olympian games.[4] He built, at an enormous expense, Cæsarea upon the sea-coast, with its harbor, and its breakwater, composed of stones of an average length of fifty feet; and he adorned

[1] Joseph., *Antiq.*, xv. 3, 8.

[2] Byron's *Hebrew Melodies:* Herod's "*Lament for Mariamne.*" Joseph., *Antiq.*, xv. 9, *B. J.*, i. 22, 5.

[3] Joseph., xv. 11. 5, 6. [4] Ibid., xvi. 5, 3.

this new and rival capital with a temple dedicated to Cæsar and to Rome, and conspicuous from afar to all who approached the coast.[1] He went so far as to build an amphitheatre in the Holy City itself, and to exhibit within it gladiatorial combats. He even erected a theatre for dramatic performances.[2] If his personal character was odious to the serious part of the nation, his half-disguised encouragement of Gentilism, of the detested ways of the heathen, and his maintenance of their usurped rule, were to the last extent loathsome.

The resistance to the flood of Gentile influences from every quarter centred in the Pharisees. Six thousand of them refused to take an oath of allegiance to Herod on his accession, but were put down with a strong hand.[3] Immediately after his death, Judas, the Galilean, whose party was a fanatical offshoot of Pharisaism, raised a revolt, which was crushed by the two legions of Varus, who crucified two thousand malcontents, besides capturing Sepphoris, the headquarters of Judas, and selling its inhabitants into slavery.[4] Out of this movement sprang the Zealots, by whom the flame of resistance was fanned, until it broke out in the last great and fatal conflict with Rome, ending in the capture of Jerusalem, and the destruction of the temple, by Titus.

But, independently of various efforts at armed insurrection, the Pharisees interposed a continuous moral resistance to the agencies at war with the liberty and religion of the Jews. They are to be considered in contrast with the Sadducees, with whom their name is so frequently coupled. Neither were sects in the proper sense of the term,[5] although they are so designated by Josephus, who wished to make

[1] Joseph., *Antiq.*, xv. 9, 6.
[2] Ibid., xv. 8, 1.
[3] Joseph., *Antiq.* xvii. 2, 4.
[4] Ibid., *B. J.*, ii. 5.
[5] See Grätz, *Geschichte der Juden*, iii. 87; Schürer, p. 425.

himself intelligible to the foreigners for whom he was writing.[1] They were parties into which the nation was divided. The Pharisees, especially, so far from being a sect, were the leaders and authoritative teachers of the nation. "They sit in Moses' seat."[2] They and their adherents comprised a great majority of the people. Pharisaism was a thing of gradual development. For its beginning, we must go back to the first settlement of returned exiles, and to the sharpened zeal for the law, and in particular, for the ritual, which they brought with them. Those who set their faces against all heathen innovations, and all laxity in the observance of the ceremonies prescribed in the law, began to be known as a class—the *Chasidim*, "or the Saints."[3] The Maccabean revolution gave an increased impetus to this movement in the interest of a patriotic and religious conservatism. The more eminent and conspicuous representatives of this intense legalism came to be called the Pharisees—"the separated," as the word denotes—the Puritans. The people looked up to them as guides and examples. The Sadducees, it is thought by some, derived their name from Zadok, a high-priest in the time of David.[4] The name, if thus derived, would signify the family and adherents of Zadok. By others it is supposed to come from the Hebrew term meaning righteousness, and to be a name of opprobrium applied by their adversaries to them as claiming to be adherents of the Law.[5]

The first point of contrast between the Pharisees and Sadducees, who emerged into a distinct form and antago-

[1] Joseph., *Life*, § 2; *Antiq.*, xiii. 5, 9, xviii. 1, 2, *B. J.*, ii. 8, 2. He styles them "sects in philosophy."

[2] Matt. xxiii. 2.

[3] Ezra vi. 21; ix. 1; x. 11; Neh. ix. 2; x. 29.

[4] Ezek., xl. 46. See Ewald, *Gesch. d. Volkes Israel*, iv. 358, 494.

[5] Derenbourg, *Hist. et Géog. de la Palestine*, P. I., p. 77.

nism to one another in the reign of Hyrcan I. († 105), is a social one. The Sadducees, comparatively few in number, were made up of nobles, of priests of high rank.[1] The high-priesthood, and other great offices of the temple, were in their hands.[2] In the heat of the struggle against Syria, the Chasidim, the forerunners of the Pharisaic party, had joined hands with the Maccabean leaders. Yet the over-scrupulous notions of "the saints" had prevented a cordial alliance at all times, even with Judas Maccabeus. Their offensive questioning of the priestly descent of Hyrcan had produced an open rupture between him and them, which their adversaries knew well how to use for their own advantage. These were the party of the aristocracy, cold in their national feeling, not only averse to fanaticism, but, also, practically, if not actively, lending countenance to the foreign influence, which, first under the auspices of the Greeks, and now of the Romans and of Herod, excited the deep apprehensions and stern hostility of their opponents. They rested under the well-founded imputation of a want of patriotism and of religious earnestness.

The second point of contrast between these parties was in their relations to the law. The Sadducees did not, as many have supposed, reject the Old Testament with the exception of the books of Moses. But they attributed the highest authority, and, perhaps, normal authority alone, to these books. They made nothing of the pregnant instructions, the germinant truths, and the kindling hopes of prophetic Judaism. And they stuck to the letter of the law, refusing to sanction additions of any sort, even the modifications which might be deemed a proper and legitimate development of the Mosaic legislation, and conformed to its spirit. Thus, it is remarkable that they were more rigid than the Pharisees in imposing the penalties in full mea-

[1] Jos., *Antiq.* xviii. 14. [2] Acts v. 17.

sure, which the Mosaic laws appointed. There must be "an eye for an eye."[1] The Pharisees, on the contrary, were bent, to use their own phrase, upon "building a hedge about the law," by defining its demands with reference to every situation and circumstance of life. They would shut out heathen contamination by covering, as it were, the whole life with a net-work of rules. Where the Old Testament statutes were silent, where they were capable of a double interpretation, where new questions might arise from the altered condition of society, the Pharisees came in with their precise expositions and precepts. These were the traditions of the elders, the supplementary laws, constituting a copious, unwritten code, which was transmitted orally, and which, it was at length claimed, emanated from Moses himself.[2] As high, and even higher authority was attributed to this code than to the written law itself. One could do nothing, and avoid nothing, which was not somehow touched by the law in its endless ramifications. Especially were the externals of worship, both public and private, the subject of the most elaborate and minute definition.

There was a noble side to this prevalent legalism, regarded as a grand attempt, in the face of adverse influences of the most powerful and varied character, to uphold the religion of the Old Testament, the religion of Moses and the prophets, the revealed faith, against the inroads of idolatry and the corrupting influences of Gentile worship and culture. When Pilate caused the garrison of Jerusalem to bring in by night the Roman standards, with small images of the Emperor upon them, the people flocked to Cæsarea in a mass, and for five days and nights besought the Procu-

[1] For other examples, see Hausrath, *N. T. Zeitgesch.*, i. 121.

[2] On the transmission of traditions, see Lutterbeck, *Die Neutestamentl. Lehrbegriffe*, i. 171.

rator to withdraw this abomination from the holy place. On the sixth day, when Pilate caused the people to be surrounded by his soldiers with drawn swords, the multitude bared their necks, and declared that they preferred to die rather than behold the violation of their law. Pilate gave the required order for the removal of the images.[1] This is only one of a multitude of examples of a devotion to their religion, which led the Jews to brave all terrors, and which might at the end, if they had possessed military leaders of competent skill, have rendered them invincible to Roman arms. Pharisaism had its worthy side, and its good men: Nicodemus, Joseph of Arimathea, Gamaliel were Pharisees.[2] But, under their auspices, religion was resolved into law—a law which, with its numberless and meddlesome injunctions became a burdensome yoke. Upon the single topic of the observance of the Sabbath, there were thirty-nine general rubrics, under each of which were numerous subordinate precepts, each with specified exceptions, and all together forming of themselves an extensive code. For example, it was forbidden to tie and untie knots, but there were certain exceptions, and what these were must be stated: for instance, a woman might tie the knots requisite for fastening her dress. With respect to fasting, lustrations, and the whole rubric of ceremonial purity, there was no end to the commandments which every pious Jew was required by the Pharisees rigidly to obey. Inward piety was well-nigh smothered under the vast weight of ritual practices, often mechanical in their nature, and performed from a blind subservience to a statutory requirement. Hence formalism belonged to the essence of the Pharisaic religion. Hypocrisy could not

[1] The insurgents under the Maccabees at first refused to resist their enemies on the Sabbath: 1 Maccabees ii. 32 seq. Plutarch refers to this incident as illustrative of the folly of superstition. *De Superstit.* 8.

[2] For exaggerated praise of the Pharisees, see Grätz, iii. 76.

fail to arise and spread, under such a system. The pride of the ascetic, the vanity that craves the applause paid by the simple to a grade of devotion above the ordinary level, a hollow, feigned sanctity mixed with a hard spirit of self-seeking, were among the disgusting fruits of Pharisaism. They made clean the outside of the cup and platter; they devoured widows' houses and for a pretense made long prayers,—these were among the characteristic sins of the Pharisaic party.[1] With their broad phylacteries—parchments bound upon the forehead and arm, with texts from the Bible inscribed upon them,—reciting their prayers at the corners of the streets, and giving alms to the poor with ostentatious publicity, they stand out in bold relief upon the pages of the New Testament. Their legalism carried them into a labyrinth of casuistry; for they undertook to distinguish between what was allowed and what was forbidden in every act and situation of life. When the selfish desire of personal aggrandizement and comfort got the ascendency, this casuistry was converted into an instrument for evading moral obligations, and for committing iniquity under the apparent sanction of law. Pharisaism, like Jesuitism, is a word of evil sound, not because these parties had no good men among them, but because prevailing tendencies stamped upon each ineffaceable traits of ignominy.

In their theological dogmas, the Pharisees and Sadducees were widely at variance. Josephus, seeking to connect familiar Greek notions with his description of Jewish parties, says that the Pharisees believed in fate without wholly rejecting free-will, while the doctrine of fate was wholly denied by the Sadducees.[2] Fate here stands for

[1] Matt. xxiii., 25 (Luke xi. 39), Matt. xxiii. 14, (Mark xii. 40; Luke xx. 47).

[2] Joseph., *Antiq.*, xiii. 5, 9, xviii. 1, 3, *B. J.*, ii. 8, 14.

the doctrine of divine Providence, which the Pharisees accepted, but did not press to the extreme of denying free agency and accountableness. Using a term of later origin, we may call the Sadducees Pelagians. The Pharisees believed in the immortality of the soul, the resurrection of the body in the case of the righteous, and a future state of eternal rewards and punishments. They believed, also, in the agency of demons and angels. The Sadducees disbelieved in these doctrines, and were materialists, holding that the soul expires with the body.[1]

A third Jewish party is described by Josephus, and noticed by other writers, the Essenes. The origin of the name is uncertain. Ewald derives it from a word meaning "the pious;" Jost from a term signifying "the select ones." Other but less probable etymologies have been proposed. They are first mentioned by Josephus in connection with the account of Jonathan Maccabeus (150 B. C.).[2] Numbering about four thousand, and dwelling occasionally with others in towns, but chiefly in village communities in secluded valleys lying eastward of Jerusalem and towards the Dead Sea, they were a body of mystics and ascetics. They lived in cœnobitic houses, under superintendents, to whom they paid implicit obedience; admitted new members to their ranks not until after a novitiate of several years; had a community of goods, sat at a common table, combined exercises of devotion with manual industry, and in the systematic ordering of their whole life, as well as in many particular customs, strongly resembled monastic establishments in other countries and ages. Their principal work

[1] Joseph., *B. J.*, ii. 8, 14; Matt. xxii. 23; Acts xxiii. 8. The evidence contradicts Grätz, who says (iii. 79) that while the Sadducees rejected rewards and punishments after death, they did not directly deny a future life.

[2] Antiq., xiii. 5. 10.

was farming; they had among them artisans also, but abjured trade and commerce. Simple in their habits, they set a high value upon quietness of spirit and the government of the passions. They discarded slavery and oaths, were sticklers for ceremonial purity, were accustomed to bathe in cold water before meals, and frequently on other occasions—even if one of them touched a companion of an inferior degree or class,—preferred white linen clothing, the apparel of priests, lived in celibacy generally, if not altogether,[1] probably abstained from meat and wine, and sent gifts to the temple, but offered no sacrifices. According to Josephus, they believed in fate; that is, in unconditional Providence. They reverenced the law, and the Scriptures which, like other Jews, they read and expounded in worship; although it is difficult to tell how they reconciled their omission of sacrifices with the Scriptural requirements. They had priests of their own, independent of the Levitical priesthood. They were quite rigid in observing the Sabbath and they punished blasphemy with death. They believed in the immortality of the soul, but not in the continuance or resurrection of the body. Such, at least, is the representation of Josephus. Good souls, they held, have a peaceful life, beyond the ocean, where there is neither rain, snow, nor heat. Evil souls are banished to a cold and dark corner where they suffer unspeakable torments. The Essenes believed that the spirit of prophecy continued among them, and individuals became conspicuous for their gift of prophetic powers. They were honored as sooth-

[1] Josephus (*B. J.* ii. 8, 13,) describes a class of Essenes who marry. Philo (*opp.* ed. Mangey, ii. 633, 634) says that some of the Essenes marry. So Pliny (*Nat. Hist.* v. 17), who says that they are recruited by those who fly to them from the tempest of fortune and the miseries of life. Compare Schürer, *N. T. Zeitgesch.*, p. 607. The fact is, probably, that in the stricter colonies women were not admitted. See Hausrath, i. 137.

sayers, or fortune tellers. Besides the dualism that crops out in several features of Essenism, we find among them the custom of invoking the sun at the dawn of day,—possibly as representing the effulgence of God. Their principal non-Judaic peculiarities were aversion to marriage, abstinence from sacrifices, and the homage paid to the sun. There has been much speculation as to the origin of these features of Essenism, which are so at variance with Hebrew feeling, and with Old Testament law, which in various other points was so strictly observed. It is probable that some of the peculiarities were due to an oriental influence proceeding from the Medo-Persian, or Zoroastrian religion. The theory of a Buddhistic influence upon them is improbable. Some writers, including Zeller, find traces of a Pythagorean influence, through the Greeks;[1] but this view, to say the least, is doubtful. With strong points of resemblance to Pharisaism, they differed in their dualistic tendency, and in discarding sacrifices. Ewald considers that they, like the Pharisees, sprang from the *Chasidim*—the party, in the Maccabean times, conspicuous for their zeal for purity.[2] Thus, if not a branch of the Pharisaic movement, both grew from the same root. The conscience of the people, says Ewald, withdrew, as it were, into the wilderness to escape from contact with pollution and wickedness. The Essenes were noted for their kindness to the poor and the sick. They were supposed to be familiar with the healing virtues of plants. In later times, they were admired by the heathen, by Pliny, for example, more than any other Jews. In the age when Christ appeared, they stood aloof from the current of events, and exerted no perceptible influence upon public affairs. This accounts for the fact that they are not mentioned in the New Testament. There is no reason to suppose that John the Bap-

[1] Phil. d. Griechen, iii. 589 seq.

[2] *Gesch.*, iii. 483 seq.

tist was allied to them;[1] and certain outward features of resemblance between Essenism and the teaching of Jesus are connected with the strongest points of dissimilarity and opposition.

In close conjunction with the Pharisees, the Scribes are often mentioned in the New Testament. They were, most if not all of them, Pharisees, and by their special agency the Pharisees aimed to secure the absolute dominion of the law over the entire life of the people. The Scribes are called lawyers, and doctors of the law. It was during and immediately after the exile that the law became a subject of doctrinal study and comment; and then it was that the Scribes began to come forward into prominence. They formed an organized class of interpreters of the law, recognized as such by the priests and the people. It was a part of their duty to transcribe the Scriptures, and to furnish accurate copies at any time, as they might be wanted for the synagogues. There were three offices of high moment which they fulfilled. First, they sat in the great Sanhedrim at Jerusalem, and their assistance was likewise indispensable in the minor courts scattered over the country. Then in the synagogues, they generally, if not uniformly, expounded the portions of Scripture that were read. And, in schools, they taught the law to young men who assembled in all parts of the land to receive this instruction, and to be themselves trained for the office of teachers of the people. The Rabbi gathered his pupils about him, both he and they being seated. The method of teaching was by colloquy and discussion between instructor and pupil. The pupil was required to store up in memory the expositions of his master. There are no greater feats of memory on record than those which are involved in the oral transmission

[1] Cf Keim, *Gesch Jesu*, i. 484.

of the vast amount of matter which entered into the Talmudic literature. To the Scribes belonged the right to "bind and loose;" that is, the power to expand and apply the law —a kind of legislative function. When the pupil became qualified to teach, he took his seat at the side of the Rabbi; but before he could conduct a school for himself he must go through a form of ordination in which, as a part of the ceremony, he was presented by the Rabbi with a key, to signify that he was now empowered to expound the word for himself.[1] The Rabbis taught without pay. They were revered, and saluted with reverence; the honor felt for the law was shared by its learned interpreters.[2] As the knowledge of the law was the whole erudition of the Hebrew, men might enter upon this study from any occupation, and at any age. There was nothing anomalous in the calling of Matthew from the receipt of customs, and Simon and Andrew from their nets.[3]

The great schools for the nation at large were the synagogues, which arose soon after the exile, and were found in every place of any consideration throughout Palestine. There were 480 in Jerusalem alone. It is probable that the smallest place had at least one synagogue. In these edifices, plain in their structure, of a rectangular form, the ark containing the law and other Scriptures was kept; and here the people, seated according to age, with the sexes apart, were assembled every Sabbath, and, also, on two other days of the week—market-days,—the service on these last occasions being briefer. The synagogue was under the charge of "elders," whose president, if such an officer existed, was only *primus inter pares*. (Mark v. 22; Acts xiii. 15, xviii. 8, 17.) In truth, either of the

[1] This gives occasion for the language of Jesus, Matt. xvi. 19.
[2] Matt. xxiii. 7. [3] See Hausrath, i. p. 78.

Elders might be termed a "Ruler."[1] There was a "minister,"[2] or servant, who performed such duties as that of taking the roll from the hands of the Rabbi. There were officers for collecting and distributing alms. An offending member might be cast out, or cut off, from the synagogue. There was a person appointed by the congregation, and representing them, who read prayers, to which the people responded "Amen;" but he was not, it would seem, a permanent officer. The Hebrew had given place to the Aramaic dialect, so that the law and the prophets, after being read, in select portions, in the original, were interpreted. The reading was attended by an exposition. The order of the service was as follows: it opened with prayer, and the reciting of selected portions of the Thorah, or Law, in which were contained in brief the great articles of Faith. Then followed the set forms of Prayer, some of which have probably survived to the present time in Jewish worship. Then came the regular reading of the Law and Prophets, with the interpretation and discourse that attended it; the whole concluding with prayer or benediction. The teaching and learning of the law was the prime object of the service. It was mainly by the agency of the synagogue that the Jews were kept familiar with the law. The whole Pentateuch was so divided as to be read in a cycle of one, or of three, years. The reader, who might be any member of the congregation, stood; but whoever gave the sermon, in connection with it, sat. The discussions in and about the synagogues at the close of the service were earnest and animated. While other nations were immersed in worldly concerns, in trade and commerce, or in the hot pursuit of power or sensual pleasure, it is surely an interesting spectacle to behold this

[1] See Prof. Lightfoot, *Philippians*, p. 205 n. 1.

[2] ὑπηρετής, Luke iv. 20.

one people, from the oldest to the youngest, absorbed in this work of investigating the law and imprinting it upon their memories.

The Great Council—the Supreme Court—of the nation was the Sanhedrim at Jerusalem. It consisted of seventy-one members, who were priests, elders, or men of age and reputed wisdom, and scribes, over whom usually presided the high-priest. They met after the morning sacrifice, commonly in an apartment contiguous to the temple. They sat in a semi-circle, with the President in the centre, behind whom, and facing the members, on rows of benches, were the pupils of the Rabbis, who were present to listen to the debates, and witness the proceedings.[1] The great Sanhedrim was a judicial body, taking cognizance of all questions relating to the theocratical law; for example, marriages, divorces, the forms of contracts, orthodoxy of opinion, and infractions of the Mosaic statutes, of every kind, as well as of the common law embodied in traditions. The Romans took away from this tribunal the power of inflicting capital punishment. Its jurisdiction stretched over the whole land. We find Herod, in the early part of his career, summoned before the Sanhedrim for executing a brigand in Galilee, without its permission. Below this principal Senate, there existed in every considerable town, a local court, composed, in part at least, of Levites, and at which the Scribes assisted—the judges being seven in number. Before this minor tribunal all ordinary cases were brought. Only cases where the interpretation of the law might be doubtful were relegated to the Sanhedrim at Jerusalem, the court of appeals. The sessions of these local courts were held in the synagogues. Their sentences were carried out, if practicable, on the spot. Thirty-nine stripes were laid upon

[1] The High-Priest generally presided. Joseph., *Antiq.*, xx., ix. 1; Acts iv. 23.

the offender, one being subtracted from forty, in order that this legal limit might not, through an accident in counting, be exceeded.[1]

The Rabbis were not perfectly agreed in their teaching. Schools of opinion arose, differing from one another on a variety of points, mostly pertaining to the ritual. Of these the most famous were the parties of Hillel and of Schammai, the former of whom was characterized by a more liberal, and the latter by a rigorous construction of the Judaic statutes.

Of the current Jewish theology, the tenets that constitute orthodoxy, we have now to speak. The canon of the Old Testament was of gradual formation. The first and second divisions, the Law and the Prophets, were first closed, and afterwards the third division, called "the Psalms," was made up. From the statement of Josephus, coupled with the testimony of Origen and Jerome, there is scarcely any room to doubt that the authoritative canon among the Jews in the time of Christ coincided with our present canon of the Old Testament. The apocryphal books, which were connected with the Septuagint translation, either written in Greek, or whose Hebrew originals were wanting, were not recognized by the Palestinian Jews. By the side of the canonical books, whose inspiration and normal authority were admitted, the Rabbis placed tradition as a collateral source of religious knowledge. The fundamental principles of Mosaic and prophetic Judaism were maintained. The gods of the heathen were regarded from two points of view; now as nothing, as wholly creations of fancy, and now as having a real being but as inferior to Jehovah, and unable to withstand His power. The doctrine of angels, both good and evil,

[1] Matt. x. 17; 2 Cor. xi. 24.

forms a conspicuous feature of the later Jewish theology.[1] The good angels were conceived of as a host, as divided into orders and ranks, the principal angelic beings having, each of them, names. They were the agents of Providence in the government of the world; by them the law was given on Mount Sinai. They were the messengers of God; they exercised a guardianship over the righteous. Yet they were not objects of religious worship, or invocation. They filled up the void, as it were, between Jehovah and the world, but they diverted to themselves none of the homage that belonged to Him. The doctrine of evil angels, or demons, and their mischievous agency, was equally prominent. Demoniacal possessions, and ceremonies of exorcism, were phenomena of daily occurrence. It may be granted that the current Jewish doctrine of angels and Satanic beings was stimulated in its development by the influence of the Zoroastrian creed, with which the Jews came in contact during the exile; yet the essential elements of this doctrine are of an earlier date, and find their warrant within the circle of their own revelation. All dualistic ideas which made sin, and the continuance of sin, a part of the necessary order of things, and shut out the personal agency of the creature, were excluded. "In theory, and in the minds of really pious men, monotheism remained inviolate; God's direction of all things was not limited by the operations of the wicked spirits; therefore they were always subject to Him."[2]

The problem of physical evil, and especially that aspect of the problem which deals with the sufferings endured by the righteous, agitated the Jewish mind, but found no complete solution. The feeling that a conspicuous sufferer must be a flagrant transgressor, that peculiar calamities imply

[1] See Gfrörer, *Das Jahrhundert des Heils*, i. 352–424.

[2] Kuenen, the *Religion of Israel*, iii. 41.

peculiar guilt, if not in him, at least in a parent, was prevalent. Yet the Jews were not unfamiliar with the idea that even the good may be objects of divine chastisement. With reference to the future life, the prevailing Old Testament representation of *Sheol*, or the underworld, the abode of the dead, is hardly less sombre than the heathen conception of Hades. The language in Job on this topic is as gloomy as that of Homer. Sheol is an abode of darkness, of feeble life, if there be life there at all. As we advance in the Old Testament, we meet with brighter views. This is the case in some of the Psalms. The passage in Job, beginning, "I know that my Redeemer liveth," is of too doubtful reference to be placed in this category. At the time of the birth of Jesus, the Jews, with the exception of the Sadducees, universally believed in the immortality of the soul. This article of faith was—if we except the Essenes, and the adherents of the Alexandrian Jewish philosophy of Philo—indissolubly connected in their minds with the belief in the resurrection of the body. Josephus attributes to the Pharisees the belief in the resurrection of the righteous only. But in the book of Daniel, which was a part of the authoritative canon, and contributed much to shape the prevailing conceptions on these topics, the resurrection of both the good and the evil is unambiguously declared.[1] On subordinate points connected with the doctrine of resurrection, however, there were wide diversities of opinion.

There was one great expectation common to all earnest Jews, the expectation of the Messiah. The Old Testament religion was prophetic in its whole nature. The guides of the Hebrew people were ever pointing to the future. There, and not in the past, lay the golden age. The Jew

[1] Daniel xii. 2.

might revert with pride to the victories of David, and the splendor of Solomon, but these vanished glories only served to remind him of the lofty destiny in store for his nation, and to inspire his imagination to picture the day when the ideal of the kingdom should be realized, and the whole earth be submissive to the monarch upon Zion. An expectation which was latent in the very nature of the theocratic kingdom, and which found utterance, in a form more or less vague, in the early Scriptures, more and more assumed a concrete expression; and the hopes of all patriotic and devout Jews centred upon a personage who was to appear upon the earth, and take in his hands the sceptre of universal dominion. The particular form which this hope took, might vary with the changing condition of the people, and the sort of calamities that weighed upon them. The imagery under which the Messianic era was depicted, or shadowed forth, might vary with the point of view of the writer, and might be cast in a mould corresponding to the limitations of his position. During the Maccabean age, when the struggle for liberty filled the nation with enthusiasm, and when another family than that of David was leading it forward to victory, it was natural that the Messianic hope should slumber. Yet it was never extinguished: it was like a fire under the ashes. The first book of Maccabees contains no distinctly Messianic prediction; yet it refers to the trustworthy prophet who is to arise, and to supersede the Asmonean family. The old expectation, in certain grand outlines, was still a tenant of the Jewish mind. Whether the book of Daniel is a product of the Maccabean era, or has an earlier date, is immaterial as concerns the present point. It is enough that the prediction of the Messianic kingdom which it contained, was familiar to the Jews, and one upon which they rested. After a description of the four kingdoms, the last of which, the

Roman, "as iron, breaketh in pieces and subdueth all things," the writer says, that in the days of these kings shall the God of heaven set up a kingdom, which shall never be destroyed.[1]

In the Apocryphal books, the *Assumptio Mosis*, and the *Book of the Jubilees*, which were written about the beginning of the Christian era, the Messianic predictions are prominent. In the Sibylline Books, the Book of Enoch, (near the end of the second century, B. C.), and the Psalter of Solomon (not far from 60 B. C.), the Messiah is personal. In the Book of Enoch, he is designated as the Son of Man, by which one individual is meant, whatever question may be raised as to the primary sense of this phrase in the Book of Daniel. The New Testament, were there no other source of knowledge on the subject, shows how deeply and widely the yearning for the Messiah had taken hold of the hearts of the people. The calamities of the Herodian age, the double yoke under which the nation groaned, intensified the longing for the Deliverer, which assumed a form varying with the temper and spirit of those who cherished it.

There are certain features of the Messianic expectation cherished at that time by the Jews, which may here be set down. The Messiah was to establish his kingdom in a time of general distress and calamity. Nature herself was to bear witness, by miraculous, terrible phenomena, such as the hiding of the sun and moon in darkness, and the brandishing of swords in the sky, to the impending crisis. The Son of Man, the title given to the Messiah in the Book of Enoch, and derived from the Book of Daniel, was to be preceded by the reappearance of the stern and solemn prophet, Elijah, upon the earth. Then the Messiah

[1] Daniel ii. 44.

Himself, the Anointed One, endued with special gifts and powers from God, would arise. The heathen powers would unite in a common onset upon Him, but would be crushed by His power. Jerusalem would be renovated and adorned with beauty; the Diaspora, the Jews who were abroad, would be brought back; and a glorious kingdom, having its centre and capital in Palestine, but embracing under it all mankind, would be erected. It was to be a time of joy and plenty, an era, also, of holiness and peace. In this form, according to many, the kingdom was to continue forever. But it was considered by many to be of limited duration, and to be introductory to a great change —a renewal of the heavens and the earth, which the Messianic kingdom was to usher in. Thus a distinction was made between "this world" (*ὁ αἰὼν οὗτος*) and "the world to come." By some the great revolution was expected to take place at the very commencement of the Messianic reign; others put it later as the ultimate issue. At this point, the general resurrection was to occur, the last judgment, and the eternal award of happiness or misery. Prior to the general judgment, the abode of the departed was in Hades, the righteous being in Paradise, but separated from the wicked, who suffered torments, the prelude of the final penalty to follow the ultimate verdict of the Judge.

As to the person of the Messiah, the Jews after the Christian era considered that he was to be a mere man.[1] In the times that immediately preceded the birth of Jesus, it is certain that pre-existence was frequently ascribed to the Christ. This is clear from the apocryphal Book of Enoch, and the Fourth Book of Ezra. He was chosen, and hidden with God, before the world was made.[2] His glory is from everlasting to everlasting. The pre-existence and supernatural character of the Messiah were involved

[1] Justin, *Dial. c. Trypho*, c. 49. [2] Enoch, 48. 6.

in the accepted interpretation of the Book of Daniel. There is ground to conclude that, in the period referred to, there was a widely diffused conception of the Messiah as already existing, withdrawn from sight, in the heavens, and destined to appear visibly as man, endowed with supernatural gifts and qualities, a Ruler of spotless righteousness.[1]

The Talmudic writings admit the conception of sufferings as falling to the lot of the Messiah, and apply to him predictions of this character in the Prophets. But within the covers of the New Testament, there is no trace of any such expectation among the contemporaries of Jesus.[2] Nor do the other writings of that period afford any proof that such an idea was cherished.[3] The galling yoke of heathen rule to which the Jews were subject, the wide-spread spirit of legalism, and their moral condition in general, led them to yearn for a political Messiah. They fastened upon the prophetic imagery which fell in with their predilection, construed it as a literal description, and not as a poetic anticipation, and they passed by everything else of a different purport. Even the humble, and those who aspired after emancipation from sin, could not divest their minds of the idea that the Messiah was, literally speaking, to sit on the throne of David. John the Baptist, in the prison in which he had been immured by Herod Antipas, was perplexed by the fact that Jesus took a course so dissonant from the universal expectation, from which he appears not to have been wholly free. He sent his disciples with the inquiry: "Art thou he that should come, or look we for another?"[4]

[1] See Ewald, *Geschichte*, v. 68 seq.

[2] John i. 29 is a possible exception to this remark. See below, p. 429.

[3] See Schürer, p. 597 seq.

[4] Matt. xi. 3; Luke vii. 19, 20. See below, p. 430.

We must not forget that there was a Judaism out of Palestine, which, if it affected the currents of Gentile thought, might also in turn be tinctured by them. It was at Alexandria, under the peculiar influences that belonged to that great meeting-place of the nations, that Jewish thought underwent the most serious modifications. There the Septuagint version was framed, the Bible of Greek-speaking Christians as well as Jews, down to the end of the first age of Christianity. There the canon took up those books, only one of which, Ecclesiasticus, is known to have been written in Hebrew, which are now commonly known under the name of Apocrypha, and which the Palestinian canon excluded. To commend the Alexandrian theology to the Jews of Palestine, "the Wisdom of Solomon" was written; just as the Book just named, "the Son of Sirach," sought to recommend the Palestinian doctrine to the Jews of Alexandria.[1]

Philo, the principal teacher of the Jewish philosophy that sprang up at Alexandria, was an old man in the year 40, when he headed a deputation of Jews to the Emperor Caligula. His birth must have occurred, therefore, not far from 20 B. C. His system is an amalgamation of Greek philosophy with the Old Testament theology; a combination of Plato and Moses, the tenets of whom he considered to be, in many points, identical.[2] The Greek sages, he held, were borrowers from the Hebrew teaching. This agreement he effected by the flexible method of allegorical interpretation, his theory being that an occult sense, open to the discerning, underlies the literal and historical meaning of the Scriptures, and is to be accepted in connection

[1] See Stanley, *Hist. of the Jewish Ch.*, iii. 296.

[2] For the literature upon Philo, see Schürer, p. 619, Ueberweg, *Hist. of Phil.* i. 225, Dorner, *Gesch. d. Lehre v. d. Person Christi*, i. 22, Lipsius, Art., *Alexandr. Religionsphil.*; in Schenkel's *Bibel-Lexicon*.

with it. Philo, like Plato, held that matter in its chaotic form is eternal, and that creation impresses upon it the pre-existing ideas, the patterns before the divine mind, through which the formless stuff of the world is turned into a cosmos. God is far above all contact with the world; He is the ineffable One, whose very attributes are an anthropomorphic conception. Between God Himself and the world, and intermediate between them, are the Powers, the instruments of divine agency and communication with the creation. Above them, and embracing them in some way, is the Logos, first immanent in God as the divine reason, and then emerging into emanent existence; in whom is the plan of the world, and through whom that plan is actualized in the cosmos. The Logos is the mediator between the absolute Deity, and created existences, bridging over this otherwise impassable gulf. He is the Son of God, the Archangel, the Paraclete.[1] The body perishes forever, but the soul is immortal. A vein of dualism, caught from the Greek schools, runs through the system of Philo, and taints his ethical doctrine. He shares only in a vague and general way in the Messianic expectation of his countrymen. The heathen, he thinks, will eventually be struck with shame at having presumed to exercise government over the Hebrews, their superiors in wisdom. The acme of devotional attainment is when the soul, in a kind of ecstasy holds communion with the Supreme Essence, without the mediating intervention of the Logos. Those gifted with this intuition, and rising to this exalted fellowship, are "the children of the father." Philo has no thought of an incarnation of the Logos. The Messiah is to be a

[1] It is a controverted point whether the Logos of Philo is a personification, or a person. The latter view is held by Dähne, Gfrörer, Semisch, Lücke, Ritter, and others. The reasons against it are given by Dorner, I., 22 n. 12, and by Lipsius, in the Article referred to above.

human personage. It should be observed that notwithstanding the Platonic influence, Philo found a point of connection and a foundation for his speculations relative to the Logos, in the bold and striking personifications of Wisdom in the books of Proverbs and Ecclesiastes, and in the Son of Sirach—personifications which approach the character of actual personality. The ideas of the Philonic school were widely diffused. Doubtless they were known in Judea, but they would be regarded with no favor by the austere guides of the people; nor is it possible that they could have penetrated to Nazareth, or within the humble circle of disciples which Jesus gathered about Him.

From the pages of Josephus and from the New Testament, one may derive a vivid picture of Palestine in the days of Jesus. Galilee, on the north, where His childhood and youth were passed, and the scene of a great part of His public labors, was a fertile and beautiful region. Especially was the lower part, lying westward of the lake, famed for its beauty, and for the rich variety of fruits and flowers that grew upon its soil. Josephus, in his autobiography, states that Galilee contained two hundred and forty cities and villages; and, in his History of the Jewish War, he says that every village contained at least fifteen thousand people.[1] Making all proper subtraction from this exaggerated estimate, we yet know that over this district was spread a dense, busy population. Somewhat less rigid than their orthodox brethren and the magnates of the nation at Judea, they were spoken of by the latter slightingly. Their intercourse with the heathen, partly in consequence of the fact that the great road for caravans between Damascus and Ptolemais passed through their land, exposed them to censure and suspicion. But the

[1] Vita, 45; B. J. III. iii. 2.

Galileans were ardent patriots; and their indomitable valor is lauded by Josephus.

Between Galilee and Jerusalem, unless the traveller took a circuitous route, was hated Samaria. Its inhabitants, denied the privilege of taking part in the rebuilding of the temple and in the national worship, after the Babylonian exile, did all that they could to frustrate the exertions of the Judean colonists. At length they erected on Mount Gerizim a temple of their own, and Manasseh, a Jewish priest, took charge of the services. This inflamed still more the mutual hostility of the neighboring peoples. "There be two manner of nations," says the Son of Sirach, "which my heart abhorreth; and the third is no nation: they that sit upon the mountain of Samaria [Mt. Seir], and they that dwell among the Philistines, and that foolish people that dwell in Sichem."[1] At length Hyrcanus razed the temple to the ground. The Samaritans still held to the law, and to the books of the Pentateuch, and looked for a Messiah who should be on their side, as it were, and confer honor on the mountain where they worshipped. They gave their sympathy, first, to the Syrian oppressors of Judea, and then to the Romans, whose subjugation of their Southern neighbors they beheld with pleasure.

The strong-hold of the Jewish nation was in Judea itself. There was the seat of theocratical authority. There was the sanctuary to which all pious Jews, from Rome to Babylon, sent up their gifts, and whither they streamed in countless multitudes to the great festivals.

No one can read Josephus without being profoundly impressed with the distracted condition of society, the confusion and distress, the passion and crime, that darkened the whole land of the Jews in the closing period of Herod's

[1] Son of Sirach, i. 25, 26.

reign. The people were held down by the overmastering strength of the Romans, and by the grim fortresses which the tyrant had erected in different places, to keep the discontented populace in subjection. When we turn from this troubled scene to the evangelical narratives, it is like beholding a star in the darkest night.